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iABSTRACT
Aviation maintenance errors account for between 13% and 23% of the global
aviation incidents and accidents initiators, which require a wider global use of aviation
maintenance safety improvement activities. The current research applies the Human Error
Risk Management in Engineering Systems (HERMES) methodology that conceptualizes
two main streams of study. These are the retrospective investigation of human errors
within aviation maintenance contexts, and a prospective innovation of new tools that
work to prevent errors occurring. In this research the impact of human reliability on
aviation maintenance safety is investigated. Rotorcraft is taken as a focal case study.
A new model to represent the accumulation of crucial maintenance human errors
causal factors, within aviation maintenance companies, is introduced. A total of 804
recent maintenance-induced helicopter accidents were reviewed, from which 58 fatal
accidents and serious incidents were thoroughly analysed using Human Factors Accident
Classification System - Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME). A 4th order of analysis is
newly introduced into the HFACS-ME taxonomy under the notion of ‘Specific Failures’
for better analysis resolution and comprehensiveness. Hypothesizing that human factors
errors within aviation maintenance industry can be more effectively managed by applying
proactive monitoring and early error detecting techniques - at both organizational and
individual levels, a proactive Aviation Maintenance Monitoring Process (AMMP) is
formulated. AMMP is a holistic hybrid retrospective / prospective integrated process that
is to be simultaneously and collectively implemented by main industry stake-holders -
regulators, manufacturers and maintenance organisations. The aim is to proactively
monitor the existence of human error causal factors that are initiated during design
practices, manufacturing processes, or at later stages due to workplace conditions. As a
result, such causal factors can be gradually eliminated to reduce the overall risk of
maintenance errors.
This generic AMMP model is based on a Root Cause Existence Scale (RCES) and
a comprehensive sociotechnical user program, coded as ‘ErroDetect’, built applying the
fuzzy Analytic Network Process (fuzzy ANP) theory. A total of 870 different assessment
criteria were designed and then in-built within the software thus mapping the outcomes of
the retrospective error causal factors investigative studies. Full simulation of the process
is conducted, and then it was further validated practically in real world within industry
for both design for maintainability within major rotorcraft manufacturer facilities, and for
MRO’s performance safety enhancement. Validation results were thoroughly discussed.
The AMMP is found to have significantly enhanced aircraft maintenance proactive safety
for both designers and maintainers. The tool can also be adopted for regulation purposes.
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PART ONE
FUNDAMENTAL AND FOCUSING
RESEARCH STUDIES
11 Introduction: Outlining This Research
In Aviation Maintenance Safety
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand,
more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success
than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Philosophizing this research in aviation safety
An absolute human reliability within complex sociotechnical systems has always
been questionable. Human errors within such contexts are vital, yet unpredictable.
Aviation maintenance, being critical environment for Human-Machine Interaction
(HMI), shares a range of 12% to 15% of the global aviation accidents initiators (Marx
and Graeber 1994, Patankar & Taylor 2004b). In this research, the impact of human
reliability on aviation maintenance safety is investigated. Rotorcraft maintenance is
taken as case study.
It is generally accepted that maintenance, as a dynamic HMI setting, attracts a
large proportion of human factors-induced problems. In fact, in aviation for instance, a
significant contribution of the technical causes of aviation accidents is attributed to
human factors in various levels within maintenance organizations. These levels cover
the base workforce of maintainers, middle supervisory body, and up to the higher
management (Gramopadhye and Drury 2000).
Reporting the state-of-the-art, it can be seen that aviation maintenance human
reliability and associated aircraft airworthiness have been the focus of many
philosophies and research works previously. Reason (2003) discussed the human
variability paradox when this variability acts – within complex human/ machine systems
– both as source of error and a vital defence of the system. He thus questioned: “How
can we limit one while still promoting the other?” In the same orientation, Hollnagel
(2007) showed that risk and safety are, by definitions, always linked together. He gave
the notion: “ Risk + barriers = Safety?” calling for higher safety acquirement through
risk elimination. This writer sees that one path to such risk elimination goes through the
pre-elimination of that risk’s causes in the first place.
2Human error is defined as”the failure of planned actions to achieve their desired
ends – without the intervention of some unforeseeable event” (Reason 1997). This
definition clearly separates the erroneous controllable actions from mere bad luck
attributes. It can thus be understood that human errors are typically associated with pre-
planned actions, especially within systems of higher complexity, where the human
element malfunctioned at some stages of the process. To this point, such a human error
may be considered as a cause for some later-induced malfunctioning within the system.
A good philosophy will then be the one that answers the question: Was that human error
a cause which led to the system malfunctioning or was it a consequence of that system’s
seen and hidden defects? This question still holds well when it comes to the aviation
maintenance context. The study of the human reliability within this industry is waited to
emphasise the understanding of the causes and propagation mechanisms of maintainers’
errors and the consequences of those errors on the overall aviation system safety.
In the same field, Reason (1997) explained that error, in general organizational
settings like those of the aviation maintenance, can be managed through two broad
strategies: Error reduction and error containment. Error reduction in turn encompasses
many techniques such as the augmentation of error detective procedures, error intrinsic
resistance enhancement, reduction of error liability regarding individuals or groups of
workers, reduction of error vulnerability of particular tasks or task elements, and the
elimination of error-producing (and violation producing) factors within the work place.
Literature is rich with plethora of theories and concepts discussing human
reliability and associated error causal factors that always trigger incidents and accidents
within safety-critical systems. The main characteristics of such safety occurrences - by
definition - are their randomness, rare predictability, sophisticated yet vague sequence
of propagation. Such characteristics can basically allow for retrospective analysis of
these occurrences and their causes at various sectors and levels within industry such that
the re-occurrence margins are reduced if not totally eliminated. The major drawback of
such reactive treatment is the high social and economic cost that must be paid through
the learning process. On the other hand, prospective research on human–centred safety
is also furnished using numerous techniques that are mainly framed taking Probability
Risk Assessment (PRA), including human reliability, as a corner stone. However,
within these efforts, the quantification of human error probabilities as major part of such
3proactive safety techniques had always faced serious limitations (Richei et. al. 2001).
Thus, a proper solution would undoubtedly be one that can collectively combine
advantages from both the pre-discussed main streams of safety analysis, and avoid their
limiting features. The purpose of this work is to introduce such a tool.
1.1.2 This chapter
This chapter gives an overall insight to this research, it discusses in brief
motives and rationale, objectives, originality, methodology, and general layout of this
thesis. The following paragraphs, as well, discuss major advances and gaps in the field
of human error treatment in general and in aviation maintenance in particular.
1.2 Research background and problem identification
1.2.1 Research milieu and rationale
It has been estimated that for every one hour of flight, 12 man-hours of
maintenance occur (Hobbs 2008). With such a colossal maintenance work span, the pre-
indicated 12% to 15% of maintenance errors involvement in accidents is not surprising.
This range almost doubles when serious incidents, developable into accidents, are
included. Further, Goglia (2002) stated that of the fourteen Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) approved FAR-121 carrier hull losses that had occurred previously on USA registered
aircrafts, seven had been implicated by maintenance shortfalls. Moreover, 19.1% of engine in-
flight shutdowns were caused by maintenance errors (Marx 1998). Financially,
maintenance errors have been estimated to be involved in 50% of engine-related aircraft
delays and cancellations (Marx and Graeber 1994). This is of enormous financial
penalties when it is realized that for a large aircraft such as a Boeing 747-400, a cancelled
flight can cost the operating airline around USD $140,000, whilst a gate delay can cost USD
$17,000 per hour on average (Hobbs 2008). Such statistics undeniably call for a wider
aviation maintenance safety and efficiency improvement activities.
Human factor-induced error in aviation maintenance has been managed so far
through several systems and procedures. Some of these are the Maintenance Resource
Management (MRM), duplicate inspections, various reporting systems, multiple
oversight groups, and many others (Van der Schaaf 1991, Patankar & Taylor 2004a, b,
Hall 2005a). Albeit these efforts and advances have had their positive influence, the
issue still calls for extra focusing.
41.2.2 Why Helicopters?
Helicopter flight performance is still far from achieving its expected safety
goals. The number of fatalities in helicopter accidents during the last ten years for off-
shore transportation and seismic operations is 10.6 and 58.5 times, respectively, that of
commercial airlines per million hours of flight (Shell 2005). This is a clear indication of
the high severity of helicopter accidents outcomes given the highly sophisticated and
demanding operational roles that they perform. It is also found that 31% of the total
helicopter accidents probable causes were technical where at least one component of the
aircraft fractured or malfunctioned (Atkinson and Irving 1995). A significant proportion
of such technical causes of helicopter accidents and serious incidents are in fact
attributed, in their upper streams within organizations’ higher managements, to
maintenance human factors as well. Technical safe -guard monitoring systems such as
Health and Usage Monitoring (HUM), Vibration and Health Monitoring (VHM), and
Engine Vibration Monitoring System (EVMS) were thus introduced and managed to
reduce the technical malfunctioning of the helicopter critical parts. Operational aspects
have also been addressed recently through the Helicopter Operations Monitoring
Program (HOMP).
Further, helicopter maintenance errors acquire higher criticality due to naturally
associated rotorcraft characteristics, some of these being the single route to failure
regarding the transmission and rotor systems, limited envelope of emergency
manoeuvres, and high vulnerability to impact (Hessmer 2001). Lastly, the vast majority
of the previous works often investigated maintenance errors and their roles in promoting
aviation accidents from the fixed-wing aircraft perspective, this highly motivated this
research to investigate the case of rotorcrafts.
1.2.3 The gap
Human errors in aviation maintenance are generally discussed through two main
approaches: Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and Human Error Classification (HEC).
HRA, as part of the PRA theory, has always faced its quantification limitations, while
HEC approach has always been described as behavioural, contextual, or conceptual in
nature. It is thus concluded that the most obvious response to a human error is to
identify its causal mechanisms and alter the system such that that error is not repeated
(Latorella, and Prabhu 2000).
5For aviation maintenance, tools to handle such mechanisms included
maintenance resources management sessions, duplicate inspections schemes, various
reporting systems, multiple over-sight groups, and many others, but nevertheless, each
of these has its inbuilt limiting features as will be thoroughly discussed throughout this
thesis. Consequently, this issue still requires more focusing. In addition, there is a fresh
general industrial tendency to start a shift towards ‘proactive safety’ after the long
saturated treatment of reactive accidents and incident investigations and the usually
safety recommendations that expectedly follow. The call for this emerging philosophy
has been reinforced by many writers (Braithwaite et al. 1998, Liou et al. 2007, Edwards
2007, Shyur 2008).. Further, In contrast to helicopters, some studies in the maintenance
error causation were already carried out for the commercial fixed wing aviation. No
previous studies concerning human errors initiation and propagation within rotorcraft
maintenance industry could be found within literature. This research claims to be the
first thus-oriented.
Summing this up, it is high time now to introduce a maintenance-monitoring
tool devoted mainly to address the human contributing factors, and to detect early their
potential error root causes and risks during helicopter maintenance practices.
1.2.4 Problem identification
In this research the Root Causes (RC) of human errors during helicopter
maintenance are targeted. Once these root causes have been determined, an Aviation
Maintenance Monitoring Process (AMMP)’ may be introduced. This intended AMMP
is a proactive monitoring procedural tool that is to be integrated within the current
maintenance industry activities in order to detect existence or over peaking of
maintenance error root causes, thus eventually trapping and damping down human
errors during maintenance practices. The research also addresses two other aspects of
human factors affecting aviation maintenance in general and helicopter maintenance in
particular, namely the scientific (procedural) determination of both the ‘Independent
Inspection Items’ as required by the regulators (European Aviation Safety Agency -
EASA), and the ‘Maintenance error - prone features’ of a given type as recommended
by manufacturers. The overall output can then be processed as feedback into design
phase and within maintenance workplace for further aviation safety enhancement.
61.3 Overview of research aim, objectives, and questions
1.3.1 Research aims
The target of this research work is to introduce new theory and applications that
can bridge the aforementioned gaps by answering their associated questions. Major
aims can thus be listed as follows:
1. Introduction of a new high resolution collective classification scheme to analyze
human errors that occur during aviation maintenance, and use of other associated
tools to precisely identify root causes of those human errors that develop within
aviation maintenance, with particular focus to helicopter maintenance practices.
2. Introduction of new multiple intermeshing models and tools to study and assess
the existence of root causes that induce human errors within aviation maintenance
contexts such that these root causes could be proactively eliminated to enhance
aviation safety.
3. The targeted tools should be applicable by various aviation industry stakeholders.
1.3.2 Research objectives
The above mentioned strategic aims of the research are sought through the
achievement of the following objectives:
1. To study current human factors models, error management systems, and
classification schemes when being applied to aviation maintenance.
2. To identify the root causes that induce or contribute to human errors that can
develop during any of the aviation maintenance practices at both organizational
and individual levels. Rotorcrafts are taken as case application.
3. To establish an industry-oriented AMMP comprising procedures to:
a. Monitor and detect early the potential root causes of maintenance errors that
can be initially triggered during aircrafts design phase, or can exist as hidden
conditions within workplace contexts at aviation Maintenance, Repair, and
Overhaul (MRO) organizations.
b. Provide scientific procedures and practices to specify the ‘Independent
Inspection Items’ category tasks for any given type maintenance program.
c. Detect and assess any maintenance error - prone design features of any given
aircraft type.
74. To verify the integrity of the developed process within the helicopter design,
manufacturing, and maintenance industries with the aim of an overall aviation
safety improvement.
1.3.3 Research questions and hypotheses
The idea, scope, and context of this research can be further illuminated through
the following questions and adopted hypotheses.
1.3.3.1 Research questions
This research tries to establish scientific precise answers to a number of
questions that are direct manifestation of the pre-discussed gaps in the knowledge pool
of aviation maintenance human error causation and propagation, some of these
questions are:
1. What are the effects of human factors – based errors in aviation as general and in
helicopter maintenance in particular? How deeply they affect aviation safety?
2. What are the existing methods and techniques that address human errors during
helicopter maintenance, what is the industry response towards them, and what
are the gaps that are to be further addressed?
3. What are the root causes of human errors during helicopter maintenance
practices? Can any safety margins be assigned to the rate or frequency of
existence of each of these root causes?
4. Can helicopter maintenance practices be proactively monitored for existence
and/ or over-peaking of these root causes in order to prevent or damp their
consequent human errors? Can such proactive monitoring procedure be
integrated within the industry’s existing maintenance practices?
5. Can aviation safety in general and helicopter safety in particular be further
enhanced by introducing procedures to determine the ‘Independent Inspection
Items’ and the ‘Human Error – prone Features’ during maintenance practices
and aircraft design phases respectively?
81.3.3.2 Research hypotheses
As a research in the air accident and incident causation field, this study adopts
the below stated hypotheses and works to verify them:
Hypothesis 1
‘Human factors errors within aviation maintenance industry can be more effectively
managed by applying proactive monitoring and early detecting techniques of error root
causes at both organizational and individual levels.’
Hypothesis 2
‘An aviation maintenance task can be executed at a significantly higher level of safe
performance such that human-induced undesired outcomes would almost be nil if
possibilities of human error that can be initiated due to any design features associated
with that task are eliminated’.
Hypothesis 3
‘An aviation MRO can operate at a significantly higher level of safe performance such
that human-induced undesired outcomes would almost be nil if the existing unseen
accumulation of mutually- interrelated root causes that lead to maintenance human
errors are eliminated’.
1.4 Overview of research methodology
The current work applies the Human Error Risk Management for Engineering
Systems (HERMES) methodology first introduced by Cacciabue (2004a,b) for
analyzing the HMI in complex contexts. This methodology is structured in a number of
steps to preserve the basic requirements of congruence and consistency between both
types of retrospective and prospective studies as well as to underpin the correspondence
between recurrent HMI analysis and practical system safety and integrity. The
retrospective (investigative) and prospective (predictive) phases of the methodology are
highly mutually inter-linked with huge volume of data exchange taking place in
between.
In this research, the impact of human reliability on aviation maintenance safety
is investigated. A comprehensive literature review is conducted to explore the
limitations of quantitative approaches in addressing maintenance human factors issues,
as well as to discuss various concepts and tools furnished for predicting and monitoring
maintenance safety variables. A new model to represent the initiation and propagation
9of crucial maintenance error within aviation maintenance environment is introduced as
the ‘Swamp’ model. This led to the introduction of the industrial proactive AMMP.
AMMP is a holistic hybrid retrospective/ prospective integrated process that may be
simultaneously and collectively implemented by main industry stakeholders: regulators,
manufacturers and aviation maintenance organizations. The aim is to proactively
monitor the existence of human error causal factors that are initiated during design
practices, manufacturing processes, or at later stages due to workplace or workforce
conditions. As a result, such causal factors can be gradually eliminated to reduce the
overall risk of maintenance errors.
This generic AMMP model is based on a Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES)
and a comprehensive socio-technical user program built applying the fuzzy Analytic
Network Process (fuzzy ANP) theory (Dagdeviren & Kurt 2008). A total of 870
different assessment criteria were designed and then in-built within the software thus
mapping the outcomes of the retrospective error causal factors investigative studies.
1.5 Key results and contributions of this research
1.5.1 Key outputs
This research worked to achieve its announced objectives through accurate
application of the HERMES methodology. The following deliverables are claimed to
be satisfied:
1. Mechanisms of aviation maintenance error initialization and propagation are
totally understood. On top, new models are introduced within the research to set
the scene for further achievements in this field.
2. The AMMP is introduced as a strategic concept comprising practical tools to
proactively eliminate root causes of maintenance errors. Further more, this
process, with its dedicated software coded ErroDetect, can be utilized to help
practitioners scientifically identifying the ‘Duplicate Inspection’ lists for each
aircraft type as well as enhancing the design for maintainability process in much
earlier stages.
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3. All the three above mentioned hypotheses are verified to be true. Details are
discussed through out this thesis chapters including the final conclusions.
4. The current research enjoys several elements of originality as well as multiple
series of new introductions as will be better discussed within the following
chapters. A final brief listing of these novelties can also be seen within the
research final conclusions.
1.5.2 Contribution to knowledge
The current research claims to have added the following contributions to the
pool of human knowledge in the field of aviation maintenance human factors:
1. Setting bases of new knowledge of maintenance error causes initiation and
propagation that comprised the introduction of the generic Maintenance Error
History (MEH) and Swamp models.
2. Introducing AMMP strategic concept and its tools for proactive treatment of
aviation maintenance errors, thus significantly improving aviation safety.
3. Introducing new algorithms within fuzzy logic arithmetic to resemble the role of
expert’s systems, thus significantly elevating practicality and flexibility of such
fuzzy ANP applications.
1.6 Thesis Structure
This thesis is composed of 10 chapters covering all activities carried out as
governed by the adopted methodology. The thesis is laid in four successive parts
mapping the various folds of the methodology. Figure 1.1 illustrates the general layout
of this thesis put in contrast to the various stages of the applied methodology.
Part one of the thesis comprises the first three chapters that exhibit fundamental
studies required both by the methodology as well as the research academic terms of
conduct. Chapter 1 is an introductory opening to the conceptualization of the research
theory and practices. It illuminates the overall spectrum of the research design, and
reflects some of its outcomes. Chapter 2 consults a significantly large number of
previous publications taking aviation safety, accidents and incidents causation, aviation
maintenance, human factors, and human error as major leading keywords. The generic
notions and speculations of research methodologies are examined within Chapter 3 that
discusses and describes the front-end design of this research. The selection of HERMES
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methodology to incorporate this research is abundantly justified within this chapter as
well. The thorough literature review in Chapter 2 is the central mast of the fundamental
foundation stage on which the adopted methodology is built.
Figure 1-1 General arrangement of the thesis structure as indicated by the applied methodology
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The Second part of the theses is the manifestation of the retrospective studies
folder of the methodology. Successive three chapters form this part. Chapter 4 deeply
explores the sociotechnical environments within the aviation maintenance industry.
Elongated ethnographic studies, in the course of which this writer recalls his two
decades of participant observation experience, summed out most of the ins and outs of
this industry. Maintenance task design techniques are also present. The fifth chapter
investigates multiple mechanisms of aviation maintenance initiation, propagation, and
consequences. Chapter 6 sums findings of the previous chapters in order to furnish the
most optimum techniques that can be implemented as proactive solutions to the
standing problem.
The prospective phase of the methodology activities are covered by the next
three chapters of Part Three. Chapter 7 starts the innovative introduction of error
management models as well as the strategic concept of the AMMP. Chapter 8 is fully
dedicated to the mathematical formulation of the AMMP tools through enlarged fuzzy
analytical network processes, while Chapter 9 explains the overall building of the
AMMP tools and their simulation and verification processes with total reference to
industry. Part four encompasses the last tenth chapter, which is a conclusive one that
provides overall strategic analysis of the research methods and findings. Conclusions
and recommendations for further works are then furnished as the final crease of the
thesis.
1.7 Chapter summary
This chapter highlighted the outlines of this research in aviation maintenance
safety. Main aspects of the research rationale, aims, objectives applied methodology are
paraded an in-built part within the overall conceptualization of the advocated research
itself. The importance, relevance, rigorousness, and innovativeness chances associated
with the spotted research gaps were listed .This is coupled with brief presentation of
salient results and contribution features.
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2 Literature Review: Searching For
Researchable Gaps
“Research is to see what everybody else has seen,
and to think what nobody else has thought”
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, 1937 Nobel Prize for Medicine, 1893-1986.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Review targets and scope
This research’s front end design activities were started by acquiring the basic
know-how of successful sociotechnical research implementation. This was achieved
through methodical digestion of relevant literature, experts’ consultation, as well as
close interaction with industry. The main purposes of this literature review were to
obtain the basic knowledge and to update existing information on various related topics
that form the background for this research. By knowing the scope and orientations of
the recent / current works in the aviation safety generally and helicopter maintenance in
particular, the gaps to be addressed are more likely to be exposed and thus treated. The
review also scans a wide range of relative methods and techniques applicable to the
research as well as highlighting various data sources and analytical tools.
The scope of this review, more precisely, covers areas of relevance such as
aviation accidents and incidents causation, safety concepts, organizations and safety,
aviation maintenance goals, techniques, and over- sighting. Other basic streams covered
by the review address the
elements of human factors,
human errors in maintenance,
individual and organizational
errors, human factors models
and frameworks, human risk
and reliability concepts, and
human factors errors in
helicopter maintenance in
narrower focusing. Figure 2-1 Figure 2-1 Conceptual scoping of the literature review
for the current research
Broad Safety
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Aviation Safety
Aviation
Maintenance
Maintenance
Human Factors
Current H F
Developments
Researchable
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gives a conceptual representation of this review. In this figure, mutual influence is
witnessed between each two successive zones in both inward and outward radial
directions.
2.1.2 Research review methodology
As a part of the main research methodology, an inter-connected sequence of
practices was conducted to set the main design of the proposed study. This sequence, as
illustrated by Figure 2.2 included a main enlarged initial literature review for further
familiarisation with subject field, appreciation of current knowledge stock, and scanning
for viable research gaps. The importance, relevance, rigorousness, and innovativeness
chances associated with the
spotted research gaps were
verified to demonstrate high
levels of required research
scholarship and methodological
excellence. The main theoretical
hypothesis was then set, followed
by research aim and objectives.
These objectives were then
resolved through careful
scientific interpretation into
research questions. Main features
and capabilities of the required
methodology to answer these
questions were then determined. Figure 2-2 Literature review as a main stream of the
research methodology
2.1.3 Review focus
As a genuine part of this methodology, a focussed continuous process of
knowledge-updating took place throughout the successive research stages as designed.
This comprised a variety of information and data sources. However, the dominant part
of this update was an unbroken follow-up to emerging literature within the whole
industry that discussed maintenance human factors. This is also indicated by Figure 2.2.
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2.2 Aviation safety
2.2.1 Aviation incidents and accidents: Trends and causation
A recent statistical study by Boeing (2004) showed a total of 1371 commercial
fleet aircraft fatal accidents worldwide for the years 1959 to 2003. The study further
emphasized the fact that although the overall rate of fatal accidents is declining but the
overall number of fatalities is growing due to the vast expansion of the world
commercial air lift capabilities. Similar statistical behaviour of aviation accidents trends
was also observed by EASA (2006). A moving 10-year average of commercial airliner
fatal accidents worldwide is calculated to be 36 accidents that resulted in 1005 fatalities
per year.
According to Patankar and Taylor (2004 b), it is widely accepted that about 12%
to 15 % of all commercial aviation accidents are attributed to human errors that occur
during maintenance tasks execution. The authors also showed that maintenance
activities can account for as much as 20% of an operator's direct operating costs and
have remained at this level for many years. Additionally, errors in the maintenance
process can impact on aircraft safety. The occurrence of a need for unscheduled
maintenance can introduce costly delays and cancellations if the problem cannot be
rectified in a timely manner. Hale et al (1997) discussed variety of factors contributing
to accidents in complex safety-critical systems such as aviation, they gave thorough
presentation of the nature, goals, and methods of pro-analysis of safety events. They
also concluded that generic social characteristics like shame, blame and liability usually
have vital role in shaping the overall organizational safety culture.
Aviation accidents are defined in many different ways in accordance with the
definer’s interests and intellectual requirements. Strauch (2002) presented many of
those, including the official definition of aviation accident given by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO): “An occurrence associated with the operation of
an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the
intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which: a
person is fatally injured, or the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure, or the
aircraft is missing or completely inaccessible”. Other government or international
agencies use similar definitions, even though specific to the particular domain. It is well
accepted that a better understanding of accidents causation scenarios allows for better
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development of preventive measures (Pajan et al. 2006). Various factors and conditions
were highlighted throughout literature as causal contributors to aviation accidents. In
this regard, increased sleepiness, physical and mental fatigue, and decreased
performance initiative were discussed by Tvaryanas et al (2006).
Matthews (2002) examined the relationship of 17 broad indicators of social,
economic, and political conditions to hull-loss aviation accident rates in 164 countries
and 13 regions. He confirmed that national wealth is a major factor among several
others that correlate with national and regional accidents rates. His core finding was that
broad social and economic factors and general measures of the state of governance are
strongly correlated with aviation safety.
Li, Wen-Chin and Harris (2006) provided an understanding, based on empirical
evidence, of how actions and decisions at higher levels in the organization result in
operational errors and accidents. Organizational processes, in deeper analysis, comprise
root causal factors promoting accidents from initial stages of the design phase.
Kinnersley and Roelen (2007) investigated the validity of the claim that 60% of
accidents root causes arise in the design stages. Their results later showed that for
aviation and nuclear industries accidents, about 50% have a root cause in design which
is, still, a significant score. The rates in both industries (being 51% and 46%
respectively) are remarkably similar. Additionally, it is showed that while quantification
of rail data was not so consistent, but design was a major contributor to main recent rail
accidents. Vast number of publications attributes aviation accidents, as well as accidents
in similar safety-critical industries, to human factors associated with personnel activities
and / or personnel existence in-built within those systems (BASI 1997, Adams2006).
Oppositely, Australia’s fatal accident rates for fixed wing aviation is generally
stable, while the rate for private aviation there is further declining for the period 2001 to
2005, this positive aviation safety record is attributed to a set of conditions and policies
that significantly enhanced the Australian aviation safety performance (ATSB 2006,
2007a, Braithwaite et al. 1998).
2.2.2 Broad safety concepts and functionalities
In a broad conceptual definition, Petersen and Aase (2007) interpreted safety as
“a collective competence that is learned and maintained in local workplace”. Patankar
and Taylor (2004b), more previously, gave similar brief definitions of safety in general
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context such as: “safety is freedom from risk”, and also “safety is management of risk
within a value that is acceptable by the society”. They indicated, particularly addressing
the aviation safety issue, that there are three main categories of safety to consider:
a. Personal safety: Usually refers to personal injuries happen to individuals while at
work on ground. This is a ground safety committee’s duty to consider.
b. Aircraft safety: Issues encompassing incidents such as incorrect or incomplete
repair, incorrect documentation, or ground damage to aircraft outside of the
‘chocks – off’ to ‘chocks – on’ period. This is an airworthiness committee focus.
c. Flight safety: Includes events that occur between ‘chock - off ‘and ‘chock- on’
essentially, that is the duration of a flight. Hence, such events affect both aircraft
and individuals, a flight safety committee concern.
To face the increasing pressure for further efficiency and growth in both
passenger and freight traffic volumes, a high level of safety in air transport must be
maintained. The development of a safety management system is recommended in order
to develop appropriate measures to ensure that safety and security targets are set and
optimised for all the areas of the air transport system (EU-JRC 2003).
De Graff (2001) predicted that as the air transport industry will continue to
grow, the public perception will be focussing on total accidents and fatalities rather than
the relative safety that the industry is achieving now. Further ambitious new aviation
safety targets are being set which will certainly require more improved knowledge of
accidents causes and better understanding of the effects of new technologies and
procedures. In the same direction, Sanfourche (2001) highlighted that a ‘Vision 2020’
Position Paper gives an overall prediction of the near aviation future as: “In 2020 the
skies are safer than ever because safety has remained the top priority of the aircraft
builders and operators and of air traffic managers”. To actually keep safety as a
permanent top priority as planned, Sanfourche recommended that various contributing
parts of the aviation industry: Aircraft, engines, equipment, air traffic management,
communications, navigation, surveillance, airports, maintenance, pilot training, human
factors and other aspects should be collectively and legitimately kept at optimum
standards regarding safety.
Hollnagel (2007) analysed the common safety model that is based upon
eliminating system hazards, preventing incidents and accidents triggers, and protecting
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against bad outcomes. He further discussed the various physical, functional, symbolic,
and incorporeal types of barriers necessary for both prevention and protection safety
strategies mentioned.
2.2.3 Individual and organizational errors
According to Reason (1997), there are two types of accidents: those that happen
to individuals and those that happen to organizations. Organizational accidents, though
very rare, but they are often catastrophic and have adverse effects on uninvolved
population, assets, and the environment. They always take place within complex
modern technologies such as nuclear power plants, commercial aviation, petrochemical
industry, marine and rail transport. Reason (1997) indicated that there must be some
underlying principles of accident causation, and that organizational accidents may be
truly accidents in the way in which the various contributing factors combine to cause
the bad outcome, but there is nothing accidental about the existence of these precursors,
nor in the conditions that created them. This theory can be highly illustrated through the
hazards, defences, and losses relationship as shown in Figure 2.3.
Defences
Figure 2-3 Relation between hazards, defences, and losses (Reason 1996)
This theory adopts the idea that all organizational accidents entail the breaching
of barriers and safeguards that separate damaging and injurious hazards from vulnerable
people or assets (collectively termed as losses). This theory is so famously known as the
‘Swiss Cheese’ model of accident causation. The barriers mentioned can be breached by
three types of factors: human, technical, or organizational. These form the overall
accidents background. These factors are totally governed by two processes common to
all technological organizations: production and protection. The ‘Swiss Cheese’ model
was recently revisited by many safety professionals including Reason himself (Reason
et. al. 2006) who concluded that this model, though widely used, has its limitations in
Hazards Losses
Dangers
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the practical field where the concept of barrier provides only one of the few
opportunities to model interaction and complexity in high risk domains.
Le Coze (2008) discussed the organizational dimension in accident scenarios
and their following investigations. He analysed various theories and models utilized to
pinpoint the ever challenging organizational inputs that – unintentionally- set path to
undesired safety occurrences. Le Coze introduced a graphical classification that helps
locating appropriate approaches to tackle each event through adopting ‘the model that
should fit the data’ or the ‘data that should fit the model’ principles extracted from the
human and social sciences theorising and interpreting process. Events investigation
usually follows a backwards orientation in the time scale through various levels of the
organization. This is illustrated by Figure 2-4 below.
Figure 2-4 Events investigation at higher and lower levels of organizations
(reproduced from Le Coze 2008)
Many writers (Yeray et al.2002, Fogarty 2004, Etienne 2007, Grabowiski 2007)
call for developing better understanding of ‘organizational accidents’ and to transfer the
overall knowledge of organizational reliability from the retrospective post-accident
analysis to a more proactive procedures. It is assumed that the safety management
process is influenced, together with other factors, by the type of understanding held
when humans try to identify the ways leading to optimum safety management. If further
efficiencies and better productivity are expected in the near future from the aviation
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maintenance sector for instance, then this must not come at the cost of reduced safety
margins. This can be achieved by thorough digestion of compiled variables such as
moral, psychological health, turnover intentions, and error management. Thus active
intervention strategies can be built to avoid future adverse occurrences.
A similar argument is given by Korvers and Sonnemans (2008), they showed
that reoccurring disruptions during daily operations were present in the path of a large
number of accidents recently occurred in the process industries. The reoccurring
disruptions can be seen as pre-warning signals. Their existence forms a gap with the
common proactive safety indicators. This gap is represented by the information already
available in daily operation, of which it is unknown (to the local assessor) that it may
lead to unsafe situation or accident. The authors thus suggested that these reoccurring
events should be analysed, weighed, and then included in the safety indicators list of the
given organization.
Patankar and Taylor (2004b) defined organizational norms as “the unwritten
rules, the way things are actually done”. Some of these norms are positive, but most of
them are negative. Aviation maintenance personnel are quite resourceful and take pride
in being able to do their job. So when their company is unable to provide them with the
ideal equipment or manpower, they improvise. For example, a company may have a
policy that require the mechanics to use wing-walkers before they push back an aircraft
from gate, however, in reality the company may never allocate enough people to allow
for wing-walkers, therefore, the organizational norm is formed. In majority instances,
such norms may not result in any undesirable consequences, however, such actions do
perpetuate the continued use of improper practices and tools.
2.2.4 Organizational safety culture
Merritt and Helmreich (1995) defined culture as “the values, believes, rituals,
symbols and behaviours that we share with others that help define us as a group,
especially with relation to other groups”. Culture gives cues and clues on how one can
behave in normal and novel situations, thereby making a system encompasses that
culture less uncertain and more predictable. The authors further defined two layers of
culture: The surface structure that contains the open observable behaviours and
‘outlook’ such as uniforms, signs, logos, and documents. The deep structure which is
the core part of the culture that consists of the values, believes, and assumptions
21
forming the base for surface structure and draw the outlines that shape the members
behaviours. As a result, it is the organizational culture which eventually crafts the
perception, relative importance, and member’s activities regarding safety.
Reason (1997) further indicated that organizations can be positioned within a
theoretical two polar safety space. An organization’s position within the safety space is
determined by the quality of the processes used to combat its operational hazard. The
two extreme poles of this safety space is that an organization being either of high
resistance or high vulnerability to withstand operational hazards. The closer the position
of the organizational behaviour to the resistance pole, the more safely is its overall
performance. This exactly applies to maintenance organizations. This is illustrated by
Figure 2.5.
Figure 2-5 The safety space and location of organizations within it (Reason 1997)
Many investigative works (McDonald et al.2000, Reiman 2007, Gill and
Shergill 2004, Choudhry et al. 2007) studied the relation between safety culture and
applied SMS’s in various aviation MRO’s, emphasis was drawn to how different
organizations manage safety and the position of human factors within that management.
Differences in safety attitudes and climate were found between various occupational
groups even within the same organization. It is argued that when complexity of work,
technology, and social environment increases, the significance of the most implicit
features of organizational culture (as a means of work coordination and achieving safety
and effectiveness of the activities) also increases. The common attributes of safety
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culture usually comprise good organizational communication, good organizational
learning, high individual responsibility, and high senior management commitment to
safety (Sorensen 2002, Kind 2004). Li, Wen-Chin et al. (2008) hypothesized that
different cultures will show different patterns in shaping causes that lead to accidents.
Reiman and Oedewald (2007) studied the organizational assessment in sociotechnical
systems. They showed that current models of safety management are largely based on
either a rational or non-contextual image of an organization, and the sociotechnical
systems are socially constructed dynamic cultures. It is concluded that: to assess a
complex sociotechnical system, an organization’s core task must be appreciated and
understood as a base on which to build the system’s effectiveness and safety.
Wilpert (2007) raised the question of where should the system boarders be when
it comes to the safety culture issues. He then derived a conclusion that safety related
regulatory bodies and their regulatory styles are usually genuine parts of the safety
critical system under analysis due to their indisputable influence on other input
variables, thus the usual reduction of the regulator role when adjusting the safety
equation of a system, aviation maintenance for instance, is undoubtedly questionable. In
an addition to the importance of the regulation process, Arocena et al. (2007) found that
the emphasis of the innovative dimensions of prevention activities, the intensive use of
quality management tools, and the empowerment of workers are all factors contributing
to reduce injuries. On contrast, the implementation of flexible production processes is
associated with higher rates of accidents.
Organizational climate, on the other hand, is analysed by many authors
throughout the last 20 years. It is being gradually but consistently absorbed, as a
concept, by different sectors and levels of industry (Haukelid 2007, Zhou et al 2007,
and Pousette2007). Dov (2007) defined the organizational climate as the shared
perceptions between members of an organization regarding its elementary properties of
policies, procedures and practices. This climate can further be furnished to lower sub-
organizational and even to group climate. Safety climate, in this regard, is a particular
sub-division that is greatly influenced by the overall complimentary surrounding
organizational climate. In the same orientation, Hahn and Murphy (2007) gave a similar
definition of the safety climate: They showed that such climate represents a background
for the day to day operational practices, and that the commonly-shared perceptions
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amongst an organisation’s staff are usually driven from main input factors including
management decisions, safety norms, and the overall organizational expectations.
2.2.4.1 Safety culture change
Taylor and Christensen (1998) discussed the organizational safety change. They
showed that management must work especially hard to shrug-off its traditional time-
consuming model of safety enhancement that only takes local improvements in
isolation. Instead, management must reach for a larger point of view that keeps the best
of the old, but puts it firmly within context of whole-system thinking. Two very
different choices face maintenance management as shown in the Table 2.1.
Table 2-1 Choices for maintenance management (Taylor and Christensen 1998)
Mechanistic Practices Systemic Practices
 Treating people as extension of
aircrafts, as tools
 Seeking to optimize technology
 Maximum task breakdown, narrow
specialization working in isolation
 People as expandable, easily
replaceable spare parts
 External controls: supervisors, outside
experts, procedures
 Tall organization chart, autocratic
style
 Organization’s purpose only
 Discouraging innovation, initiative
 Completion, gamesmanship
 Treating people as complementary to
mechanical things, as masters
 Seeking joint optimization: social and
technical systems
 Optimum task grouping, multiple,
broad skills, working in teams
 People as key resources with further
potential
 Internal controls: self regulating sub-
systems
 Flattened organizational chart,
participative style
 Member’s and society’s purposes too
 Encouraging innovation, careful
experimentation
 Collaboration, team work
Grote (2007b) called for ‘safe’ organizational change regarding safety. She
noted that some organisational changes which are not directly related to risk and safety
management issues within an organization may eventually turn to be very safety-related
events at a time. These changes may be of objective nature such as workload
distribution, or of subjective nature such as motivation. Based on that, the assessment of
an organization’s risks should always make room for change management during large
organizational changes. In a wider industrial context, Cooke (2002) argued that
organizational change may lead to the requirement of new maintainers’ skills, and that
interpersonal skill may be an important skill element required.
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2.2.5 Safety measures
The literature shows many ways of measuring various safety aspects within
aviation as well as other safety critical domains. Hobbs and Williamson (1999)
surveyed the Australian aviation maintenance personnel regarding safety understanding
and practicalities. Statistical results showed that the most witnessed unsafe acts among
the maintenance workforce are procedures shortcuts, misunderstandings, and memory
laps. In fact most of the surveyed population considered that it was sometimes
necessary to ‘bend the rules’ to get the job done. Further, the maintenance workforce
mostly referred to issues of pressure, fatigue, coordination and training as causal factors
leading to safety occurrences. In a similar approach Ayomoh and Oke (2006) applied
the Hybrid Structural Interaction Matrix (HSIM) tool to prioritize safety parameters in
an organization. The technique was introduced to overcome the previous drawbacks of
similar ideas, mainly through easier application and reduced subjectivity.
Many models have been introduced as well to measure variables of aviation
safety with main concentration on commercial airlines (Villera et al 1999, Liou et al
2007, Shyur 2008, WHO 2006, ATSB 2005). The basic straightforward technique for
measuring safety variables (and thus identifying various locations of organisations,
nations, or regions within the safety space) is the direct gathering and analysis of
statistical data that directly or indirectly influences safety. Such data may include hours
flown, departures, passenger movements, aircrafts movements in airports, aircrafts ages,
personnel licensing (flight / maintenance) , number and rates of accidents, fatal
accidents percentages and fatalities records, airprox incidents, etc. Safety - in broad
understanding - can also be evaluated for existence by observing the interrelationships
between various civil system sectors such as health, transport, environment, and
industry stakeholders.
Nielsen et al (2007) discussed various techniques used to measure both safety
culture and safety climate at long and short time intervals respectively. In a deeper
context, Cabrera et al. (2007) introduced a new cultural measuring instrument focussing
on organizational practices relative to the safety management systems. The core of this
tool is based upon a 7-dimensional questionnaire that surveys the empirical structure of
safety culture values and practices. The model is elaborated around four quadrants
representing organizational culture or models that show shared different values of the
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organization life, these are: human relations model (clan culture), open system model
(adhocracy culture), internal process model (hierarchy culture), and finally rational goal
model (market culture). Safety climate, in the other hand, is also subjected to various
measuring techniques. Lin et al. (2007) presented a questionnaire-based model to
measure safety climate in China. Several critical factors shaping the safety climate were
found, including safety awareness and competence, communication, organizational
environment, management support, risk judgement, safety precautions and training.
2.3 Aviation maintenance and airworthiness
2.3.1 Basic aspect s of aviation maintenance
Kinnison (2004) gave various definitions of maintenance from previous
literature and then gave his own: “Maintenance is the process of ensuring that a system
continually performs its intended function at its designed – in level of reliability and
safety”. This definition implies the servicing, adjusting, replacement, restoration,
overhaul, and anything else needed to ensure the proper and continued operation of a
system or equipment within an inherent or designed-in level of reliability and safety
Chiu et al (2004) proposed the use of case-based reasoning concept to provide
in-advance support to the aircraft maintenance personnel when tackling technical
problems. Reliable and effective support can be provided building on previous repair
experience. Case-based reasoning is a continuous learning method that compares
previous similar cases to solve the current problems. Generic algorithms were set to
enhance dynamic weighting and the design of non-similarity functions. This gives more
superior performance when compared to the traditionally known tools that have either
equal/ varied weights or linear similarity functions. Further, maintenance scheduled
tests frequencies of various helicopter components could be remarkably improved by
utilizing new decision making algorithms, the overall target being reduced frequencies
of inspections at the same previously designed Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
(Michlin and Migdali 2004).
Aviation maintenance manpower and hardware chain of supply have captured
the attention of many writers throughout the previous decades (Sherif 1982, Fisher
1990, Dukstra et al.1991, Yan et al 2004, Quan et al 2007). Aviation maintenance also
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has always been constrained by several factors such as rising costs of manpower and
material, increased complexity of systems, cannibalization, and increased quality
requirements. Several algorithms were developed to handle optimization of various
types of inspection and maintenance schedules in regard to such limitations. These
maintenance supportive algorithms adopted numerous approaches such as Markov
process model, utility theories using Pareto optimal solutions technique, decision
support system based on Lagrangian relaxation, and mathematical programming solvers
such as Matlab and CEPLEX. The ultimate goal of these tools and many similar others
is to provide analytical support regarding decision making with respects of the two
extremes: maintenance requirements and maintenance constrains.
2.3.2 Influence of maintenance on aviation safety
The authentic effect of maintenance reliability on the overall aviation safety was
discussed (Matteson 1985, Hummels 1997, Sachon and Cornell 2000, Lutters and
Ackerman 2002, Sherali et al 2006). It is found that aircraft reliability is the sum of all
aircraft’s sub-systems reliabilities, these sub-system reliabilities are in turn overall sum
of partial components reliabilities. Several concepts attempting to quantify such
reliability trains were introduced. These include mechanical delay rates (dispatch
reliability), log entries per 1000 flying hours, significant failure rates components, etc.
Further, maintenance-related aviation safety is considered to be a direct resultant of
continuous interaction between several modular inputs such as management decision
variables (e.g. maintainers’ level of qualification), flight delays handling policy,
maintenance performance quality, and organizational internal and external moral.
2.3.3 Aviation maintenance quality promotion
Many tools were introduced regarding efficiency and productivity enhancement
within various sectors in the aviation industry. Orton (1989) initially demonstrated the
visibility of utilizing the “Methodology for Generating Efficiency and Effectiveness
Measures (MGEEM)” in military terms to measure and increase productivity and
efficiency within the US Navy. Two similar military facilities from the same department
were set as the experimental and control fields respectively. The MGEEM was fully
applied to the first of those. Results showed that productivity increased by 43.7% after
the implementation of the model.
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More recently, Abeyratne (1998) argued that “the pre-eminent concern of the air
transport industry and aircraft manufacturers at the present time is safety in the air”. He
also showed that this air safety is the first concern of all regulatory bodies headed by
ICAO, such that the basic strategic objective of the ICAO’s strategic action plan
adopted in 1997 was to further improve safety, security, and efficiency of international
civil aviation.
Aviation maintenance, as an influential component of the aviation industry, can
be highly improved in quality through numerous windows, two basic approaches to
these are appropriate personnel training and certification, in addition to performance
oversight functions. As for safety inspection and maintenance activities oversight,
Luxhoj and Williams (1998) have developed a decision support system for aircraft
inspectors. Their research aimed at introducing more refined ‘alert’ indicators to
nationally compare maintenance activities and aircraft performance data in order to
signal out any potential problem areas by aircraft type for the use of safety inspectors.
Data analysis and integration aspects are carried out in two levels: integration of
technical aircraft components that influence the decision support system, and then
integration of this decision support system with individual behaviour
On the other hand, Kinnison (2004) also referred, during discussing maintenance
oversight functioning, to the FAA Regulation (121-373) that indicates the need for
monitoring the aviation maintenance activities, to ensure that the maintenance and
inspection programs of a given operator are effective enough. In this direction, the
FAA’s Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS) is introduced. Many
operators interpreted this regulation to mean the establishment of a quality assurance
program as well as a reliability program. Essentially the CASS is a program to detect
and correct deficiencies in maintenance programs effectiveness and performance. It
looks at possible problem areas, determines corrective actions required, and tracks the
activities afterwards to determine the effectiveness of the corrections. This is
accomplished through data collection and analysis and through monitoring of all the
activities in the maintenance function of the operator, its suppliers, and its contractors.
The author addresses the oversight functions (within aviation maintenance
organizations) required by the CASS. Each oversight function encompasses specific
areas of interest such as the quality assurance, quality control, reliability and safety.
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2.3.4 Regulating aviation maintenance
Reporting of aviation safety occurrences is one of the main tools that regulatory
bodies use to derive required knowledge about specific safety-critical issues or potential
problems that need more focussing. According to ATSB (2007b), reporting officially
encompasses two main schemes: immediately reportable matters and routine reportable
matters. Safety–oriented reporting, as a legal and regulatory requirement, has been
adapted by almost all national and international regulators (Chaparro and Groff 2001,
Perezgonzalez and Smith 2005, Masson and Koning 2001, Abeyratne 1998). In this
regard, much national and international legislation have been put at act such as
Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (Australia), EASA Part 145.A.60 (Europe), and
the Joined Aviation Regulation (JAR) known as JAR.145.60 Amendment 5
(International).
To this end, human input in aviation safety has always been decisively
considered by regulators. Human factors training, in this regard, is being increasingly
adapted and furnished by almost all sectors of aviation industry. This wave is, to a great
scale, being powered by various national and international regulators (CAA 2002 a and
b, CAA 2003 a and b, EASA 2004, FAA 2006) . The CAA-UK issued, for instance,
many publications in human factors training, human factors influence in maintenance
(CAA 2003c), and Safety Health of Aviation Maintenance Engineering (SHoME) tool.
FAA, in the other hand, issued the Flight Standard Service Plan for Maintenance
Human Factors “to provide an overview of maintenance human factors activity within
the flight standard service”. The tasks within these standards are grouped as regulatory
support and guidance, workforce support, and research and development. Activities are
represented in past, present, and future prospectus. A list of facing challenges is also
discussed. Similar more recent research took place in various fields, the most common
of these are the human factors –oriented analysis of incidents and accidents databases
(BASI 1997, Hall 2005b and 2007, ATSB 2007c), and the international survey of the
maintenance human factors trends (Hackworth et al. 2007, Johnson 2007). Further
details of human factors in maintenance are given through next pages.
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2.4 Human factors influence on aviation maintenance
2.4.1 Basic definitions and concepts of human factors
2.4.1.1 Human factors definitions
Human factors have been assigned numerous definitions that comply with
various perspectives of areas of interest to different parties and authors. Patankar and
Taylor (2004b) listed many definitions for human factors:
 “Human factors are the discipline that tries to optimize the relationship between
technology and the human” (Kantowitz and Sorkin 1983).
 “The central approach of human factors is the application of relevant information
about human characteristics behaviour to the design of objects, facilities, and
environment that people use” (Grandjean 1980).
 “The goal of human factors is to apply knowledge in designing systems that work,
accommodating the limits of human performance and exploring the advantages of
the human `operator in the process” ( Wickens 1984).
The author also provided various definitions of the term ‘ergonomics’. One of these is:
 “Ergonomics is the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of
interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession
that applies theory, principles, data, and methods to deign in order to optimize
human well-being and overall system performance” (International Ergonomics
Association).
It is also concluded that ‘ergonomics’ is used as the umbrella term in Europe and
‘human factors’ is used as the umbrella term in the USA, both primarily in terms of
human -machine environment perspectives.
Taylor and Christensen (1998) similarly indicated that the term ‘human factors’
“denotes a multi disciplinary field devoted to optimizing human performance and
reducing human error, it incorporates the methods and principles of the behavioural and
social sciences, engineering and psychology”. The two authors further saw the human
factors as an applied science that “studies people working together in concert with tools
and machines. It embraces variables that influence individual performance and variables
that influence team or crew performance”.
Kinnison (2004) gave a brief definition as: “In capsule form, the nub of human
factors can be considered as the process of designing for human use”, while Cacciabue
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(2004a) defines human factors as: “the technology concerned with the analysis and
optimization of the relationship between people and their activities, by the integration of
human sciences and engineering in systematic applications, in consideration for
cognitive aspects and sociotechnical working contexts”.
On anther orientation, Baybutt (n.a) listed the following types of studies
concerning human factors and their influence on industrial safety:
 Human error analysis: “The systematic identification and evaluation of possible
errors that may be made by operators, maintenance engineers, technicians and
other personnel in the plant (examples: using checklists, task safety analysis, and
task error analysis)”.
 Human factors engineering: “The analysis of the interface of people with the
process and its impact on system operation (this includes: human factors
engineering review, human factors engineering evaluation)”.
 Human reliability analysis: “The assessment of impact of humans on the reliability
of process plants (this involves task analysis plus quantification using event and
fault trees)”.
2.4.1.2 Human factors general concepts
Human factors influence on modern aviation maintenance has been addressed –
as a concept – by numerous writers. An overall perception of this can be traced in the
obligation of industry to rely on human capabilities whatever the case of the technology
advancement. Sherritt (1998) concluded: “Maintaining an aircraft is a complex
business, and anything we can do to eliminate complications and reduce stress will be
beneficial to all. Modern technology has brought new pressures, some that that our
aviation forebears never had to deal with, other oddly familiar. Each new design
requires advanced training for the manufacturing and maintenance personnel who will
build or repair it. But some of the new technologies, computer software and composite
repairs for example, don’t lend themselves readily to inspection after the fact. Much as
for the tradesmen of old, we are forced back into reliance on the integrity of the
practitioner. Back to reliance on the human factors”.
Kinnison (2004) indicated that human interaction with systems makes it
imperative that the users, operators and maintenance people be considered as parts of
the system, and thus can be considered during design, development, and operational
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phases of the system’s life. Since the effects of human presence are as real as the
presence of voltage or mechanical linkages. The human being is an element of the
system, when all elements are working properly, the system as a whole work properly.
He also showed that human factors in the past has usually referred to physical
characteristics of people such as size, strength, physical dexterity, and visual acuity,
now other attributes are introduced such as lack of knowledge or understanding of a
system, human forgetfulness, or personal attitude as examples.
Cacciabue (2004a) indicated that human factors are a transversal to other well-
established sciences, such as physics, mathematics, psychology, and sociology. Human
factors extend over four essential domains: engineering, psychology, sociology, and
computer science. It requires blending the existing theoretical methods in all those four
fields, generating new and specific theoretical formulations and paradigms. Thus it
becomes possible to represent real sociotechnical aspects in theoretical forms, which
then needs further simplification and elaboration, so as to develop practical applications
and quantifications for use in, or assessment of, real working contexts.
Stanton et al. (2005) analysed many human factors methods that can be utilized
for Human Factors Integration (HFI) applications. They wrote: “the HFI provides a
process that ensures the application of scientific knowledge about human characteristics
through the specification, design, and evaluation of systems”. The HFI covers areas of
manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, system safety, and health
hazards. HFI process is intended to be an activity that supports attention towards all of
the above six domains during the entire system design lifecycle.
During discussing various aspects of Human-Machine Systems (HMS),
Cacciabue (2004a) showed that two main factors have contributed to generating
relevant concern and attention on the human factors role in safety: the improved
reliability of hardware, and extensive use of automation. In this way the contribution of
human factors to safety analysis has been enhanced, and the ‘human error’ has become
the primary cause of most accidents in all technologically developed domains. The
author defined the HMS as “a composite, at any level of complexity, of personnel,
procedures, tools, equipment, facilities, and software. The elements of this composite
are used together in the intended operational or support environment to perform a given
task or achieve a specific production, support, or mission requirement”. The
32
sociotechnical elements of HMS are organizational processes, personal and external
factors, local working conditions, and defences, barriers, and safeguards provisions. In
this regard, a Human Error and Accident Management approach (HEAM) can be
emphasized through the definition: “HEAM is the variety of methods and measures
designed to reduce inappropriate and risky human machine interactions at different
stages of a system life time, by offering means and ways to recognise and prevent them,
to contain and escape their adverse consequences when full recovery is not possible”.
2.4.2 Human factors in maintenance
A considerable proportion of the technical causes of helicopter as well as other
aircraft type’s accidents and serious incidents are in fact attributed to human factors in
various levels within the maintenance organizations. It is generally accepted that
maintenance, as a potential environment for critical interaction between humans and
machines, attracts a large proportion of human factors induced problems. As introduced
in Chapter 1 before, human errors in aviation maintenance are generally discussed
through two main approaches: HRA and HEC. It is also understood that identification
of the causal mechanisms that led to a human error is the most vital input to that error’s
rectification (Latorella and Prabhu 2000).
Different human error-inducing factors were discussed as regard to aviation
maintenance. There are always multiple publications discussing each and every one of
such error causal factors in depth. Some of these problematic maintenance areas are:
fatigue (Goranson 1997, Signal et al 2006), language (Drury and Ma 2003), situational
awareness and work load (Hendy 1995, Pritchett et al 1996, Endsley and Robertson
2000, Folkard 2003, Gregoriades and Sutcliffe 2007 ), implementing new technologies
(Johnson 2001, Weigmann and Rantanen 2002), non adherence to procedures (Karwal
et al. 2000, Patankar 2002), supervisor – subordinate relations (Lee 1995), technical
documentation ( Chaparro and Groff 2001, Chaparro et al 2002, Chaparro and Groff
2002, CAA 2003d, Rogers et al 2005), aircraft design (Steinberg and Gitomer 1993,
Zha et al 2001, Besnard et al 2004, , Bristow and Irving 2007), psychological health
(Schofield et al. 2006), and training (Walter 2000, Hall 2005a).
Crotty (2002) gave executive definitions to some aspects involving human
factors in maintenance, some of these definitions are:
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 Maintenance human factors: “It is the study, compilation, and establishment of
principles related to human capabilities and work place aspects relative to the
optimum and safe performance of maintenance and inspection work”.
 Maintenance error: “Refers to place, element, activity or inactivity in a
maintenance system where a breakdown or error has occurred but doesn’t explain
why it occurred”.
 Maintenance error reduction efforts: “Programmes of airlines and maintenance
organizations that are focussed to identify high error vulnerable areas, take steps to
eliminate or reduce these areas and improve the investigation of such
occurrences”.
Reason (1997) stated that there are three types of human activities that are
universal in hazardous technologies, control under normal conditions, control under
emergency conditions, and maintenance–related activities. The last type is the one
having the largest human factors problems. The greatest hazards facing modern
technologies comes from people, and most particularly from the well intentioned,
Greater awareness is needed of the varieties of human fallibility and the error–
provoking nature of large parts of the maintenance task, especially during installation or
reassembly. Similar attitude was also expressed by McDonald (2001).
Patankar and Taylor (2004a) discussed implementing the human factors in
aviation maintenance from three behavioural perspectives, individual, organizational,
and collegiate. They referred to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) as
well as the JAR66 and JAR 145 requirements. The authors analysed effects of various
human factors on aviation maintenance such as the Dirty Dozen (CAA.2003c), and
similar lists. They showed that a review of history of human factors in maintenance
indicated that their success tends to be attributed to at the individual level, and failures
tend to be attributed at the organizational level. The authors also concluded that it is
essential that academic community should also incorporate appropriate human factors
principles, because sustenance of changes in safety practices is a cultural change, and as
such , it needs to take place at both workplace level as well as collegiate one.
Maintenance programmes usually meets the requirements of the manufacturers
(i.e. design goals, safety, reliability), and the regulators (safety, airworthiness etc), and
then the operator who adds his needs to these requirements. Thus the adjustment of
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tasks intervals must be in the line with the human capabilities and requirements
concerning work schedules, endurance, appropriate tools, documentation, and skill
make-up of the work crew to avoid over work, fatigue etc.
Bussalino (1999) discussed various issues concerning human factors in aviation
maintenance. He described the theories involved in assessing errors, violations, error
mechanisms, types of errors, and various human factors models. Bussalino discussed
thoroughly the areas of conflict and corresponding remedy procedures concerned with
human factors in aviation maintenance. A survey conducted by the researcher gives
comprehensive results concerning the type of organizational cultures, reporting systems,
maintenance personnel particularities such as training, age, shift changes and so on. The
research further discusses the role of the manufacturers and regulators to enhance safety
through optimizing performance in the maintenance side of the industry.
In contrast to helicopters, many studies in the maintenance error causation were
already carried out for the commercial fixed wing aviation. Hobbs and Williamson
(1995) used the Rasmussen’s Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) framework to identify the
types of errors made by aircraft maintenance technicians and the systemic or
organizational failures which set the conditions for such errors. It is found that errors
due to inadequate knowledge were rare and were usually committed by trainee
technicians. Absent-minded skill based slips and lapses occurred in approximately 25%
of the total incidents studied, while the majority of the errors were found to be rule-
based mistakes. These results gave the view from the ‘hangar floor’, thus the authors
cited that a more thorough investigation may have revealed different factors as well.
Schmidt et al.(1998) showed that, during the 1970s through 1990s, human error
in naval aviation maintenance did not decline at the same rate as material / mechanical
aircraft failure, and in the late part of that period, human error has not only levelled off
but may be increasing. This underscores the need to combat more effectively all forms
of maintenance human error. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System-
Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) taxonomy was introduced to classify causal
factors that contribute to maintenance related aviation mishaps. Fogarty et al (1999)
investigated the causes of maintenance errors. Analysis showed that individuals were
mostly at fault, making errors because they failed to follow procedures and were
inadequately supervised at percentages of 32% and 40% of the studied sample
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respectively. Organizational variables such as pressure created by poor planning were
also cited. A Maintenance Environment Survey Scale (MESS) was introduced to
measure a range of psychological, physical, environmental and organizational variables
considered to be related to maintenance performance.
As an extension to their work, Schmidt et al. (2001) also applied HFACS-ME to
analyse 15 of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports describing
major commercial fixed wing airliner incidents and accidents. A value of 0.85 Cohen’s
Kappa level of agreement was achieved indicating high suitability of the taxonomy to
analyse such types of maintenance - related safety occurrences in both military and civil
contexts. This work further emphasised the ability to address the ‘why’ question instead
of only stating ‘what’ had happened regarding aviation safety occurrences. Results
obtained by Schmidt and his group, given in Table 2.2 concluded that HFACS-ME was
effective in capturing the nature of, and relationships among latent conditions and
active failures presented in the addressed mishaps.
Table 2-2 15 maintenance related aircraft accidents analysis using HFACS-ME (Schmidt 2001)
Main causes
of human error in maintenance
Citation of causes
within the analysed sample
Supervisory conditions Cited within 60% of the analysed sample
Organizational conditions Cited within 26.7% of the analysed sample
Maintenance crew conditions Cited within 20% of the analysed sample
Environmental and workspace conditions Cited within 13.3% of the analysed sample
Maintainer errors Cited within 87% of the analysed sample
Maintainer violations Cited within 46.7% of the analysed sample
Crotty (2002) indicated that efforts should be directed at improving the
investigation process and establishing a data bank of maintenance error causal factors
related to accidents and incidents. He suggested HFACS-ME and the Maintenance Error
Decision Aid (MEDA) of Boeing to represent major tools for maintenance error
analysis and understanding.
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Krulak(2004) examined 1,016 aircraft mishaps using the information from the
Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS) web-based database.
These mishaps, categorised as of high and low severities, were also categorised using
HFACS-ME. The population, composed of aviation mishaps between years 1996 and
2000, was examined in order to determine the third level HFACS-ME factors which
were present, and the possible existence of correlations between maintenance errors and
mishaps frequency and severity. This examination yielded 4,325 individual third level
factors which were unevenly distributed.
Figure 2-6 Mishaps causal factors analysis using HFACS-ME (Krulak 2004)
The factors of inadequate supervision, attention /memory errors, and judgement
/decision errors were respectively involved in 80%, 51%, and 52% of the whole
population of mishaps studied. Figure 2.6 demonstrates the uneven distribution while
focusing on all factors with at least five times the expected frequency (3%).
2.4.3 Error management
Human error has been addressed in its wide prospective by many authors.
Wiegmann and Shappell (2000) provided safety parishioners with an overview of the
prominent human error perspective in aviation particularly when being approached
through the organization / individual interaction orientation. They also highlighted a set
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of objective criteria that can be used to evaluate different human error frameworks.
Similar overview studies are given by Dhillon and Liu (2006), Walia and Carver (2007).
Hale et al (1997) and Strauch (2002) discussed the long complicated process of
organizational learning through backward analysis of accidents and incidents in safety
critical contexts. Many other writers discussed the available error management tools or
gave various proposals for new measures. Examples of such orientations are the well
established error reporting schemes (Fogarty 2003), team error management ( Sasou and
Reason 1999), layers of protection in process industry for safety enhancement (Baybutt
2002, 2003a,b), cognitive error analysis in incidents and accidents (Busse 2002),
managing the impact of safety climate on maintenance error (Fogarty 2005).
As discussed in Chapter 1, Reason (1997) showed that in the organizational
scope, error management has two components: Error reduction and error containment.
These include, for instance, measures that are required to minimize error liability of
individuals or teams, reduce error vulnerability of particular tasks or task elements,
discover, assess, and then eliminate error-producing (and violation producing) factors
within the work place, etc.
One other relative work was conducted by Ashworth (1998) who gave definite
steps to create an error management program. Once appropriate attention has been given
to establishing an ‘Error Threshold’, an error management programme must be defined
in a template that provides a road map through the error management process. Primary
components of such programme can be:
 Structured human factors- based error investigation system.
 Validation of investigation results.
 Data analysis.
 A management – backed corrective action system.
 A metrics system to track the success or failure of corrective actions.
 A feedback / training system to ensure results dissemination to the work force.
An error reduction strategy must, however, be clearly communicated both to
employees and customers if buy in is to be attained. Although improving safety,
reducing rework, and enhancing financial performance are valid goals, however, the
error management philosophy must be driven by actions and objectives that are tangible
to the work force and visible on a daily basis.
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A more formal address to error management within aviation maintenance
organizations is given by the Safety Regulation Group in UK (CAA.2003c). This
regulation, as given also highlighted before in section (2.3.4), addresses safety
management from an organizational perspective and describes the elements of a Safety
Management System (SMS). Emphasize now is upon human factors and error
management programmes which should form significant part of an organizational SMS.
The regulating document CAP 716 (CAA.2003c) is structured around the main syllabus
topics in EASA GM -145 requirements, thus it furnishes perfect simple guide for human
factors training and / or practicing in aviation maintenance.
2.4.4 Risk assessment of human performance
Risk, as a broad concept, has been widely discussed in literature, and it is always
considered as a major indicator of the overall system safety. As for aviation, risk in
reality is inspired within almost all components of the system: Aircrafts, flight
conditions, air traffic systems, aircrafts maintenance, and above all, the human input to
all of these. Janic (2000) has overviewed all such measures involved in aviation risk and
safety under the ever increasing industry pressures, and proposed a model to quantify
risk and safety within the larger civil aviation sectors. Similar perceptions were also
highlighted by Abrahamsen et al. (2006), Arezes and Miguel (2007).
Risk has further been studied with regard to maintenance workforce and
maintenance activities in a higher resolution. Specific more problematic areas have been
afforded deeper focussing in literature such as workers fatigue (Rhodes 2001, Rhodes
et al 2003), non-destructive inspections (Aldrin et al 2006), helicopter operational
pressure (Hokstad et al 2001), and loss prevention techniques (Lees 1996).
Patankar and Taylor (2004b) discussed in details the concepts of risk and
reliability when generally applied to aviation maintenance. They defined the risk as “the
probability of an unfavourable outcome”. In aviation industry risk could be expressed in
terms of number of accidents per allocated number of flight hours, thus ideally, the
safest activity would have a zero probability of accidents. However, safety is dynamic
as well as relative because it is the probability of an accident that is acceptable to a
given society. In other words, as long as a society perceives the benefits of a certain
activity to be greater than the risk of failure in that activity, then that activity will be
considered ‘safe’ in that society.
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Risk is introduced into the system due to errors committed by every entity
connected with aircraft operation. Thus, redefining safety as management of risk within
the society expectations: To achieve total safety, either errors must be avoided
completely or systemic redundancies must accommodate all possible errors. In aviation
industry, risks are controlled largely by specifying the minimum acceptable standards
through both national and international regulations.
Kirwan (1998a,b) showed the close relation between risks and error
identification. He indicated that the risk assessment process of determining whether a
plant is safe to operate or build, or whether it should be altered, shut down, or cancelled,
is critically dependent on human error identification. Patankar and Taylor (2004b)
discussed types of risks taken by aviation maintenance professionals. Four levels of
risks are listed in this domain:
 Good Sarnaritan Risk: an inherent risk present in every maintenance action that
involves re-assembly of aircraft parts after job is complete.
 Normalized Risk: Every time a maintainer deviates from the prescribed course of
action (procedures) without adverse events, there is reinforcement that perhaps
that deviation was acceptable. This is called ‘normalization of deviance’.
 Stymie Risk: It is the situation in which a mechanic needs to remove a part or
disable a system in order to gain access to his / her specific task. When a person
‘disturbs’ the original installation or configuration of an ‘interfering part’, that
person takes risks of not returning that disturbed part to its original configuration.
 Blatant Risk: these risks are clearly under the individual’s span of control, like
performing maintenance without proper training, poor tool control, sign-off work
not performed, and use of old parts as references to obtain replacement parts, etc.
Literature is rich of theories and models that propose various approaches to
resolve the tight spot of risk associated with the ever growing HMI. Kanki (2002) and
Ling Hsu (2004) listed and compared a group of risk analysis techniques, these included
PRA, Hazard Mode and Effect Analysis (HMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event
Tree Analysis (ETA), Flight Operations Risk Assessment (FORAS), Risk Analysis
Matrix (RAM), and risk specific safety index products-performance indicators. Kariuki
and Lowe (2007) proposed an approach that integrates human factors into process
hazard analysis with a focus on risk identification.
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2.4.5 Human reliability
Gertman and Blackman (1994) generally defined the quantitative reliability as
“the probability that an item (component, equipment, or system) will operate without
failure for a stated period of time under specific conditions”. In another hand, Patankar
and Taylor (2004b) defined reliability from a technical sense as “the measure of how
often a system or a component meets its standards”. They further defined failure as “a
non-conformance to some predefined performance criterion”. Reliability is always
defined in terms of failure rates while safety is measured in terms of risk.
Human reliability is further defined as “the probability that a human will
perform a given maintenance action to the established standards consistently” (Patankar
and Taylor 2004b). The authors also argued that “unlike machines or physical
components, human tends to degrade in their performance more than simply fail”. Such
degradation is not absolute and certainly not irreversible (i.e. can be cured), hence, it is
difficult to detect even by the individual who is affected. Some such degradation factors
include, stress, fatigue levels, limitation in technical knowledge or skills, ambiguity in
/or lack of correct and current technical literature, lack of appropriate equipment and
resources, unreasonable environmental conditions, etc’. Human reliability is taken
further as a key factor when theorising an answer for the question: Are accidents
generally avoidable? Two arguments were introduced in this regards:
 High reliability theorists, they believe that all accidents are avoidable.
 Normal accident theorists, they believe that at least some accidents are
unavoidable.
Both sides have strong theoretical foundations and empirical data at hand.
Wong (2002) stated that “human error can never be totally eliminated. The
methods used to assess human reliability require considerable knowledge and
experience on the part of the user”. Many other writers also discussed the concept
furnishing dependence of the technical aviation system reliability ( aircraft systems
reliability) on the human reliability of the workforce in manufacturing, maintenance,
and operations phases. Deodatis et al (1996) investigated the reliability of aircraft
structures under non-periodic inspection sessions. It is found that human reliability has a
direct influence on this as an overall integrated process. Similar results were obtained
through other research works regarding human reliability during maintenance activities
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(particularly inspections) (Narasimha 1977, Lewis et al 1978, Floyd 1993 a and b,
Floyd and Schurman 1995, Floyd 1996, NATO 1998, Coolen and Schrijner 2006).
Numerous methodologies were established to quantify human reliability in
maintenance, Kirwan et al (2007) generated human reliability data for the air traffic
sector. Similar works include, as examples, a computer-based model for system level
reliability (Byrd et al. 1992), a non-probabilistic prospective and retrospective human
reliability analysis approach (Vanderhaegen 2001), and a safety, reliability and risk
management integrated approach (Cox and Tail 1998). Vanderhaegen (1999) introduced
the human ‘unreliability’ analysis method (APRECIH) which was built on the
assumption that errors during task performing can result due to three behavioural
malfunctioning factors: acquisition related failures, problem solving related failures, and
/ or action related failures.
Mosleh and Chang (2004) called for a new generation of human reliability
models that provide explicit cognitive causal links between operator’s behaviour, and
the directly or indirectly measurable causal factors of safety occurrences.
Finally, it is generally accepted, referring to the literature, that human reliability
can be increased as follows:
 At individual level by better managing the workforce degradation factors.
 At organizational level by building appropriate redundancies in number of
systems / components that can perform a required function, or in number of
functions assigned to each part of the system.
2.5 Applications of human factors concepts to aviation
maintenance
2.5.1 Human factors models and frameworks
The literature is rich of works that proposed several types of theories, methods,
models and frameworks that address the human factors in general, and that of aviation
maintenance in particular. The Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) issued a
guide to methods and tools for airline flight safety analysis. A large number of all the
currently used human factors–related applications are listed and thoroughly discussed.
These included safety events reporting, flight data monitoring, risk analysis, and
statistical approaches to human factors induced problem (GAIN 2003). Another
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annotated bibliography was previously given by Weigmann et al (2000). Their listing
included human factors errors and accident causation theories, frameworks, and applied
analytical techniques. Similar works was prepared by Kontogiannis et al (2000) and
Everdij (2007) who compared the available accident analysis techniques for the man -
machine critical interaction systems within complete safety methods databases.
In the same orientation, many models were introduced to address the human
factors issue. Johnson and Maddox (2007a,b) proposed the ‘People-Environment-
Actions-Resources’ (PEAR) model to explain human factors in aviation maintenance.
The model is built on the assumption that human behaviour within this industry is the
overall resultant of four interacting components: people, environment, actions, and
resources. Hall and Silva (2008) introduced a conceptual model to analyse accidents and
incidents in safety critical systems. Other computer based simulator tools addressing the
maintenance environment were built by Bellamy et al (2007b) and Truitt and Ahlstrom
(2001). On the other hand, Leach (2005) proposed a new approach to maintenance error
prediction. The theory of his model is to provide a flowchart-based tool that can
estimate the criticality of various maintenance activities such that more focus could be
assigned to those tasks, specially those of higher critical consequences, if any human
error is encountered when they are performed. A similar model was also proposed by
Simmons (2002). Several other approaches were furnished as well by Drury and Prabhu
(1996), McFadden and Towell (1999), Fojita and Hollnagel (2004), Clarke (2005),
Vinnem and Aven (2006). Large proportion of these mentioned frameworks and models
and other ones within literature were introduced, by way or another, as direct or indirect
reflection of major theoretical hypothesis’ in the field of HMI. These theories represent
a base for most of the recent research. The following sections briefly discuses some of
these basic theories:
2.5.1.1 Sociotechnical systems
Patankar and Taylor (2004b) reported that “Socio-Technical Systems (STS) is a
powerful organizational model describing purposeful work systems in complex
environments”. STS presumes that any system is a set of parts or pieces that are closely
interrelated with reference to their shared environment. STS is a specific kind of
system-thinking which helps to determine ‘goodness of fit’ among people and
technology within their surrounding environment. STS’s contain three elements:
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 The technical subsystem or program tools and processes.
 The social subsystem or people and their roles which are expected to provide
judgment and guidance for the technical subsystem.
 The enterprise system which defines purposes, values, objectives, boundaries, and
environment.
During maintenance daily activities, there are usually instances in which
ambiguity or uncertainty will occur, such cases are called ‘voids’. It is of prime
importance to manage such void experiences to prevent errors, and thus to prevent
accidents and incidents. An effective STS is the one in which ‘management in the void’
is not only possible, but planned-for through the so called ‘performance by design’.
2.5.1.2 Maintenance resource management
Crotty (2002) defined the MRM as “the training addressing various principles
and good practices concerning management of personnel and resources to improve
maintenance work efficiency and effectiveness and therefore indirectly improve safety”.
Taylor and Patankar (2004 b) indicate that MRM is more than a training programme. It
is a tool to provide individuals and groups with the skills and processes to manage
errors that are within their control, such as communication, decision-making, situational
awareness, work load management, and team building. Part of MRM is training, but
part of it must be the application and management of the attitude, skills, and knowledge
the training and behaviour can provide.
MRM can be classified into four generations, the first of them was introduced in
1989 with the intention of reducing maintenance errors through improved interpersonal
communication and team work. The second generation started in 1992 as a set of
focused groups of foremen and mechanics, these programmes led to the ‘on-shift’
meetings and mechanic’s participation in planning technical changes that improved
safety. The third generation were essentially programmes consisted of training that
enhanced mechanic’s safety awareness and improved individual coping skills in dealing
with safety issues. The last generation of MRM programmes currently taking place are
characterized by commitment to long term communication and behavioural changes in
maintenance. It is now a continuous process of increasing trust among maintainers, their
managers, and their regulators that enable them to learn from present by behaviours in
order to improver future quality and efficiency.
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2.5.1.3 Defence in depth (Swiss cheese) model
According to Reason (1997), ideally all defensive layers would be intact,
allowing no penetration by possible accident trajectories, however, in reality each
defensive layer has its weaknesses and gaps through which accident trajectories
penetrate. These defects (holes) are due to ‘active failures’ or ‘latent conditions’.
Active failures are the unsafe acts committed by individuals that have a direct
impact on the safety of the system, thus causing immediate adverse effects resulting in
accidents. These acts usually form the final stages of the accident causation sequence.
Latent conditions are properties of technological organizations that may be present
within them for many years prior to accidents occurrence. These latent conditions
(states) arise from strategic other top level decisions of the organizational policy
makers. The impact of such decisions spread through out the organization shaping a
distinctive corporate culture and creating errors–producing factors within individual or
place. Latent conditions are present in all systems. They are an inevitable part of
organizational life, nor they necessarily the products of bad decisions, although they
may well be. Latent conditions can increase the likelihood of active failures through the
creation of local factors promoting errors and violations. They can also aggravate the
consequences of unsafe acts by their effects upon system’s defences, barriers, and
safeguards.
Figure 2-7 Stages in the development and investigation of an organizational accident (Reason 1997)
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The combination of latent conditions and unsafe acts usually leads to accidents.
Having an organizational accident occurrence, investigation can follow an opposite flow
direction from the last active failure that produced the immediate accident down to its
roots in a wider organizational concept. This is given by the previous Figure 2.7.
2.5.1.4 The SHELL Model
The SHELL model is one of the two most common theories of organizational
accidents used in aviation psychology ( the other being Reason’s model). SHELL model
is first advocated by Edwards (1972) and later modified by Hawkins (1987). The
component blocks of the model which need to be matched were interpreted as Liveware
(humans), Hardware (machines), Software (procedures, symbology), and Environment
(the conditions in which the Liveware – software – hardware system must function).
Figure 2-8 SHELL Model (from Edwards (1972) and Hawkins (1987))
Liveware is at the centre model, and it is necessary for the other components to
be adopted and matched with this component. SHELL, as in Figure 2.8, is a human
factors model that helps understanding errors from a system’s perspective. In this
model, It is highlighted that most problems or errors occur at the interfaces, and
Liveware-Hardware interface has been the focus of most human factors studies, for
instance, ergonomics particularly deals with the human / machine interface.
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2.5.2 Human factors methods applied to aviation maintenance
Many applied methods were introduced as tools to handle human factors
influence during aviation maintenance. Leonelli (2003) discussed the CASS introduced
to evaluate, analyse, and correct deficiencies that may arise during the performance of
maintenance and inspection activities given in air carriers programmes, and the
effectiveness of these programmes. Other applied methods include a generic reliability
monitoring system (Tan 1983), a technique for error reduction in maintenance (Tanja
2002), inspection workcard management (Drury et al. 2000), paperwork design (Drury
1998), fault diagrams (Sheppard and Butcher 2007, Remenyte and Andrews 2006),
performance optimization (Mjelde 1984, Coolen 2006), expert judgement (Goossens et
al. 2007), safety integrity level (Baybutt 2006), and safety events reporting (Sanne
2007).
2.5.2.1 HFACS-ME taxonomy
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System–Maintenance Extension
(HFACS-ME) is an error analysis system that is designed to deeper analyse human
factors related to aviation maintenance and classify them. This taxonomy was discussed
by a number of references including Shappell and Wiegmann (2001), Wiegmann and
Shappell (2003), USA Naval Safety Centre (1997), Schmidt et al (1998), Crotty (2002),
and Krulak (2004). HFACS- ME was derived from the operational HFACS programme
devoted to flight crews. HFACS-ME is a frame work that can be used to identify targets
for intervention of errors in the maintenance cycle. It is adapted to capture human
factors errors in maintenance and to facilitate the recognition of absent or defective
defences at four levels: Unsafe management conditions (organizational and
supervisory), maintainer conditions, working conditions, and maintainer acts. Each
level of these is sub-classified into three stepping down orders to address the root causes
of errors. Order one factors are the broadest in scope, and order three factors were the
narrowest (roots of causes). The first three levels each influence the next successive
level and they are in rank order furthest from the site of an accident. Failures or absence
of defences at any of these levels are considered ‘Latent failures’ which can exist or be
dormant for some period of time, even years, before coming into play when being
actualized. The last level four, say the ‘proximal failure’ is the unsafe act. This is the
only active failure in Reason’s model. This system works to answer the question ‘why’
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the accident or incident (related to maintenance) took place? According to Marx (1988)
“human factors have been (under-served) by traditional maintenance error analysis
systems, they adequately identify ‘what’ happened, but not ‘why’ it occurred. Now this
HFACS-ME works to answer this ‘why’.
2.5.2.2 MEDA taxonomy
MEDA is similarly described in many publications, an example is that given by
Crotty (2002) who indicated that this tool is a structured process used to investigate
errors made by maintenance personnel. It is an industry standard maintenance error
investigation tool developed by Boeing 1992. By using MEDA as analytical tool,
organizations can learn from their mistakes as a part of their SMS. To carry out a
MEDA error investigation, the investigator will interview the worker who made the
error to find out the contributing factors to the error. The interview outputs are
represented in a specially designed MEDA results form that covers specific error
descriptions such as installation error and servicing error.
Further, MEDA identifies a group of contributing factors which negatively
affects how worker does the job, thus they contribute to the error, and these factors
include:
 Organizational philosophy (policies, procedures, process, quality improvement).
 Supervision (planning, organizing, positioning, instructing, feedback,
performance, management, team building)
 Immediate environment (facilities, weather, design, time pressure, team work,
communicating, on-the-job training).
 Worker (knowledge, skills, abilities, other characteristics).
Stanton et al (2005) provided a range of human factors methods that can be used
in system design and evaluation. The book discussed over two hundreds of various
theories, models and tools applicable to human factors analysis, particularly in complex
systems. The authors also provided some guiding factors for choosing the appropriate
method for each type of analysis, some of these factors are:
 The accuracy of the method (especially if prediction is involved).
 Flexibility of the method (prediction or evaluation).
 The criteria to be tested (e.g. time, errors, communication, movement, usability).
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2.5.3 Recent developments in aviation maintenance human
factors
As a previous precedent to the works of Simmons (2002) and Leach (2005), Yu
et al. (2000) applied a human error criticality model that aimed at improving the
assembly process of an initiator. Sorting such criticalities of personnel in work activities
gave hints to areas that needed more concentration during the assembly process. The
tool also helped reducing production costs by decreasing the overall time and material
waste. A brief listing of other recent research includes using of virtual reality technique
for aircraft visual inspection training (Vora et al 2002), the development of an aircraft
maintenance continuous improvement system (Ward et al (n.a)), using Analytical
Hierarchy Processes (AHP) for estimating human error probabilities (Park 2007), a
functional integral model of human factors, safety management system and
organizational behaviour (Bellamy et al 2007).
The European Commission Research website (2005) showed a variety of
projects being conducted in the fields of aeronautics and aviation. One of those is
known as the Technologies and Techniques for new Maintenance Concepts (TATEM)
project. The objective of this integrated project is to validate technologies and
techniques which can be used to transfer unscheduled maintenance to scheduled
maintenance, and provide the means to make the maintenance task more efficient and
effective. The technologies and techniques to be validated include: Novel onboard
sensor technology to gather data from the aircraft systems (avionics, utilities, actuation,
engines and structures), maintenance-free avionics, signal processing techniques (e.g.
fuzzy logic, neural networks, model-based reasoning) which can be used to convert data
into information describing health of systems, and diagnostic methods to identify and
locate failures and malfunctions so as to reduce number of incidences of ‘no fault
found’. Other techniques are the prognostic methods that provide support for
preventative maintenance actions, decision support techniques to provide the
maintenance crew with process-oriented information and guidance, and the human
interface technologies to provide the ground crew with information at their point of
work. Reporting simple safety-influencing shortages and / or near-miss critical
occurrences is another vital applied concept. Reporting has always been considered as a
powerful organizational learning tool that can – if effectively applied – help
reoccurrence prevention. Van der Schaaf (1991) outlined three basic purposes of a
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confidential incident reporting scheme: Modelling, monitoring, and motivation.
Building on that, Harris (1994) thoroughly discussed the importance, functionality, and
limitations of confidential reporting schemes and their application to aviation.
ATSB (n.a) introduced in the late 1990’s a proactive safety method called
Identifying Needed Defences In the Civil Aviation Transport Environment
(INDICATE). This was intended to provide critical and continuous examination of air
operators’ safety systems, as well as reporting possible weaknesses in aviation
regulations. INDICATE was first implemented within major airlines in four successive
steps: hazards in areas of flight operations, maintenance, and ground operations were
identified and ranked in order of importance, then the already-in-place defences were
listed for each identified hazard. The effectiveness of each of the defences was then
evaluated and all possible deficiencies were pointed out to establish any required
modifications or additional controls. INDICATE was preceded by a number of
proactive tools (ATSB (n.a), Reason 1997) which are intended to periodically monitor
organizational latent conditions that develop safety failures. Some of these tools are:
Managing Engineering Safety Health (MESH) of British Airways, Aviation Safety
Monitoring System (ASMS) of the CAA- NewZealand, and several others tools in other
industries such as well.
Fogarty et al (1999, 2004) developed MESS, a questionnaire that measured
variables relating to maintenance activities. These variables addressed organizational
and individual aspects such as: Rewards, physical conditions, safety attitude, training,
documentation, stress, fatigue, job satisfaction, supervision, turnover intentions, etc. It is
found that organizational factors have strong direct influence on individual factors,
which ultimately lead to errors. Re-adjusting input variables, an overall maintenance
performance can be predicted regarding safety and efficiency of a given organization.
Luxhoj (2002) introduced the Aviation System Risk Model (ASRM) to explore
the interrelationships between various organizational, tasks, environmental, and
individual variables that usually combine and lead to incidents and accidents. ASRM is
based on the ‘Swiss cheese’ model of accident causation, coupled with the Bayesian
Belief Networks (BBN), BBN, in turn, are formed by assigning conditional probabilities
to a ‘Swiss-Cheese’ model-evolved influence diagram as the one shown in Figure 2.9.
ASRM handles both qualitative and quantitative methods of tackling various scenarios
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of errors and their consequential outputs. Numerous variations of defences breach can
be applied in order to predict all the relative possible results and their different degrees
of severity. This enables closer acknowledgement to the complex interrelationships that
mutually influence HMI systems. The model again utilized the contribution of subject
matter experts and analytic generalization from relative case studies.
Figure 2-9 Overview of an ASRM influence diagram ( Luxhoj 2002)
Cacciabue et al (2003) developed a model and a computer based simulator to
analyze and predict the task performance of a virtual aviation maintenance technician.
Based on the SHELL and RMC/PIPE models of cognition and human-machine
interaction (Neisser 1967, Hollnagel 1993, Cacciabue 1998), this numerical simulator
provides a reasonable device to repeatedly tackle the huge volume of data associated
with maintenance environment, task properties and requirements, and the Performance
Influencing Factors (PIF) affecting the technician behaviour. A model of maintenance
action execution is firstly given where the physical and cognitive input parameters of
the Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) and the surroundings are analyzed to give
a consequential output for each task or sub-task executed. These outputs should be
correct actions, omission errors, commission errors, or recovery actions. Various stages
of the simulator are given in Figure 2.10.
51
Thorough mathematical treatment is carried out to calculate each PIF regarding
environment, management, and
individual properties. The
Simulator enables deep
analysis and prediction of the
AMT possible erroneous
behaviour through swift
random or manual alterations
to various influencing input
data that may shape a given
task execution. The tool can
give detailed representation of
the AMT level of expertise,
physical and mental fatigue,
motivation, situation
awareness, skills of
communication and other
aspects depending on the initial
settings fed in or altered later.
This is of great benefit Figure 2-10 ATM Simulator (Cacciabue et al 2003)
for the aircraft designers, the maintenance procedures writers, and for the overall
research and training purposes. The authors discussed the difficulties associated with
setting the initial highly complicated input parameters that can resemble real working
environment. Other point is the limited possibility to validate the simulation outputs due
to lack of actual data from the field that can be used as exact comparators. Team work
concepts and software usability features are also to be addressed in later versions of this
simulator.
Hsia (2007) gave a tool for safety-based evaluation of the writing quality of
aircraft maintenance technical orders. He applied the well known Quality Performance
Matrix (QPM) method to capture two main indices, the readability and the importance
of technical orders, thus providing clear practical guidelines for urgent and future
amendments needed for more reliable technical maintenance manuals. The general
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QPM approach, as cited by Hsia, is highly effective in identifying weak, maintainable,
or that zone which require various level of re-evaluation. Figure 2.11 represents a
typical QPM of a profit-oriented company. Two main indices were considered:
Customer satisfaction (along the i-axis) and customer expectations (along the j-axis).
According to the rating of each performance variable against these two indices, a
relative performance quality zone can be identified for that specific variable. The QPM
methodology proved high efficiency in predicting areas of weaker or over-controlled
measures that can be addressed
by a given firm management
for optimum performance. It
can also identify priorities at
which these out-of-target
variables can be handled. In the
same sense, QPM approach can
be utilized as a safety-related
variable analyzer to capture
risk describing parameters such
as events frequencies and
associated degrees of severity.
Figure 2-11 Typical quality performance matrix (Hsia 2007)
Edwards (2007) introduced the concept and practicalities of maintenance
compliance monitoring within the aviation maintenance environment. He called for the
systematic check of the total compliance with established procedures by all the
organization staff at all levels such that both process and practice may be insured to be
carried out as intended by the procedures. This in turn will greatly help reducing risks
associated with the ever existing work-around phenomena, well known at almost all
maintenance organizations.
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2.6 Current gaps and possible solutions
2.6.1 Limitations of quantitative approaches to address
maintenance human factors issues
Harris (1994) discussed issues associated with targeted quantitative analysis of
the qualitative data present in the confidential incident reporting schemes like UK-based
Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Program (CHIRP) and the USA
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). He showed that for a meaningful analysis to
be undertaken, incidents need to be given in larger categories to identify the reasons
‘why’ things happened not only ‘what’ happened. This should involve deeper
representation of psychological precursors within the reports layout. Even after, the
process of driving useful quantitative trends by coding qualitative data given in such
reports still faces deep inter-reliability difficulties. Categories like ‘workload’ and
‘tiredness’, ‘cockpit ergonomics’ and ‘misleading displays’ usually fail to attain a
desired degree of inter-rater reliability either due to difficulty in distinguishing between
such similar pairs of categories, or due to insufficient information given within reports.
Johnson (1999) indicated that human error modelling techniques have had little
impact upon improving safety in many industries, he argued that human factors research
has failed to seriously consider the problems of actual systems development. Examples
of such shortages are the poor documentation and/or presentation of most of these error
modelling techniques, as well as the fact that many of them depend entirely upon the
skill and intuition of human factors experts. Many companies have failed to positively
assess both the merit of those experts and their techniques due to lack of professional
accreditation. The published advice on how to apply human error analysis to tackle
reality in complex organizations is relatively very limited. Johnson highlighted that
models of human and organizational failures will continue to be of little actual benefits
until the practical problems associated with their application are solved, some of these
problems are:
1. Lack of agreed standards and methods.
2. Dependence on expert’s interpretation.
3. No provision of real time prediction.
4. No support for design phase prediction.
5. Focusing on individual errors rather than team failures.
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6. Focusing on operational aspects not regulatory requirements.
7. Need to reduce errors during error analysis in the first place.
Johnson concluded that most human factors research helped to improve
understanding of human error, but very limited part of this research can be directly
utilized - as it is given - to reduce the frequencies of such errors or to lightening their
impact in actual industrial sense.
Melloy et al (2000) studied the explicit trade-off between speed and accuracy in
the structural inspection of aircraft. They modelled the processes of searching an aircraft
structure as sequence of fixations of vision on each area (cell) of the structure. Many
factors influence the accuracy at which a defect may be detected. These include the
likelihood of the inspector fixating on a given cell, time available for that fixation,
complicity of the target and its distance from the centre of fixation. All these factors and
others as well greatly influence the conditional probability of defect detection such that
certain amount of uncertainty is always expected. This necessitates the introduction of
some assumptions in order for the proposed quantification process to be achieved.
Richei et al (2001) introduced the Human Error Rate Assessment and
Optimizing System (HEROS) to evaluate and optimize HMI in Probabilistic Safety
Assessment (PSA). The authors firstly showed major disadvantages of the current HRA
methods as:
1. Lack in quality of reliability data and questionable transferability.
2. Insufficient criteria for choosing the Performance Shaping Factors (PSF’s).
3. A scope virtually restricted to skill and rule-based behaviour, and hence a limited
capacity for evaluating cognitive behaviour.
4. Human error is considered as a phenomenon with little attention paid to its causes.
The authors, in a trial to overcome such previous shortages, gave a thorough
presentation of HEROS as an analyzing and optimizing tool for man-machine systems
with computer implementation. HEROS is built on basis of the Technique for Human
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) method (Swain and Guttmann 1983) but with more
ability to address and evaluate different PSF’s to determine the human error probability
associated with different tasks execution such that necessary improvements may be
implemented. HEROS uses the fuzzy set theory to capture the normal data uncertainties
as well as describing the general human behaviour, however, the system limits its
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handling of the impact of ‘management’ on human performance (e.g. motivation,
training, education, decision hierarchy, safety culture, and team composition) to the
three basic behaviour categories given by the pre-mentioned SRK model (Rasmussen
1983) namely, rule-based, skill-based, and knowledge-based behaviours. HEROS
comprises a simple model to treat the knowledge based behaviour. Again, this model is
still to be verified. Lastly, the given system, although having addressed many
shortcomings of previous tools, but it still depends widely on expert participation and
judgment, the thing that may not always be available for daily practice within industry.
Cacciabue (2004b) divided the methods developed through the last decades to
tackle human factors issues, as being introduced within the Quantitative Risk Analysis
(QRA), into two generations: The first generation ( 1970’s to 1980’s), wherein methods
like THERP mainly focused on behavioural aspects of human performance. These
methods, as means of HRA, provided the required probabilities of human error.
However, they strongly focused on quantification in terms of success / failure of action
performance with lesser attention to in – depth ‘causes’ and ‘reasons’ of erroneous
human behaviour. These methods generally didn’t answer ‘why’ humans made their
undesired errors, and thus these first generation efforts stood short to contribute to
recovery and mitigation aspects required by typical modern Human Error Management
(HEM) techniques. Other shortage of this group is their tendency to capture only static
dependencies of the human behaviour rather than addressing dynamic aspects of HMI.
The second generation of methods, started in the 1990’s, tried to overcome these
difficulties, thus several techniques for identifying causal factors of human errors in
complex industries were furnished. The main common problem that faces most of these
more modern techniques is the rare availability of adequate supporting practical data.
2.6.2 The need of proactive measures to enhance aviation
maintenance safety
A reliability programme for the aviation maintenance is essentially a set of rules
and practices for managing and controlling the maintenance programme. The main
function of a reliability program is “to monitor the performance of maintenance
activities and the associated equipment and call attention for any need for corrective
actions, to monitor the effectiveness of those corrective actions, and to provide data to
justify adjusting of maintenance intervals or procedures whenever those actions are
56
appropriate” Kinnison (2004). A good reliability programme consists of seven basic
elements as well as a number of procedures and administrative functions. Those
elements are: Data collection, problem area alerting, data display, data analysis,
corrective actions, follow-up analysis, and periodic (may be monthly) reporting. The
data collection allows operators to compare present performance with past one in order
to judge the effectiveness of the maintenance and the maintenance programme. An
alerting system should be in place to quickly identify those areas where the performance
is significantly different from the normal. Standard event rates are set according to
statistical analysis of past performance, and deviations from those standards (the alert
level) are detected and treated as required.
On another side, Patankar and Taylor (2004b) discussed the required steps for
changing the aviation maintenance sociotechnical system into a safer one by introducing
these three pillars of change:
1. Management support : Successful change requires an equivocal top management
support, or making the sociotechnical system safety principles part of the culture
2. Quality intervention : successful change requires a well conceived and relevant
quality intervention
3. Measurement and feedback: Successful change requires timely and appropriate
feedback through a broad range of measurement and evaluation.
During analysing the effects of human factors and human errors in aviation
maintenance and the corresponding responsibilities of various parties, Kinnison (2004)
indicated that the airframe and equipment manufacturers have implemented human
factors programs to improve design such that maintenance can be performed more
easily and reduce the number of possible errors that can be made. Improvement in
maintenance manuals and other documents are also under manufacturers’ scrutiny, also
certain academics are looking into the problem of human errors, but ‘operators also
have a responsibility to monitor the processes and procedures they employ, and to
modify those with respect to human error reduction’.
Cacciabue (2004a) showed that safety assessment can be performed through
three quite different perspectives: Design-based accidents, QRA also known as PSA or
PRA, and the Recurrent Safety Audits (RSA). The constitutive elements of complex
technologies have been identified in the presence and interconnection with four factors,
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namely: Organizational and culture traits, working conditions, defences-barriers-
safeguards, and personal and external factors. He also indicated that the assessment of
the safety level throughout a system or organization requires that these four above
factors be evaluated at periodic intervals. These types of evaluations focus on data,
critical system functions, specific human/ machine characteristics that require particular
attention. The safety assessment of an organization generally attempts to evaluate the
safety state (level) of an organization with respect to a variety of safety indicators and
markers. Cacciabue further showed that the improvement of the safety of a system can
not be achieved by tackling actual inappropriate performance that has occurred or may
have happened during an accident, but rather by understanding:
 ‘Why’ operators took certain steps and ‘what’ are the root causes that may have
caused that, or may have generated or triggered-in the failure, or inappropriate
human behaviour?
 ‘What’ forms of inappropriate behaviour was produced, or could result, from such
sociotechnical root causes?
 ‘How’ can systems be developed and human be trained to further enhance safety?
Braithwaite (2001), Nelson et al (1998), Holmgren (2006), Reinman (2007),
Shyur (2008), Liou et al. (2007), Edwards (2007) and others as well highlighted the
general tendency to start a shift towards ‘proactive safety’ after the long saturated
treatment of reactive accidents and incident investigations, and the expected safety
recommendations that usually follow. This proactive perception should not only address
but also dominate the overall aviation industry thinking.
As a practical step, Zolghadri (2002) used the flight parameters abnormalities as
an early warning and error prediction mechanism for overall system safety
enhancement. Beabout (2003) discussed application of statistical process control in
aviation maintenance as an overall predictive identifier of problematic areas. Chen and
Yang (2004) introduced a predictive risk index for safety performance in process
industries. Their predictor is based on regular observation of unsafe acts and conditions.
These unsafe observations are then quantified through a simple rating comprising
estimates of probability of danger, frequency of work exposure, number of persons at
risk, and maximum of probable loss. Similarly, Primatech (2002, 2005) introduced the
Layers Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) concept, a simplified risk assessment method
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that can be applied as a production process to evaluate risk of hazard scenarios, and
compare that with the risk tolerance criteria available. LOPA can be seen as an
extension to the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) which usually involves subjective
engineering judgements. LOPA is meant to eliminate such subjectivity. Jorgensen
(2007) called for systematic use of information from accidents as predictive indicators
to prevent reoccurrence.
Korvers and Sonnemans (2008) discussed the concept of Safety Indicators (SI’s)
within an organization. They defined two types of SI’s: Reactive SI’s, which are
indicators ‘after an accident’ that are resembled by lessons learned, and proactive SI’s
‘before the accident’ that work to prevent undesired events in advance. Proactive
indicators are in turn categorized as predictive (to identify the safety related risks before
any operational activity has been executed) or monitoring (to indicate risks from the on-
the-job pre-warning signals) as given respectively in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
Table 2-3 Predictive safety indicators (Korvers and Sonnemans 2008)
Indicator Tools Data
‘Old’ safety risks Handbooks,
procedures, standards
Substance properties,
process conditions,
piping & instrumentation diagrams‘New’ safety risks Process hazard analysis
Table 2-4 Monitoring safety indicators (Korvers and Sonnemans 2008)
Indicator Tools Data
Safety deviation --------------------- Near misses, minor safety-related
disruptions
Safety measure
check
Inspections, observational
programmes
Presence and functioning of safety
measures
Organizational
risk factors
Audits, inspections Presence and functioning of
organizational safety factors
Safety attitude Safety climate, safety
index
Opinions of employees regarding
safety of the organization
The authors indicated that in spite of all these tools implemented in various
industries to predict or monitor safety status, accidents still happen occasionally.
Consequently the two writers derived a hypothesis that: “There still exist safety risks
that are not covered by current SI’s”. To support this thinking they analyzed a large
sample of reported accidents and found that most of those were preceded by ‘early
signals’ which can be identified in recent accidents trajectories, but are not covered by
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current proactive SI’s. This is because normally for a’ pre-warning signal’ to be
included in the active SI’s lists, it must be either tangible or measurable, which is not
always the case. In fact, the used SI’s are usually based on ‘safety related data’ while
those pre-warning signals are ‘not safety related’ or at most are ‘indirect safety related
data’, thus they are normally ignored when setting up SI’s, and therefore they are not
fed as input for the current active safety tools. Current safety tools, while being very
efficient, but they are generally fed only by ‘safety related data’, thus large amounts of
information from these ‘signals’ are usually left out, a fact that creates ‘holes’ within
these systems. The two writers recommended that focus should be given on reoccurring
disruptions that are present in daily operations because they include important indicators
of potential accidents. The writers also called for the knowledge regarding this to be
mutually extended between various safety-interested actors within industry.
In a forerunner approach, Grabowski et al (2007) discussed the safety indicators
application to high reliability virtual organizations. Safety indicators are similarly
categorized as lagging (reactive, focusing on organizational malfunctioning with large
scale of analysis), and leading (proactive, primarily covering individual to departmental
levels with small units of analysis).
This is indicated by Figure 2.12.
The writers then proposed an
approach to adapt the leading
safety indicators (objective and
subjective) in a collective proactive
process to identify hazards, and
control risks.
Figure 2-12 Leading and laging safety indicators
(Grabowski 2007 )
Hollnagel (2007) discussed the relations between risk, barriers, and safety. He
concluded that any organization may face all or any of three safety threats: regular
threats of frequent presence such that standards could be developed to tackle them,
irregular threats which normally are one-off events that can be imagined but can never
be faced with known standards, and unexampled events which are virtually impossible
to imagine and which exceed the available collective experience. Both irregular threats
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and unexampled events are infrequent and unusual that they can not be treated in the
conventional way of designed barriers. Their distinguishing feature is that they emerge
out of situation, thus the ideal way to deal with them is to proactively address the
situations and conditions where they can occur.
2.6.3 Fuzzy logic approach to human reliability enhancement
Fussy logic was first introduced by Zadeh (1965) to address the need for new
mathematical tools that can be used to accurately model a variety of uncertainties within
different systems and activities, the thing that may not be possible through using
conventional mathematical techniques. The core importance of the fuzzy logic theory is
its ability to convert data of uncertain and subjective nature into a usable certain,
objective, and quantifiable data that can be utilized, with high accuracy, to built
mathematical modelling for problems within imprecise, vague, ill defined, ill separable
or doubtful contexts or data sources (Kaufmann and Gupta 1985, 1988).
Fuzzy logic, though only recently introduced, but it is spreading fast and finding
new applications within complex engineering areas each day. Very recently fuzzy logic
has similarly been used to model problems of HMI systems and human reliability
quantification (Cox 1999). Dagdeviren et al (2007) introduced a fuzzy ANP model to
identify faulty behaviour risk in work system. The ANP is an extension of the AHP and
it is applied in fuzzy context using pair-wise comparison matrices to quantify risks
associated with various activities within a production plant.
Some other emerging research works that applied fuzzy logic to various extents
are: A real- time decision- making of maintenance using fuzzy agent ( Lu and Sy
2008), application of extent analysis method on fuzzy AHP (Chang 1996), multi-criteria
analysis with fuzzy pairwise comparison (Deng 1999), quality function deployment
planning using fuzzy ANP (Kahraman et al 2006), inductive learning in fuzzy systems
(Castro and Zurita 1997), selecting efficient maintenance approaches using fuzzy logic
(Al Najjiar and Alsyouf 2003), knowledge-based linguistic equations for defect
detection (Gebus et al 2007), a process monitoring module of fuzzy logic and pattern
recognition (Devillez et al 2004), extracting syntactic information from java code using
expert system (Depradine 2003), a fuzzy modelling application of CREAM
methodology for human reliability analysis (Konstandinidou et al. 2006), a fuzzy
approach to the conditioning monitoring of a packaging plant ( Jeffries et al 2001).
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2.7 Chapter Summary
Literature is rich with theories, concepts, and models discussing human
reliability and associated human error causal factors that always set the scene for
incidents and accidents to occur within safety-critical HMI systems. As initially titled,
the chief purpose of this chapter is to exhibit the search for researchable gaps within
scientific knowledge of the aviation maintenance field, and the impact of human
fallibilities on it. The chapter described a review methodology that covered concentric
folds of safety, aviation maintenance, and more focally, maintenance human factors.
The aim is to systematically absorb the previous available information within literature
from the broad spectrum of safety to deeper focus into the thesis subject matter. The
chapter is also intended to elevate from the limited local understanding and
familiarization with the subject that usually features co-existent reviews, to higher level
of openness as a conclusive referee document. This systemized prospectus necessitated
this elongated feature of the chapter.
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3 Selection and Application of the Research
Methodology
Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it,
and I shall move the world.
Archimedes
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The importance of a research methodology
A Research’s Methodology (RM) is its core. It is the second elevation in a
triangular podium that joins also research scholarship and research contribution as
indicated in Chapter 1. More precisely, this writer sees RM as ‘the holistic integration
of theories and actions that work systematically to develop answers to that research’s
questions emerging from current knowledge gaps’. It can thus be considered as a logical
manifestation of those
questions, and subsequently,
of their upstream triggering
gaps, all in nature, quantity,
and depth. Figure 3.1
illustrates the vital role of a
RM within the research
paradigm conceptualization.
The overall notion of RM is
to provide the indispensable
channels bridging current
knowledge pool to future
discoveries, solutions, and
innovations in all fields.
According to Mellenbergh et
al.(2003), RM “is an essential
part of research and teaching
in the behavioural life and
social sciences”. They further
Figure 3-1 Research Methodology Paradigm
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indicated that RM is intimately linked, on one side, to substantive areas of knowledge
such as engineering, medicine, education, sociology, psychology, and economics. On
the other side, RM is also linked to statistics techniques and computer science with their
expanding applications, and to the philosophy of science as an overall imperative
abstract structure. Still, RM should always be clearly separated from all these fields.
Although RM initiates from substantive researchable information cavities and
applies statistical tools and insights from other fields, but it cuts its own path in
creating, building, and applying new models, methods, and insights. The importance of
RM as a decisive element formulating the advancement of a specific research is
inescapably high. This is absolutely evidenced by the facts that correct design or
selection of solution roadmaps, appropriate application of sequential intermeshing sub-
methods, adequate provision of analysis reliability measures, proper interpretation and
usage of research findings, etc. - being all about methodology – are, in parallel
contemplation, key factors for any targeted success.
The adopted methodology for the current research, as will be discussed shortly,
greatly inspires such an understanding. This methodology is totally taken with firmness,
throughout all its stages, to resemble the research’s first booster to achieve its
objectives. Its importance stems from the very complicated context of the problem:
Tackling unpredictable human errors within dynamic safety-critical sociotechnical
system of aviation maintenance.
3.1.2 This chapter
This chapter furnishes the necessary conceptual platform supporting the
selection of the main methodology of this research. An overview of various ideologies,
schools, and paradigms of research methodologies is comprehensively presented and
discussed. Then, with adequate reference to this research’s questions and objectives, a
general set of characteristics needed for the main RM is identified. A new generic
procedure for methodology selection is subsequently introduced. Using this procedure,
the main RM is selected and justified. In the course of further describing the adopted
methodology, a brief account of the main activities carried out within this research is
laid, leaving full details to next parts of the thesis.
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3.2 Identifying characteristics of the required methodology
3.2.1 Adopting a research methodology: The basic Know-How
Mellenbergh et al. (2003) discussed the two well-established folds of research
mechanisms: The theory-driven and the data-driven poles of research. The theory-based
research, also known as the confirmatory analysis is usually launched by dedicated
theoretical notions that are used to construct a model. This model is fitted, in turn, to
empirical data in the course of validation. The theory is then either falsified or backed-
up according to the degree of empirical data fitting within the model frame. The major
drawback that this confirmatory analysis faces is that a model, being only an
approximation of reality, can never be completely correct.
In distinction, the data-driven research, also known as exploratory data analysis,
starts from empirical data and works to derive a model from that data. This is possible if
relations between data variables can be patterned. This approach also suffers a major
problem: the derived model persuasively fits, by nature, the data within the specified
sample. However, it is not definite to fit the data form other populations. In philosophy
of science, both approaches are evidently recognized in the tendency to distinguish
between a milieu of discovery, within the data-triggered research, and a perspective of
justification within the theory-launched research. In practice, an ambitious research
designer must often make a mindfully consideration of these two mechanisms.
Other major classification of research works put them into either quantitative or
qualitative respects. It is, in the main, acknowledged that picking of a qualitative or a
quantitative approach during a research’s front design is significantly decided referring
to the original orientation of that research, and whether any of the two approaches is
more effective in achieving its announced objectives. This depends on the state of the
research being formulated to test or create a theory. Delattre et al.(2009) declared that
“the main objective of qualitative research is to create a methodology for approaching,
understanding, analysing and explaining management phenomena at a social or
company level”. Thus, a qualitative research can result in certain intellectual
formulations that usually accommodate the needed explanations, dissimilar to
quantitative systems that often look at validity through simplifications and
generalization. Delattre et al (2009) cited also many works (Marshall and Rossman
1989, Stake 1995) when listing the following characteristics of the qualitative research:
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 It provides ‘in depth’ learning of societal phenomena.
 The allowance for close and yet holistic understanding of complex organizations,
groups, or communities and the significant roles of human element within them.
Not like quantitative works that target the validation of hypothetical contents via a
small capacity of variables.
 Attentively focus on more intensely exploring the origins and varieties of believes,
opinions, actions, and accumulative traditions.
 When studying companies, qualitative research considers management conditions
as a unity, this facilitates contextualization of the whole study elements.
 Aims at producing new theories
 The resultant theoretical construction is not finalised before the end of all
qualitative field study activities. This is because newly emerging questions may
come up during the interface between “theorisation and empirical realism”, and
thus, the main research query can even be customized, as the research advances, to
have room for the results from the field.
 Data collection is usually more flexible and fluidized through qualitative
approaches when compared to quantitative ones.
Flick (2002) listed many current schools in qualitative research applications
including grounded theory school, narrative and biographical analysis, objective
hermeneutics, phenomenology, ethnography, cultural studies, and gender studies.
Ethnography, according to Flick, works to provide understanding of the insides of the
social context involved. This understanding can be achieved by actually participating in
the processes leading to the events under focus instead of just performing limited
surface interviews or observations. Ethnography, launched early 1980’s, encompasses
many methods including formalized interviews, documents analysis, or observation. .
Farmer et al. (2006) tinted the state-of-the art in various techniques followed to
enhance reliability of qualitative research methodologies. One of such techniques is
‘triangulation’; the “methodological approach that contributes to the validity of research
results when multiple methods, sources, theories, and/or investigators are employed”.
However, although many works in social sciences cited the magnitude of triangulation
as a duplicated validity of the research methodologies, but only little of these works
ever explained the practical aspects of this triangulation application.
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A challenging matter to a research designer, as well, is the ‘depth’ to which the
research ‘digging’ mechanisms should go. In other words, how much data are to be
collected, and more importantly, how deep that data should be analysed in a fashion that
satisfies the equation joining the terms of research objectives and its allocated resources,
nonetheless of these are manning, finance, and time. In general, the depth and
comprehensiveness of the required analysis will always be dictated – at least
temporarily – by the complexity of the problem, its questions and its expected answers,
if any can be predicted.
To conclude: The quality of pragmatic research is significantly secured by its
applied methodology’s obstinacy. A successful research, with salient methodological
rigor, must be aptly and robustly designed with sufficient consideration paid to
measuring instruments, as well as various methods construct, practicality, validity and
reliability. Samples are to be selected as to provide highest levels of suitability and
capacity of representation. Analysis and findings reporting stages, regardless of the
depth that analysis may set out, must also be well performed with the required levels of
accuracy and soundness.
3.2.2 A methodology to set ‘The Methodology’
The front design stage of a research in a field as multifaceted as safety
enhancement within the sociotechnical context of aviation maintenance is a real
demanding challenge. The detailed problematic issues concerning human reliability
there-within is not of lesser complexity either. Thus, good planning and concrete
evidence of methodology setting correctness will be main requirements bridging to any
targeted success. For the purposes of this particular research, a detailed preparatory
procedure was followed to get to the final methodological setting that is later
implemented in the course of the current study fulfilment.
As illustrated by Figure 3-2, an initial all-ranging sequential procedure was
followed to ‘set’ the required research methodology that is most predominantly capable
of answering the research questions, and satisfying its objectives within the available
resources. For convenience, this procedure is given the code: Research Front-End
Design (RFED) methodology. RFED, although essentially launched within this
research, but it is so generic that it can support early design stages of limitless
applications of research studies.
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Figure 3-2 RFED generic procedural methodology
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This procedure, in fact, exposes a mini-methodology that objectivists setting the major
research methodology. The sequence of steps accordingly followed, in the course of
designing this research, was performed to ensure that the targeted major methodology
satisfies the following capital characteristics:
 It demonstrates evidence of understanding of philosophical, empirical, as well
as academic implications of the problem under investigation.
 Its final design is concluded after thoroughly refining a affluent assortment of
methodological choices, including inventing new methods.
 Its selection, modification, upgrading, or introduction is totally justified.
 It demonstrates capability of fulfilling the announced research objectives with
the highest operational competence possible.
More practically, in the course of RFED implementation, a broad methodology-
oriented literature review was initially conducted in the fields of human factors, human
reliability, aviation maintenance, aviation accidents and incidents investigations, human
error causal factors, organizational and safety cultures, and many other folds of the
research subject matter. This literature scanning was simultaneously accompanied by
active industry insights and consultations regarding aviation maintenance-induced
safety occurrences and the available remedy practices. Thus, a clear image featuring the
state-of-the-art in this regard was obtained. This standing preliminary surveying acts,
moreover, highlighted a large number of theories, models, methods, taxonomies, tools,
programmes, case studies and research activities all dealing with human reliability
within aviation maintenance complex context in particular, as well as the all-
surrounding broader organizational safety management and safety culture perspectives.
The above probing booster process, more to the point, was widened to
accommodate openings from other safety-critical fields such as nuclear industry,
medicine, and other modes of transportation, mainly rail and marine. This early
illumination led to the appreciation of a number of previous and current works and
associated methods in these fields. Accordingly, the sequence given in Figure 3-2 was
exclusively followed such that the working major methodology of this research was
ultimately set in the light of the required capital characteristics discussed above. Details
will be presented in the coming sections, however, it is worth stressing here that the
term ‘methodology set’, as used here, is precise. The ‘setting’, depending upon many
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variables, is a collective behaviour that can include: adopting an already established and
practically validated methodology, making an integrated consortium of pooled
methodologies, accepting a methodology after doing necessary modifications and / or
upgrading on it, or explicitly crafting and introducing fresh methodologies of mature or
invented ingredients and techniques. For this writer, it is at this stage, in which such
behaviour is conducted, when the basic research methodology is sensibly ‘set’.
3.2.3 Required characteristics of the research methodology
In addition to the basic targeted methodological characteristics discussed in the
previous section, and according to Shrivastava (1987) and Varadarajan (2003), a
successful research methodology is the one that, furthermore, satisfies a range of other
intermeshing research and methodological features. These features, some of which are
listed here below, were adopted by this thesis as further influential methodological
guidelines:
 The methodology structure was carefully set to effectively answer the research
questions
 Measures were taken to ensure exactness and yet flexibility of data collection
processes as well as related measurement influencing issues, such as applied
methods practicality, validity, reliability, and data aptness to the risen questions.
 Appropriate methods of human factors and human reliability-oriented analysis
were applied, followed by necessary statistical and numerical procedures and
formulations that empirically treated the research questions and the overall
research objectives.
 Necessary arrangements were furnished for the validation of findings and their
practical implications
 Utmost care was paid to ensure proper and accurate reporting, analysis, and
discussion of this research’s findings in addition to the entire set of theories and
actions that led to them.
 The research design was laid such that all research objectives are to be achieved
within available resources, nonetheless of is time span.
These guidelines formed a well-constructed instrument that greatly shaped the
finally-applied research methodology as will be discussed thoroughly in the following
sections.
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3.3 HERMES methodology: The concept and application
3.3.1 The methodology concept
The adopted methodology, which is justified as the best leading to this
research’s objectives, is known as Human Error Risk Management in Engineering
Systems (HERMES) first introduced by Cacciabue (2004a,b) for analyzing HMI in
complex contexts. This methodology encompasses a complex mosaic of human factors
analysis and modelling techniques. It is structured in a number of steps to preserve the
basic requirements of congruence and consistency between both types of retrospective
and prospective studies as well as to underpin the correspondence between recurrent
HMI analysis and system safety and integrity. An illustrative presentation of the
HERMES methodology is given in Figure 3-3.
HERMES, with its embodied analysis techniques, was introduced to fill the need
to correlate retrospective and prospective studies in a logical analytical process that can
support the considerations of sound HMI practical industry-oriented approaches. Its
major fields of application are accident and incident investigation, human factors
training, human factors design enhancement, and safety assessment of complex
engineering systems.
As Figure 3-3 shows, the methodology structure starts with two main
simultaneous streams leading to actual realization of the emerging problematic
phenomenon: A meticulous evaluation of the sociotechnical context enveloping the
problem under focus, and a thorough theoretical background furnishing the state-of-the
art of the conceptualities governing or influencing that problem. This preliminary stage
of the methodology involves ethnographic studies, task analysis, HMI models and
taxonomies. It sets the pace to “identify the conditions that favour certain behaviours,
which may foster accidents” (Cacciabue 2004a). The correlation between humans and
machines shaping the phenomenon under investigation can thus better be
acknowledged, and a firm base of understanding regarding the problem can be formed.
This will greatly influence the formation and execution of the next two investigative and
predictive stages of the research. The retrospective (investigative) and prospective
(predictive) phases of the methodology are mutually-linked. Although they are varying
in sequence of application time-wise, but huge volume of data exchange is expected to
take place between the two stages.
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Figure 3-3 HERMES methodology structure (from Cacciabue 2004a)
A general sequence of correlation within these two investigative and predictive
streams of activity can be briefly highlighted as follows:
 The retrospective stage starts with a detailed investigation of the past events’
causes, sequences, and patterns. This is conducted through a comprehensive
detailed Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of such events. Both individual shortages
and / or organizational systemic malfunctioning that led to these events are
identified, this is a deeply-engaged secondary accident investigation activity.
 Accidents analysis will provide highly sophisticated information on the causes,
effects, and reasons of accidents, as well as related parameters, indicators of
possible malfunctioning within the overall system.
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 Detailed human factors-oriented training programmes can thus be undertaken
using the knowledge acquired through this post-event examination of safety
failures when put in contrast to the initial data and theoretical background
information.
 The output from the retrospective analysis is directly utilized to determine and
evaluate the individuals and organizational performance influencing factors, thus
various forms of possible future erroneous functioning scenarios can be predicted
in generic modes.
 These generic behavioural scenarios can then be further elaborated to identify
initial and boundary conditions for the required prospective analysis. These
conditions are the ones setting exact description, context, environment, and even
culture of the predicted erroneous scenarios of the future. These initial and
boundary conditions are merely generated out of the subject-matter knowledge,
expertise, and brain creativity of the analyst.
 By containing the safety occurrences data, indicators, performance governing
factors, initial and boundary conditions, and the various HMI models and
taxonomies involved, it is possible then to apply risk methods in order to predict
future weaknesses and to set possible remedies on-the-spot. This is applicable for
both general safety assessment as well as design-for-safety enhancement.
3.3.2 Why choosing HERMES for this research?
The decision to select and modify HERMES to form the working methodology
for this research was taken after carefully applying the previously discussed RFED
procedure. This crucial decision is justified through the following focal describers:
1. The selection of HERMES for this research can firstly be justified by accrediting
its original in-built resourceful characteristics such as:
 This methodology is a generic framework with applications in the fields of
accident / incident investigation, human factors training, human factors design
enhancement, and safety assessment of complex engineering systems. This
multipurpose orientation ensures greater degrees of operational flexibility.
 Its ability to link retrospective and prospective types of studies in a logical
analytical process that supports the considerations of sound HMI approaches.
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 It is a hybrid methodology firmly joining theoretical concepts with practical
implementation. It has already been successfully applied in a variety of safety-
critical industries such as aviation and rail.
 The smooth association between persistent HMI analysis and system safety
and integrity.
 Flexibility in selecting sub-techniques and particular HMI tools within the
generic methodology layout to satisfy specific progressive tactical targets.
2. HERMES’s core concepts and practicalities are all directly relating to this
research’s subject matter, namely the influence of HMI in the total system safety.
3. This methodology provides suitable environment to effectively accommodate all
previously discussed characteristics and properties (section 3.2.3) required for the
methodology of this research. In this regard it holds open opportunities to free
selection of suitable sub-methods and localized models, plus flexible room for
data and analysis reliability assurance. Further, it calls for triangulation, empirical
data collection, practicality, and full application of brain creativity and
innovativeness within its final stages.
4. The possibility of meaningfully re-crafting the detailed structure of HERMES to
exactly suit this research’s objectives and resources without altering the general
conceptual sequence of the methodology manifestation.
5. According to RFED logic, adopting a re-composed version of HERMES, is the
most suitable adequate option for this research. This detailed modified structure of
the methodology was cross checked for further confirmation regarding accuracy of
the proposed alterations and their effects on the research plan.
3.4 The applied version of HERMES
3.4.1 Adapting HERMES to this research
One evolved aim of this research is to introduce a holistic integrated Aviation
Maintenance Monitoring Process (AMMP) that can be utilized collectively by
operators, regulators and aircraft manufacturers to monitor and early detect potential
existence of errors causal triggers associated with human factors during aviation
maintenance. The process, comprising multiple strands, is to be practically applied and
refined within industry.
75
To suit this research, some major alterations has been applied to the original
HERMES structure in order to accommodate the research overall scope, while being
loyal to the original main philosophy stream. These alternations included dropping of
the accident/ incident investigation and the human factors training as end user terminal
applications. In the other hand, safety auditing application is replaced in the new version
with a proactive safety monitoring process. This monitoring process, mainly dedicated
to aviation maintenance practices, includes safety enhancement both during aircraft and
their parts design for maintainability, as well as for day to day operational life within
MRO’s. Details of the finalized research methodology are shown in Figure 3-4.
3.4.2 The methodology application: a brief overview
3.4.2.1 Fundamental Studies
The front end studies comprised a sophisticated literature review that focused
knowledge of the field, and critically evaluated the previous contributions. Then a
sociotechnical evaluation of the helicopter maintenance context was performed through
detailed ethnographic studies based on observation, meetings, interviews, and visits to
regulators, operators, manufacturers, and research centres. Maintainer task analysis was
then performed. In a parallel line, a theoretical and conceptual knowledge base of the
HMI systems and human behaviour taxonomies was built. By the end of this stage, the
research problem was crystallized. Consequently, the research orientation was set and
the associated research aim, objectives, and questions were furnished. The methodology
processes roadmap was then set as the work’s core structure.
3.4.2.2 Retrospective Backward Studies
For main data collection, a number of 804 helicopter safety occurrences were
carefully scanned. Out of these, a sample comprising 58 of maintenance-induced fatal
accidents and severe incidents was then thoroughly analysed using Human Factors
Accident Classification System – Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) taxonomy
(Schimidt et al. 1998,2001). Human error causal factors were first identified through the
well established three classification orders of the taxonomy. Then a new more
sophisticated fourth order of causal factors classification was introduced to raise the
analysis resolution from 34 categories at the established third order to a total number of
197 new fourth order categories which are coded: ‘Specific Failures’ (SF’s).
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Figure 3-4 Research applied methodology structure based on HERMES methodology
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Inter-rater reliabilities of 0.766 Cohen Kappa and 94.77% Percentage of Agreement
were obtained during analysis. A further emphasis was given by applying FTA and
Hierarchal Task Analysis (HTA) to identify probable mechanisms of helicopter
maintenance errors. The end of this stage represented a major milestone by the
identification of maintenance PIF’s. PIF’s are the factors and performance sequences
leading to human maintenance errors.
3.4.2.3 Prospective Forward Studies
Using the outcomes of the retrospective research, a creative thinking process was
conducted to set pace for the targeted maintenance proactive monitoring process. This
was triggered by introducing ‘The Swamp’, a new human error model that explains the
sequence and propagation of safety-related human errors through the behaviour of
aircraft maintainer, supervisor, crew or other associated personnel. As a direct means to
apply this ‘Swamp’ theory, the main AMMP project layout was introduced as well after
a series of successive developments. The AMMP- as a holistic process- is a framework
designed to join safety-oriented integrated activities within regulators, manufacturers,
and most importantly, aircraft maintenance organisations. This communal process is to
systematically collect maintenance performance safety-related raw data, analyse them
and then design and apply any required new measures or modify those already in place
such that any relative cited error causal factors can be proactively eliminated or at least
positively treated.
3.4.2.4 Fuzzy logic: The core of the final product
The projected AMMP, as discussed previously, aims at assessing the existence
of root causes leading to errors within ‘real’ uncertain and vague environments such as
those witnessed within aviation maintenance industry. The usual subjectivity, always
present within explorers’ and experts’ opinions when judging such existence, is yet
another vital factor that led, with the first, to the selection of fuzzy analysis to be the
main practice of the AMMP software programme (branded as ErroDetect). Kaufmann
and Gupta (1988) wrote: “If our knowledge of the environment is imprecise, as happens
in medical diagnosis, engineering, management decision-making, etc, the model must
include the notion of the level of presumption. Fuzzy numbers have been created to
reflect the vagueness of human perception and thus the notion of the level of
presumption. These fuzzy numbers thus reflect the human cognitive process”. New
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fuzzy logic algorithms are thus introduced within this research to further affectionate the
established tactics in this regard, and to significantly reduce the need of complicated and
costly systems of experts, thus setting a more industry-oriented product.
The AMMP model is built using fuzzy ANP theory. It comprised two fields of
application:
 Design for maintainability continuum.
 Line maintenance performance continuum.
The concept is to continuously monitor existence of maintenance human error
triggers that may initiate during aircrafts and other equipment design process, or during
maintenance practices at the MRO lines. Having error triggers identified in advance,
they can then be eliminated systematically. As a final part of the applied methodology,
the AMMP process was subjected to simulation tests, field experts’ evaluation, and
direct application within real world settings.
3.4.2.5 Roadmap for methodology application
The adopted methodology was conducted through sequential stages that formed
successive mile stones of a major roadmap dictated by the outlines previously illustrated
as per Figure 3.4. Although detailed description, analysis, and application of various
theories and models, discussed within this research, are given through the following
chapters, nevertheless, a brief staged roadmap of the methodology activities can be
indicated here as per Figure 3. 5.
3.4.3 Challenges to the methodology application
The application of HERMES in this research was faced by many challenges, the
earliest of those was the need to modify the original methodology layout in order to
accommodate the present research requirements. This was first suggested by this writer
and then approved by Cacciabue, the methodology initiator, and his team at the
European Union’s Joined Research Centre-Italy. This modification consequently gave
rise to a new challenge to the adapted methodology being the first to be thus
implemented. Another difficulty was in-built within the methodology itself, in fact, the
original methodology is a multi-teamwork-oriented protocol due to its well branched
and diverse activities that need to be simultaneously addressed, thus it proved out to be
very challenging for a limited number of researchers to cope.
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The most critical conundrum that faced the application of this methodology
broke out at the phase of data collection. It was very difficult to get formal helicopter
accidents reports that are written with satisfactorily reflection to human factors issues,
consequently only 58 reports could be used for data analysis out of a total number of
804. The wide spectrum and diversity of the methodology sub-components necessitated
serious upgrading and enrichments to the researcher’s abilities and know-how such that
those sub-components may be satisfactorily handled, for instance, a formal accident
investigation qualification was obtained first in order to better understand accidents
occurrence mechanisms and accident reports writing and analysis. A tactical problem
faced the execution of the interrater reliability for the analysed reports. It was seriously
difficult to allocate experienced co-workers with approved qualification in the yet new
HFACS-ME taxonomy and associated report coding and analysis. Further more, a major
challenge as well was the ability of selected aviation maintenance organizations to
allocate the necessary provisions within their daily activities and staff workforce to
practically apply the designed AMMP in the course of its verification within industry.
3.5 Chapter summary
HERMES is a much systematized methodology that provides strategic as well as
tactical guidelines for a smooth flow of research sequential activities. The methodology
is totally generic to accommodate different requirements of HMI treatment within
safety-critical engineering systems. It has already been applied within various industries
where it showed high rates of reliability. The current research, by adopting a modified
version of HERMES, is ambitious to make the best out of its characteristics to address
human error as seen in helicopter maintenance context, this will be of significant
benefits for aviation safety in general. On the other hand, a sound application of the
adopted methodology is hoped to give provision for the academic requirements of a
PhD study to evolve, those undoubtedly encompass scientific scholarship, methodology
practicalities, and a substantive contribution to the field knowledge pool.
Each of the afore-discussed challenges and the ways they were tackled
represented an indispensable learning opportunity, the HMI models selection and
application, the limited number of co-workers, the desperate data hunt, the required
analysis reliability affordability, and the inventive introduction of new safety tools.
PART TWO
ANALYTICAL RETROSPECTIVE STUDIES
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4 Evaluating the Sociotechnical Context
of Aviation Maintenance
Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature.
And that is because, in the last analysis, we ourselves
are a part of the mystery that we are trying to solve.
Max Planck
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Understanding the sociotechnical context
Contemporary research works, reports, and other publications that converse
safety and / or reliability issues without genuinely referring to the term ‘sociotechnical’
are rare. To explore this term, the Collins English Dictionary (1995, P782, 850) defines
‘sociology’ as “the study of the development, organization, functioning and
classification of human societies”. Further, it defines things that are ‘technical’ as those
“of or specializing in industrial, practical, or mechanical arts and applied sciences”.
Joining these two connotations, a conceptual frame that describes the existence and
behaviours of humans within machine-driven environments can be understood.
Before the 1950s of the last 20th century, research and industry institutions often
called for technological determinism where technology advancements and practicalities
were taken to have the main direct effects on the production cycle. By then, terms
standing for human presence were never added to the wheel-turning equation. It was
only by Trist and Bamforth (1951) when an appreciation to the influence of human
input within technical systems was introduced. The two writers argued that “human and
organizational outcomes could only be understood when social, psychological,
environmental and technological systems are assessed as a whole”. This approach,
which is defined as the ‘sociotechnical system’, was further developed and described by
many works. Griffith and Dougherty (2001) showed that organizations constitute of
“people (the social system) using tools, techniques and knowledge (the technical
system) to produce goods or services valued by customers (who are part of the
organization’s external environment)”.
Cacciabue (2004a) showed that HMS’s are those realistic contexts in which
humans operate machines through appropriate interfaces and controls. For him, these
HMS are composed of two folds: The technical plant capital (interfaces) and the
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enveloping sociotechnical working environment. Sociotechnical fold, in turn, comprises
four intermeshing elements:
a. Organizational processes: These are represented by strategic organizational
decisions and the associated corresponding organizational culture. Both of which,
when coupled together, play the vital role in setting the manner in which a
technical system is - or should be - operated.
b. Personal and external factors: Personal factors are the individual’s specific
physical or mental describers that dictate his / her behaviour within the work
context, while external factors are “all random physical or system contingencies”
impinging on neighbouring working conditions including safety measures.
c. Local working conditions: These are the conditions affecting the implementation
of tasks by influencing either the interface between operators and control systems
or the cognitive powers of these operators or both. Maurino (1995) defined these
local working conditions as “the specific conditions that influence the efficiency
and reliability of human performance in a particular work context”.
d. Defences, barriers, and safeguards: These are the structures and mechanisms,
either substantial or societal, that are premeditated, programmed, and set within
the human-machine system so as to provide for higher capable and safe running of
a plant, both for planned or emergent operations.
Sociotechnical systems have always been challenging when it came to safety
management perspectives. This is totally coinciding with the basic in-built
characteristics of these systems: having humans, with all their potential reliability
fallibilities, operating compounds of technology that are, by definition, significantly
complex. Carayon (2006), Reiman and Oedewald (2007), and many other writers
highlighted this juxtaposition of difficulties. They called for intense application of
human factors techniques and ergonomic advancements to better handle such
difficulties, expressly for sociotechnical systems that join work across multiple
boundaries of many integrated, yet individual disciplines. In this regard, a “more
proactive and predictive approach is needed, that is based on an accurate view on an
organization and the demands of the work in question”.
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4.1.2 A unique dilemma of aviation maintenance
Patankar and Taylor (2004b) cited many works that showed aviation
maintenance as a unique sociotechnical context. To such an understanding, safe and
successful aviation maintenance and repair are not to be achieved solely through
utilizing technology, contrary, technology ‘users’ are those who were found more
responsible for such safety or success.
An aviation maintenance mechanic sometimes faces, in spite of all the precise
technology around him/ her, some moments of uncertainty. Huge amounts of factors
can play seen and hidden roles in crystallizing such uncertainties. Such situations, when
there are no clear boarders between the right and wrong ways of completing a job, when
no or only void supportive information are available, when he/ she is required to
finalize a task while passengers are getting ready to board on the other side of the
aircraft. Such situations, and so many similar ones, are the moments when human
fallibility bounces out of control to set the trigger for a maintenance error.
“Maintenance personnel are confronted with a set of human factors unique
within aviation maintenance” (Hobbs 2008). A large range of aviation maintenance
activities are far hazardous to perform than most of the jobs within other labour roles in
other industries. Tasks are to be successfully and safely completed in extremely high or
low temperatures, open or closed workplaces, high locations and confined spaces. In
aviation maintenance, preparatory and technical documentary work can actually
resample higher weights than the actual physical activities on the aircrafts. At the gates,
huge mental pressures are always there to be coldly absorbed by the mechanic who is,
nevertheless, obliged to follow each and every detail. Huge brainstorming capabilities
as well as supreme physical fitness are essential where faults diagnosis, decision
making, remedy solution implementation, and technical measures execution are all to be
handled together. What's more, communication and coordination margins are critical:
With long distances between the job platforms at the far rear parts of an airliner and the
controlling displays in its cockpit, high levels of noise, heat, and gas emissions from
power plants and test rigs, working on semi-illuminated dark tarmacs, and so many
other comparable scenarios, it is always hard to guarantee that the required levels of
effective and efficient communication and team collaboration are secured.
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Another completely separate category of overwhelming mental and
psychological pressures, that aviation mechanics carry with them day and night, are
those associated with the long-term influence of their momentary activities on aircrafts.
An accident can suddenly explode out as a result of some ‘sleeping’ error within a
maintenance job that was performed months or even years before. The mental and even
spiritual loads on a mechanic whose maintenance activities once resulted in an accident
are tremendously immense. Aviation maintenance, by all means, is such a sophisticated
sociotechnical environment where both its ‘socio’ as well as ‘technical’ strings are
stretched to their maximum limits.
4.1.3 This chapter
This chapter describes the activities performed during the preliminary stages of
the adopted methodology execution. Ethnographic mapping of the aviation maintenance
context is performed, maintenance task analysis is consequently conducted. As a result,
detailed conception and deep understanding regarding the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of this
sociotechnical system are achieved.
4.2 Ethnographic study of aviation maintenance
4.2.1 Ethnography
Ethnography, as a subset of anthropology, has been first introduced as a concept
and a tool to explore the lives, behaviours and human production of other cultures
(Garfinkel 1967). The main characteristic of an ethnographer is ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’
there in the same moments. The concept of ethnography, as a direct powerful way of
learning about different human settings, is built on the idea that the information
collector being totally immersed within the targeted population such that detailed
knowledge on all life aspects within that population is acquired, and simultaneously
being so contained, professional, articulate and light such that he / she has utterly no
footprint impacting the original setting under investigation. Through ethnography, some
pure exhaustive descriptive data pertaining to the community under analysis is planned
to be obtained. Such set of ‘thick data’ usually converges-out free of any imposed
external pre-conceptualities or influential ideas.
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Ethnography, although first launched within research targeting social, racial,
cultural, psychological and even philosophical contexts of the communal samples
under light, but gradually it tends to accommodate other contexts as well. To this end,
work contexts have recently become famous targets for ethnographers. Work
establishments comprising man-technology settings often found nowadays to resemble
true reflection of the surrounding local and national habits and cultures (Cacciabue
2004b). These are found to increasingly impact the active policies, implementation
procedures, and the overall business attitudes set by a given organization. Ethnographic
studies are featured by a set of properties that are thoroughly illuminated by several
writers (Robson 2002, Wolcott 2005):
a. Ethnography is not only about collecting data describing behaviours, actions,
events, and contexts of the community under investigation, rather, it is about
understanding the meanings behind these attributes.
b. To obtain such an understanding, an ‘insider’s perspective’ is essential.
c. Ethnography is a scientific paradigm, an applied procedure, yet it is an art.
Sensitivity and sensibility of an ethnographer are but main inputs to the fieldwork,
chiefly within situations when sheer quantifying scientific data is not required, or
at least not the sole that is required.
d. Participant’s observation is an essential ethnographic technique.
e. Data collection may take elongated periods through multiphase setting.
Casley and Kumar (1992) defined a participant observer as the one who
“participates in the activities that are the subject of his study”, however, this definition
is progressively more used to cover lengthy inhabited observation with only minor
definite participation. Direct observation is always supplemented by information
gathered from interviewing key informants (Johnson 1990) as well as from analysis of
documents, records, etc.
4.2.2 Objectives of the ethnographic investigations in this
research
In accordance to the holistic methodology adopted by this research, the
ethnographic study of aviation maintenance should work to push the knowledge
envelope pertaining to safety culture, performance, and descriptive indictors there
within. This study is targeting the following objectives:
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a. Knowing the overall and detailed structures of MRO’s, and understanding the
procedures and legislations governing the sequence of work performance there
within.
b. Understanding the social component, the human capital within MRO’s, their
qualifications, professional characteristics, work habits, norms, inter-personal
relations including vertical and horizontal organizational relations.
c. Appreciating the impact of the ‘cultural pyramid’ (section 4.2.4) on the behaviours
of maintainers, supervisors, and higher managements within MRO’s.
d. Mapping locations of various MRO’s within Reason’s (1997) ‘safety space’. Thus
further understanding causes and reasons behind each anticipated location.
e. Understanding the role of technology, dark or bright, in work performance within
MRO’s.
f. Mapping the relations of MRO’s, as self-contained context, with external
influential organizations such as parent companies, aircraft manufacturers,
suppliers, and regulators.
g. Using the above objectives to realize aviation maintenance errors, their hidden
causes, momentary triggers, and propagation scenarios.
4.2.3 The scope of ethnographic study of aviation maintenance
within this research
As genuine authentic part of this research, aviation maintenance worldwide has
been ethnographically analysed through a strappingly-coupled series of activities. These
activities were set to achieve the above listed objectives and simultaneously to satisfy
the strict scientific requirements of an ethnographic research. The span of this
ethnography extensively expanded to include rich participant observation that lasted for
almost two decades prior to the formal start of this study. With 20 years of career within
various direct aviation maintenance profession posts and other aviation-oriented duties,
this writer has been endorsed with adequate amount of information, data, and practical
hand-on experiences in this field. This expertise covered various aviation maintenance
attributes including line maintenance tasks performance, hanger management, off-base
‘dig-outs’, technical storage, mass shipping of aircrafts and their components , aircraft
overhaul, aircraft purchase contracting and technical acceptance checks, maintainers
training, maintenance management, quality auditing, and others.
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Table 4-1 Ethnographic studies of aviation maintenance within the current research
Activities Brief descriptions
Participant
Observation
Elongated participation in all aspects and levels of duty within
aviation maintenance industry mainly devoted to rotorcraft. This is
performed within multi-cultural, multi-location, and multi-roles
settings. Observation located in Middle East, East and South Africa,
and Russia. Details of findings from these participant observation
activities are listed in section 4.2.4.
Key
Informants
Interviewing
Key informants were interviewed. Those are people who were in
direct daily contact with aviation maintenance safety, human factors,
and accident investigation issues. Their opinions were used to draw a
picture concerning maintenance error causes, propagation, prevention
barriers, and reactive investigation techniques. Interviewees were a
selected sample from Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) -
UK, Defence Aviation Safety Centre-UK, North Sea helicopter
operators (Bristow, CHC), British Airways, Helicopter Manufacturers
(Agusta Westland, Eurocopter). The overall located Time span was 3
years.
Surveillance
Visits
Surveillance and exploratory organized visits were performed to
various aviation MRO’s within UK in order to further closely
understand the influence of work environment, procedural contexts,
and the interactions between maintenance personnel and technology
on triggering maintenance errors scenarios, and accordingly to
observe various safeguards put in place to withstand such potential
errors. Visits were performed to North Sea helicopter operators
(Bristow, CHC)-Aberdeen, British Airways advanced maintenance
facility in Cardiff, and Eurocopter – UK. Allocated time spanned 3
years.
Documents
Analysis
Documentation recounting to aviation maintenance management,
regulations, safety, accident investigation, human factors, and related
subjects were richly gathered and analysed for maintenance error
causal factors, error propagation, breakable safety barriers, and other
relative issues. This included over 800 helicopter accidents and
incidents investigation reports, relevant research literature, regulatory
publications, industry databases, aircrafts logs and maintenance
manuals, specialized bodies reports (FEME, CHIRP, MEMS, etc.).
Documents were analysed for maintenance human factors-based error
and for other factual information. Allocated time spans 4years.
Experts
Consultation
Experts in the fields of aviation maintenance, human factors, aviation
safety and accident investigation, aviation regulation, maintenance
error reporting schemes, and other relevant fields were consulted on
the maintenance error initiation, propagation, and prevention aspects.
The consultations aimed at filling any gaps in information and data
obtained from previous ethnographic activities, and simultaneously,
the consulted experts gave their opinions and evaluation of the current
status of aviation maintenance, and draw guidelines highlighting best
practices that
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Table 4-0-1 Ethnographic studies of aviation maintenance within the current research (continued)
Activities Brief descriptions
Experts
Consultation
(continued)
can be followed to enhance aviation maintenance safety. The
consulted sample included experts from the following organizations:
CAA-UK, CHIRP, MEMS, EU Joint Research Centre- Ispra (Italy),
Bureau Enquêtes-Accidents (France), The allocated time spans for 3
years.
Research
and
Scientific
Debate
Aviation maintenance safety enhancement has been the focus of
numerous research works and on-going scientific debate.The current
research deeply engaged in this debate and closely followed its
progressive outcomes
This expertise witnessed multiple work environments and cultures in Sudan,
Libya, Ethiopia, Iraq, South Africa, and Russian Federation in both civil and military
settings. Complementary folds of information and data collection, different work
settings appreciation, multi-cultural involvement and others aspects as well, are later
added to the previous experiences. This fresh addition was obtained within the western
aviation standards in Europe, USA, Australia, and New Zealand. An overall mapping of
activities carried out as parts of this ethnographic study is presented in Table 4.1, while
details of these activities and their findings are discussed in the following sections.
4.2.4 Participant observations: From hangar and office
The participant observation technique, as described in Table 4-1, resulted in a
rich pool of data and know-how that can only hardly be categorized into five separate,
yet closely inter meshing zones. A summery of the observed findings is revealed
through the next following paragraphs.
4.2.4.1 Humans
Humans are all people having direct or indirect impacts on aviation
maintenance. Consequently, any factors that can influence those humans, at any degree
of intensity, will have their induced impact, on aviation maintenance. The following are
some summarized findings regarding this orientation:
1. Maintenance personnel are very proud of their profession and of their abilities and
skills that should set them capable of successfully completing their assigned tasks.
They are further observed to be of even greater loyalty to their trades, lines, teams,
and even shift groups.
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2. Social intimacy and personal relations play major role in the workplace. This is a
double-edged tool: Good social life and friendly environment, particularly in
horizontal relations within an organization, can significantly push forward a given
line’s performance. However, too personalized work relations can badly influence
the formal implementation of regulations especially for the vertical inter-
organizational channels. This human-human interaction, with both its positive and
negative impacts, also shapes the MRO’s relation with its external related
community of organizations and agencies.
3. Aviation maintenance has its own ‘flavour’ as a sociotechnical system. Further
more, this flavour is, in turn, coloured in accordance to the compiled pyramids of
cultures in which and through which a MRO performs. An observed ‘cultural
pyramid’, a concentric regime of various influential cultures is always there. This
starts when mechanics from one trade appreciate their trade’s privileges over other
trades. Engines/ airframe mechanics, for instance, sometimes feel some superiority
over those from the avionic trade and vice versa. This is a pure human nature. The
next outer envelope is the overall occupational culture that surrounds these local
trade-wise interactions. Occupational culture is sequentially surrounded by the
company and the national cultures. Figure 4.1 shows those observed cultural
contexts critically shaping the human performance within MRO’s sociotechnical
system.
Figure 4-1 The cultural Pyramid: Influential Cultures on MRO environment
The national culture, as observed in this context, has its vital role in colouring the
manners in which, even various international regulations, are handled locally. The
implications of so close interpersonal connections within workplace, as discussed
in paragraph 4.2.4.1/2 are just a simple illustration of this cultural impact.
Personnel
Trade Privilege
Occupational
Culture
Organizational
Culture
National Culture
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4. Maintainers and supervisors are generally very adamant on having their assigned
tasks successfully completed. The degree of such a success depends on a varying
set of factors. Failure in completing a job is socially unbearable since it can easily
be attributed to some personal skills and competence shortages especially for new
comers. The peer pressures in this regard are huge. Thus the obligation to
complete tasks, if coupled with any opposing factors, may drive maintainers
towards some undesired behaviours such as shortcutting, shyness of seeking
second opinion, waiving duties to next shifts if possible, or other similar conducts.
5. Organizational culture within MRO’s is really varying between the two extremes:
Totally blame and totally forgiving contexts. The majority of MRO’s observed
within this study are located generally some where in between the two limits and
more tending to be at the ‘blame’ side. The blame intensity dramatically increases
within more disciplined settings such as in military or even in some critical
government-associated organizations. Higher are the blame features, higher are the
pressures put on humans, and more susceptible are they to commit errors during
various stages of task execution.
6. Each MRO is characterised by its unique in-work social life. As discussed earlier,
very close personal connections can develop, within other leadership issues as
well, sets of bad norms as the boarders between various employees and their
specific roles get gradually diminished. In such cases, various supervisory
problems may emerge such as their failure to inspect, deficiency in correcting
persistent problems or controlling foreseen hazards, etc.
7. Communication between employees within ever changing contexts like that of
MRO’s are vital. Task instructions, feedbacks, explanations, etc. are either given -
or essentially supported - verbally. Consequentially, the slightest miss matching in
communicating any of this information will open all possibilities for maintenance
errors.
4.2.4.2 Organisations and management
The organizational dimension plays critical role in the ultimate success of
aviation maintenance industry, or inversely, in its failure. In fact, almost all of the
maintenance related incidents observed within this sample could be back-traced to some
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shortage at a certain level in management of the MRO involved. The following are
some main observations regarding this organizational impact:
1. Aviation maintenance worldwide stands on firm base of legislations, regulations,
and rules. These cover very complex areas of personnel initial qualification and
continuous development, workplace standards, aircraft technical standards, etc.
The differences in performance between MRO’s are direct mapping to how firmly
and correctly these MRO’s check-mate in compliance with these governing rules.
2. The overall level of performance efficiency and effectiveness within MRO’s
highly depends on the available provisions for continuous personal development
training and other activities. This implies, from maintenance safety perspective, all
relevant technical skills and competences-sharpening activities, human factor
awareness, etc. The observed sample of MRO’s revealed a fact that maintenance
errors are significantly reduced as such personal development activities increased
and vice versa. This is a direct impact of the MRO management behaviour.
3. The management of a given MRO leads the way to the work’s safety up-keeping.
The more correct, active, and effective is the role played by the management in
this regard, the less are the witnessed maintenance errors. The roles of
management spans widely in activities such as arranging for persistent morning
briefings, appropriate manning and task distribution, quality control, quality
assurance, etc. The observed sample showed direct relation between effective
management performance and reduced number of maintenance errors incidents.
4. The observed sample showed varying levels of maintenance errors re-occurrences.
Error re-occurrences are direct mapping of the overall organizational learning
abilities of a given MRO. Employees and management both have their relevant
roles in setting measures, individually and as a system, to prevent errors re-
occurrences. MRO’s with weaker management performance usually face greater
rates of re-occurring maintenance errors or persistent unsafe behaviours.
5. The observed sample showed close coupling between level of information
technology fluency of the working force members and the rates of safety-related
maintenance incidents. For instance, maintainers who have more access to safety-
related databases, human factors awareness information, workplace safety
training, etc, are lesser vulnerable to error promoting conditions within workplace.
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6. The observed sample showed that deficiencies in manning provisions, guidance,
oversight, task design and work distribution, shift handover procedures, financial
and / or technical resources, etc. can certainly impact the overall performance of
maintainers and allow more room for maintenance error initiator situations.
4.2.4.3 Aircraft
1. An aircraft’s design totally controls its maintenance. This control covers almost all
aspects of the maintenance activities such as the overall maintenance programme
of the given aircraft, maintenance cycle timings, parts operating and shelf lives,
aircraft airworthiness provisions and limitations, essential maintenance facilities
that, in turn, dictate maintenance locations, maintainers required skills and
qualifications, maintenance task descriptions, maintenance materials,
consumables, and tooling, MRO certification and associated regulatory
conformity, and so many other inputs to the maintenance function. Thus it is
totally of logic to observe that an aircraft’s design can impact, positively or
negatively, each one of the maintenance input assets whether they are human
capital, software, environment, or hardware.
2. It is observed that poor design for maintainability of an aircraft, or any one of its
components, can certainly form colossal potential for maintenance errors to be
committed by maintenance individuals or teams. The most frequent of such
drawbacks are poor for-maintenance accessibility, remote or confined working
areas on aircrafts, complex parts design necessitating complex maintenance tasks,
easy-to-incorrectly install parts, delicate or high technology sensitive components
with special maintenance needs, etc.
3. The aircraft maintenance-related documentation and information exchange
channels are vital in securing error-free maintenance. Any deficiency or
malfunctions in these two attributes were observed to have led to critical
maintenance errors. This involves the working aircraft logs, maintenance manuals,
job-cards and other task-sheets, technical support publications and bulletins,
feedback channels with aircrafts operators, manufacturers, and regulators, etc.
4.2.4.4 Operations and environment
1. A limited number of aircrafts within a given fleet of expanding duties will
certainly induce higher demand on aircrafts availability. Thus higher serviceability
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records are required usually within shorter intervals of time. This in turn induces
huge workloads and work pressures on the maintenance workforce, a situation
more prone to develop maintenance errors triggers. An airline company with
higher aircraft redundancy would certainly have its internal or even contracting
aircraft maintenance providers operating at lesser work pressures.
2. Overall climate settings and spontaneous weather conditions in which an aircraft
is based and /or operated have significant influence on shaping types and
frequencies of snags that that aircraft develops during operation or storage.
Corrosion problems that sea coast-based jets suffer are larger in scales and
severity compared to those suffered by Sahara-based ones for instance. Such
variations in environmental conditions deeply influence types of maintenance jobs
required and associated competences expected from the maintenance workers.
3. Environmental and operational conditions also impact the details of a given
maintenance program and /or technical limitations allowed for components
serviceability. The compressor wash frequency of a rotorcraft operating in rainy-
cold weather in Europe for instance is far lesser than that frequency required for
the same type operating at a dusty-hot environment near the Equator. Thus local
conditions have their practically local consequences on the maintenance process
regardless of the technical data given in manuals. This, if coupled with the pre-
mentioned financial or political limitations, would certainly impose more hazards
to the maintenance safety provisions.
4. Environment and weather also play critical roles in the correct completion of
maintenance tasks by shaping the workplace environment. Windy, cold, hot, or
dusty weather will totally state the cleanliness, ventilation, air conditioning,
humidity, etc. of the workplace, and thus significantly influence tasks execution.
5. Operational requirements also influence safety of maintenance activities. A ‘dig-
out’ maintenance mission usually applies certain lesser-firm technical activities to
recover a defected aircraft when compared to the hub-based maintenance, where
more adequate maintenance inputs are usually expected. Operational-induced
shortcuts are dramatically observed to increase in the military setting or at more
remote rural destinations. Maintenance errors are thus more expectedly fertilized
within such scenarios.
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4.2.4.5 Economics and politics
Aviation industry is a one that involves huge financial and statuary investments.
Subsequently, aviation maintenance, as part of this industry, is greatly influenced by the
economical and political environments surrounding a given MRO. The following
observations are recorded in this regard:
1. Performance within a MRO is directly influenced by the surrounding economical
environment. It is observed that MRO’s existing within more stabilized to high
levelled economies have, by nature of things, more access to financial resources
that can guarantee more advanced technical assets and even higher qualified
human capital. Better surrounding economy also indicates better established
infrastructures that have their direct and / or indirect impact on maintenance
activities execution. Stable energy supplies and efficient transportation networks
are just only examples of such infrastructures. These observations are totally
coinciding with the international reports indicating that regions of lesser
economical power share greater rates of global aviation accidents and incidents.
2. Higher economical levels of living have their influence on the physical and
psychological wellbeing of maintainers and even their higher management. Lesser
life pressures greatly help maintainers to better perform their tasks at higher levels
of accuracy and correctness.
3. Economics and politics have, collectively or in parallel, great impacts on the
overall aviation maintenance functions. Restrictions or limitations superimposed
by these two attributes can extremely hinder proper performance within MRO’s.
Flow of aircrafts components and spare parts, maintenance material, tools, and
workplace assets, technical information and support, organizational learning and
technology transfer, training and know-how enhancement, etc. are just some parts
of the numerous maintenance inputs that can be damaged in this regard. For
instance, a simple solution that a MRO can take, in a trial to overcome a political
ban of aircraft spare parts, is to extend their life limits – usually without the
necessary technical authentication, or even to re-use previously removed slightly-
defective parts. Collecting major components of crashed aircrafts to be re-installed
in operating ones is not unusual in such circumstances. The whole philosophy
behind maintenance can thus be severely hurt.
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4. Richer financial resources play the main role in better developing skills,
competence, and overall technical fluency of the maintenance workforce. Human
factors training, for instance, can be seen as some sort of luxury within MRO’s
that are starving to provide for the least operating inputs in the first place. Within
the observed sample, the number and depth of the continuous development
training sessions are directly related to the overall available financial funds.
4.2.5 Interviewing main aviation active informants
A major part of the ethnographic evaluation of aviation maintenance was
performed through interviewing active experts and practitioners within this industry.
Interviews, as briefly highlighted before in Table 4.1, covered colourful collections of
aviation safety-related professionals in the accident investigation, operation,
manufacturing, and regulatory roles. Detailed output accounts of these interviews can be
presented here below.
4.2.5.1 Interviewing aviation accidents investigators
10 experts from the AAIB-UK and the BEA-France were interviewed regarding
their reflection on aviation maintenance errors causes, consequences, and required
measures for re-occurring prevention. Open-end questioning technique was basically
adopted with some extended open discussion for deeper exploration of the field. The
basic set of launching questions was as per Appendix A-1. The consequential output of
these and other maintenance safety-oriented topics that were discussed with the
investigators can be collectively summarized in the following account:
1. All interviewees declared that an aviation accident site or a certain condition of an
aircraft that has witnessed an incident can not openly indicate the involvement of
one or more maintenance errors. Only after thorough analysis of the collected
related evidence when a maintenance malfunctioning can be concluded.
Maintenance errors are generally of hidden nature and follow varying routs for
propagation of consequences. This propagation of error consequences on the
aircraft involved can take very long periods of time before a tangible indication for
that error existence becomes observable, or before the incident or accident occurs.
2. Eight interviewees declared that aircraft documentation, operational logbooks,
maintenance manuals with associated job cards, and maintenance history records
are vital sources of evidence or information regarding the possibility of
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maintenance malfunctioning involvement in a given accident or incident. Thus an
appropriate handling and usage of such records has its crucial importance in the
prevention of such maintenance shortages in the first place, as well as being
decisive informing source during a substantial investigation.
3. A collective sum-up of all the interviews statements shows the most frequent types
of maintenance errors that were involved in aviation incidents and accidents as:
a. Incorrect installation of aircrafts parts and components.
b. Incorrect sequence of component assembly.
c. Forgetting open panels, loose parts, unfixed covers, etc.
d. Omitting a step or more in the maintenance task sequence.
e. Applying the wrong value of torques.
f. Using the wrong type, calibre, part number, of spare parts.
g. Forgetting tooling and other foreign items on aircrafts.
h. Using the wrong type or quantity of gases, solvents, lubricants, fuels, etc.
i. Incorrect data interpretation and / or entry in aircraft logs.
4. A collective sum-up of all the interviews statements shows the most frequent
concluded causes of maintenance errors that led to incidents and accidents as:
a. Lack of appropriate skills or aircraft knowledge
b. Lack of close supervision or inconsistent self –certification
c. Non-referral to maintenance manuals during tasks execution
d. Failure to inspect.
e. Poor aircraft design.
f. Complex maintenance tasks or inadequate technical information /jobcards.
g. Working during night or in inadequate conditions
h. Task handover between shifts, or poor task distribution.
i. Inadequate resources.
j. Improper use and update of aircraft maintenance logs.
5. All interviwees stated that a maintenance error may not always be initiated at the
individual maintainer level, and that a significant number of maintenance errors
concluded had their initiating points (roots) emerging from higher levels within
the given organization’s management. Six interviewees admitted that the concept
of a ‘root causal factor’ is always referred to when meaning the very initiating
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triggers of maintenance errors, these being usually deeply and latently existing
within organisational scales. Thus, when the error is a direct consequence of the
overall existing norms or other organizational culture issues, then the root cause is
described as an organizational one, on the other hand, when the error is initiated
due to the individual’s malfunctioning, then such a shortage is either a personal
active error or a violation.
6. All interviewees stated that the current frequently used maintenance errors
investigation tool is the MEDA. Only four interviewees knew about other
taxonomies such as HFACS-ME and Maintenance Error Investigation (MEI), they
explained that such new taxonomies are yet to be introduced into aviation
maintenance accident and incidents investigations. The depth to which human
factors analysis is usually conducted during investigations depends on the
complications and severity of each given accident in one orientation, and on the
investigators’ skills and fluency in human factors tools implementation in the
other.
7. All interviewees stated that types of maintenance errors vary with the level of
maintainers’ technical skills and aircraft knowledge. Further explanations showed
that while errors associated with poor skills or know-how shortages are usually
committed by new inexperienced maintainers, it is noted that errors resulting from
memory laps or procedural omissions are usually committed by highly
experienced and qualified maintainers who, as part of the enveloping
organizational norms, ignore consulting the maintenance manuals or other
technical information sources.
8. Six interviewees stated that errors associated with inappropriate inspection or
guidance failures are attributed to changes in oversight functions that followed the
shift within industry from utilising independent quality control departments within
the MRO to adopting self-certification of job performed.
9. All interviewees admitted that each of the fixed-wing and rotorcraft has its own
distinguishing characteristics that directly influence their relative maintenance
programmes and associated practicalities, but only three interviewwes clearly
stated that there are no significant differences in maintenance errors committed in
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both of the two types of aviation sectors in regard to error causal factors,
propagation, and adverse consequences.
10. All interviewees stated that maintenance errors can be reduced by developing
organizational learning from previous shortcomings. This is a totally reactive
strategy with exceptionally high social and economical costs. Consequentially, the
industry is looking forward to newer proactive measures to help further prevent
errors re-occurrences. Some maintenance errors monitoring techniques, if
introduced, may preserve such huge costs of the current organizational learning.
4.2.5.2 Interviewing aviation MRO’s safety managers
To develop deeper appreciation of the aviation MRO industry perspective
towards aviation safety and maintenance errors prevention, a series of interviews were
held with active safety and quality managers of four different well established helicopter
and fixed wings aircraft operators, those are: North Sea helicopter operators (Bristow,
CHC), British Airways, and the maintenance facility of Eurocopter UK. A set of open-
ended questions was carefully prepared to explore their and their organizations’
perceptions of maintenance safety issues. Open concluding discussions were held at the
end of each interview. The main pre-set interview questions are presented as well in
Appendix A-2. The collective account of these interviews and the thorough discussions
associated with them can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. All four interviewees showed that they had a type of safety management system
already in place within the interviewed organizations in regards to maintenance
safety and human errors prevention techniques, however, there are still areas of
higher levels of risks that need to be addressed. These areas include further
enhancement of individual’s safety awareness, further involvement of maintainers
to absorb newer concepts of workplace generative cultures, reporting schemes, etc.
2. All four interviewees emphasized the general need within industry to initiate
major shift from the costly reactive safety measures to more proactive ones.
3. Three interviewees claimed that there is a general lack within industry of specific
more scientifically-supported models that can help determining and verifying lists
of duplicate inspection items within each MRO and for each given type of aircraft.
It is further indicated that the current procedures in this regard depend mainly on
the ‘good will’ and the accumulative experience of the personnel involved.
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4. Two interviewees declared that there seem to be some persistent features within
MRO’s that continuously give rise to higher degrees of maintenance safety risks
during day to day performance, such areas include high workloads and time
tensions, tooling control, shifts handovers, and other points as well.
5. Two interviewees showed that although some safety-oriented devices and
procedures are playing vital roles within the overall technical and procedural
SMS’s, but they have their drawbacks as well, for instance the HUMS, although
being of critical value in assuring the overall aircraft integrity, but it involves very
branchy and complicated implementation technical and administrative procedures,
the thing that hinders the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the process.
6. All four participants indicated that generally they keep good information transfer
channels with manufacturers. These involve a variety of folds covering the spare
parts flow, technical support, technical documents, bulletins and other
publications, and continuous maintenance programme updating. However, they all
indicated that the areas of emergent technical consultation and determination of
the local duplicate inspections are vital points needing more focussing.
7. The location of each MRO within the safety space depends on the values and work
organizational culture. For the given interviewed organizations, all of them
counted their location as to be of generative cultures where maintenance errors, as
well as other safety concern initiators, are not totally assigned, as a blame
responsibility, on individuals. Rather, some organizational learning process is
taking place.
8. The overall appreciation for safety-oriented regulatory programmes, such as the
various confidential voluntary reporting schemes, vary significantly between the
interviewed MRO’s: Whilst two organizations are totally accepting and
participating in these schemes, other organizations still doubting any positive
output of these programmes and thus they are not so keen to take part there within.
4.2.5.3 Interviewing helicopter manufacturers
Safety and quality responsible officials from Agusta-Westland and Eurocopter,
two major rotorcraft manufacturers, were interviewed in the course of further examining
the overall sociotechnical context of aviation maintenance. The interviews explored the
helicopter manufacturers’ perception and implementation of various design for
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maintainability concepts and other relative issues such as the position of human factors
considerations in design, various procedures and basics of a given aircraft type
maintenance programme, the determination of vital points and safety-sensitive
maintenance lists. A list of pre-prepared questions for the interviews can be seen as per
Appendix A-3. Main outputs of these interviews can be presented in two deterministic
points that were favoured by both organizations:
1. Human factors understanding and practical considerations are being gradually
introduced as part of the design for maintainability. However, a lot is still to be
introduced in this regard.
2. There are no specific scientifically-approved mathematical or other models that
are systematically utilized to determine the duplicate inspection items for each
type. Pure reliance on previous experiences is the usual practice in this area.
4.2.6 Other ethnographic study activities
This stage of the research comprised as well other ranges of interlinked activities
that worked to further enrich the stocks of both scientific information, and this writer’s
personal appreciation of the subject matter variables within numerous settings. As listed
in Table 4.1 before, some of these activities are:
 Performing multiple planned visits to different MRO’s. These included visits to
both light and heavy maintenance lines of both fixed and rotary-winged aircrafts.
 Comprehensive studying of different types of aviation maintenance related
documents. These included regulatory documents and reports, aircraft manuals,
research publications, industry reports, etc. All types of documentary formats were
consulted.
 Consulting industry experts and research centres practitioners. This included
continuous discussions with current and ex-aviation maintainers, safety training
providers, regulators, theorists and co-researchers, and a number of aviation
maintenance and human factors lead experts.
The complete accumulative outputs of these and other activities as well are
widely spread through out the successive stages of this research, and thus they are
totally covered or referred to through various chapters of this thesis.
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4.3 Maintainer context identification
This research’s methodology calls for exhaustive understanding of the working
context enveloping people under investigation, aviation maintainers in this instance.
According to Cacciabue (2004a), the SHELL model is a recommended tool in such
approach due to some major considerations:
 SHELL is the reference model adopted in many domains that are strongly affected
by human factors issues, such as aviation, for accidents and incidents analysis. For
example the Accident / Incident Data Reporting system (ADREP 2000) of ICAO
and MEDA of Boeing are both based on SHELL.
 SHELL has been validated and widely applied in other working contexts for many
decades.
Based on SHELL model, and using the previous accumulated knowledge, a
sociotechnical relations chart of the maintainer and supervisor within a maintenance
organization context was prepared in details as part of this sociotechnical initial study,
the chart is given in Appendix B. The chart is an advanced step towards an overall
perception of the work nature within MRO’s. This is totally required as a base for the
next prospective studies of this research.
4.4 Aviation maintenance tasks analysis
4.4.1 Defining tasks analysis
Seamster et all (1997) defined the Task Analysis (TA) as the analysis tool that
“specifies the primary job tasks and their criticality, frequency, and difficulty, the
performance objectives, and the behavioural requirements for the job”. Annett and
Stanton (2000) edited another definition for TA as “Methods of collecting, classifying,
and interpreting data on human performance in work situations”.
Sandom and Harvey (2004) showed that TA covers a range of techniques to
describe, and sometimes evaluate, the human- machine and human-human interactions
in a system. One of the best known TA tools is the HTA where a task is broken down in
terms of goals and sub-goals and their associated plans. The end result can be a pictorial
representation, often in a form of flowchart, showing the actions needed to achieve a
successful completion of the task. On its own, this type of breakdown of the task can be
useful in demonstrating where the problems are.
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4.4.2 Conducting maintainers task analysis
According to the adopted methodology roadmap of this research, detailed
analysis of maintainer tasks within work place was conducted using the HTA
techniques. Maintenance activities were divided into two categories representing both
maintainer and supervisor jobs. No previous works could be found that show exactly,
or even in broader format, the various steps a MRO maintainer employee may take in
order to have an autonomous aircraft maintenance job performed as standardized from
the start to completion. Consequently, referring to maintenance manuals of many
aircraft types, and to other associated technical documentation as well, and recalling all
previous accumulated information through the previous stages of this research,
including the elongated participant observations as per section 4.2.4, a basic TA of the
aircraft maintenance activities is performed.
In this research, the maintainer job was typically sub-divided into twelve basic
blocks of main tasks. These start by receiving the job notification and end by signing
the helicopter (or aircraft as general) as serviceable or unserviceable. Each of the
twelve blocks was in turn set into sub-tasks, which were further refined into partial sub-
tasks and so on till all basic activities of the job were obtained. Similar approach was
conducted for the supervisor activities. Appendix C shows brief parts of the first levels
of the maintainer typical task analysis diagram.
4.5 Chapter summary
As a major approach to evaluate sociotechnical context of safety and human
factors within aviation maintenance organizations, in particular those maintaining
helicopters, a series of activities were conducted: These included organized visits to
related manufacturers, operators and regulators, official databases reviewing, interviews
and consultations with maintenance engineers, safety managers, accident investigation
experts, regulators, human factors practitioners and detailed observation of written,
verbal, and behavioural protocols within maintenance workplace. As a result, an all-
inclusive awareness of the hazards, risks, and malfunctioning inherent within the overall
maintenance system and its various components and activities was reached.
Simultaneously, a parallel interpretive theoretical milieu was built encompassing
various models of cognition, and working taxonomies within HMI settings.
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5 Root Cause Analysis
of Aviation Maintenance Errors
Science is wonderfully equipped to answer the question "How?"
but it gets terribly confused when you ask the question "Why?"
Erwin Chargaff
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Root cause analysis: The basic concepts
Human errors in aviation maintenance are generally discussed through two main
approaches: HRA and HEC. The later mentioned approach has always been described
as behavioural, contextual, or conceptual in nature. The most obvious response to a
human error is to identify its causal mechanisms and consequentially altering the system
such that that error is not repeated (Latorella and Prabhu 2000).
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) was firstly originated within the nuclear industry
when accidents and incidents investigators discovered the need to go beyond the ‘what’
happened to accommodate a far wider scope of ‘why’ it happened, thus providing
spacer room for real organizational learning. RCA thus facilitated an important way-out
of the shortages in abnormal occurrence investigations which were usually terminated in
the past without the ‘real’ cause of the mal performance, technical or human, being
determined. The terminology governing the definition of ‘what was wrong’ or ‘what
went wrong’ that induced an undesired occurrence or phenomenon are very precise.
Many works tinted, collectively, a set of definitions concerning such conceptualities:
Causal Factors:
 Causal Factors: “The human errors and/or equipment failures that, if eliminated,
would have prevented the incident or would have substantially reduced the
consequences of the incident” (Kiihne 2008).
Root Causes:
 Root Cause(s): “the most basic cause that can be reasonably identified and that
management has control to fix” (Paradies and Busch 1988).
 Root Cause(s): “A condition which is necessary for an accident such that if it had
not been present, the precise accident would not have happened” (Kinnersley and
Roelen 2007).
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 Root Causes: “The most basic causes. They are almost always the absence,
deficiency, or neglect of the management systems that control human actions and
equipment performance” (Kiihne 2008).
Contributing Factor:
 Contributing factors: “Other factors (than causal factors and root causes) that were
present and contributed to the accident occurrence and/or its severity” (Kinnersley
and Roelen 2007).
It is clearly understood that there are no definite sharp boarders between these
categories, such that a contributing factor in a given occurrence can be a direct causal
factor in another. This is natural since “accidents are rarely clear-cut”. Identifying root
causes of a given undesired occurrence effectively set the track for the necessary
remedies to be put in place. To boot, it is always potential to systematize a set of
databases of root causes which tackle individuals, paraphernalia, and organizational
quality faults, thus allowing for closer determination of root cause trends for the given
field. Understanding such trends, even more effective preventative recommendations
can be designed not only to prevent reoccurrence of the given specific undesired events,
but also to handle so may of the surrounding associated incident initiators.
Regardless of the exact types, depths, and efficiencies of the practical techniques
that a safety-related investigation process follows, it is found that such investigation
characteristically spans through three major sequential phases. These phases must all be
covered communally and effectively if the investigation is to achieve its seen and
hidden aims. These three phases are (Livingston et al. 2001):
a. Sequencing of events: This is the immediate stage after the safety-related
occurrence. It comprises “obtaining a full description of the sequence of events
which led to the failure”. All types of physical evidences, witness interviews, etc
are utilized to freshly obtain and arrange the available pool of data into an
understandable sequence of events.
b. Identification of causal factors: This is a later stage in which investigators ascertain
the most critical events and / or actions from amongst the general sequence. Then direct
cause (s) of each of these critical events is identified. Thus the overall causal factors of the
safety occurrence are obtained. Many organizations usually stop their investigation probes
at this stage due to the wrong anticipation that knowing the direct causes of the given
occurrence is sufficiently enough for the overall organizational learning process.
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c. Identification of root causes: This is much deferred stage in which direct causal factors
are further re-visited such that their underlying promoting conditions, known as
root causes, can be determined. Enquirers are tasked to use suitable tree structures
or other relevant tools to identify these root causes which are often expected to be
some pre-existing underlying conditions or contexts that first set the pace for the
causal factors to exist and line-up.
5.1.2 This chapter: Investigating the investigations.
In this chapter, a detailed data-mining process is described. As a complement to
the understanding of the overall sociotechnical context of the aviation maintenance, a
thorough statistical analysis of a sample of 58 helicopter maintenance-induced safety
occurrences is conducted to study helicopter accidents and incidents’ survivability and
the severity distribution of such occurrences. The sample is obtained out of reviewing
804 formal finalized investigation reports of previous maintenance related helicopter
incidents and accidents worldwide Analysis is carried out to identify helicopter main
and sub-systems mostly exposed to maintenance errors and to determine various types
of such errors. Expected inherent relations between rotorcraft components affected and
types of associated maintenance errors are investigated. Human factors – based triggers
of these accidents and severe incidents are explored. The concept of ‘Specific Failures’
that immediately precede each of such occurrences is newly introduced for more
detailed representation of the last breached individual and organizational safety barriers.
Root causes of these safety occurrences were then sought utilizing the HFACS-ME
taxonomy with a refined focus on its third order categories list. The influence of
rotorcraft characteristics on MRO’s and the maintainers overall on-the-job behaviour is
discussed on the light of the root cause investigation results.
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5.2 Investigating root causes of aviation maintenance errors
5.2.1 Data for factual and root cause analysis
804 formal helicopter accidents and incidents reports from Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, UK, and USA were screened as per Table 5.1.
Table 5-1 Helicopter accidents / incidents reports selection
Country
Of Events
Reports Issuing
Body
Screened
Reports
Analyzed
Reports
Australia ATSB 56 7
Canada TSB of Canada 79 10
New Zealand CAA of New Zealand 13 1
UK AAIB 368 16
USA NTSB 288 24
Total 804 58
From these, a set of 58 safety occurrences were selected according to the
following criteria:
1. Occurrences were exclusively maintenance-related.
2. They covered the period from 1995 to 2005.
3. Occurrences were from similar contexts regarding standards of provided training,
human and materials resources, and overall technical performance. This formed a
homogeneous sample of occurrences regardless of the country of event.
4. Occurrences involved modern helicopters currently utilized worldwide.
5. The associated formal reports were written with accepted reflection to human
factors issues.
The selected sample of occurrences, listed in Appendix D, was then subjected to
two separate stages of analysis:
1. General statistical analysis of accidents’ factual data.
2. Human factors-based analysis to explore the root causes of these occurrence
(having causal factors already been concluded within reports).
Findings of these two stages of analysis are thoroughly described and discussed
through the following sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
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5.3 Factual analysis of helicopter safety occurrences
5.3.1 Objectives of factual analysis
The selected sample of helicopter maintenance-initiated safety occurrences is
first analysed for factual data, this analysis targeted the achievement of the following
objectives:
a. Drawing detailed appreciation of the severity level of maintenance-induced
helicopter safety occurrences.
b. Recognition of helicopter most critical parts or systems in regard to maintenance
sensitivity. Exacting emphasis is to be paid to smaller-sized fixations and power
transmission elements.
c. Establishing recognition of various types of maintenance errors associated with
different helicopter systems and parts.
d. Investigating existence of inter-relationships between helicopter hardware design
and maintenance errors.
5.3.2 Constructing actual databases of safety occurrences
A fully detailed database was first constructed to analyze the general data of the
selected 58 helicopter maintenance related safety occurrences. Each accident or serious
incident was analyzed regarding severity, main helicopter systems involved, helicopter
sub-systems or sub- components involved, and types of maintenance errors committed
that led to the associated occurrence. The research was then focused to identify any
correlation between helicopter affected hardware systems / components and the nature
and types of errors committed by maintainers at various levels. Factual analysis
database is given in Appendix E.
5.3.3 Analysis of factual collected Data
5.3.3.1 Safety occurrences severity
The given accidents and incidents population, as indicated by Figure 5.1,
comprised various degrees of outcome severities, these included 6% of accidents that
led to ‘minor injuries’, ‘serious injuries’ of 7%, ‘no injury’ incidents of 31%, and
dominant 57% of ‘fatal’ accidents.
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Figure 5-1 Severity distribution of the analysed helicopter safety occurrences
It is clear that helicopter accidents are highly critical and mostly of fatal
consequences. Low occupant survivability (Hessmer 2001) of helicopter crashes
necessitates more efforts to be focused on helicopter safety including maintenance
practice issues.
5.3.3.2 Main helicopter systems involved
Analysis is required to identify helicopter systems that are most frequently
affected by maintenance errors. Figure 5.2 shows the main rotor system as one of the
most critical helicopter parts. 32% of the total cases of the given population involved
main rotor system maintenance errors, this should be taken in contrast to the fact that
work on the main rotor system usually involves a significant amount of the total
maintenance activities (Eurocopter 1999). Given the criticality of this system with
major moving parts rotating under the main load and manoeuvres of the aircraft, then all
maintenance, inspection, and duplicated inspection activities on this system are
naturally expected to be performed at high levels of perfection, however, this is not
always the case here. This is attributable to the overall complexity of the system.
Further explanation may be also furnished by emphasizing that human factors play huge
role in causing maintenance and inspection errors for this system in particular, for
instance, the usual high and compact location of the main shaft and rotor hub
components give significant rise to errors such as those induced due to personal reach,
handling, liquids level reading, and accessibility limitations or restrictions.
Fatal
57%
Serious injury
7%
Minor injury
5%
No injury
31%
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Figure 5-2 Helicopter systems involved in safety occurrences for the given population
Similarly, it is highly impractical to achieve error-free visual inspections for the
mid sections or far tips of the cantilever-hanging main blades. Such visual scanning is in
fact required by most of the maintenance procedures to be carried out on the upper and
lower blades surfaces by having the maintainer climbing to the aircraft top or by
standing on ground. Both of the positions are frequently impractical for high detailed
inspection reliability (Melloy et al 2000, Floyd and Schurman 1995). Figure 5.2 also
shows that the tail rotor assembly, engines, and load- bearing airframe components
(e.g. tail boom, stabilizers, under-carriage) are the next frequently affected systems by
maintainer’s errors, each with 17% of the total accidents and incidents cases given. This
again emphasizes the relation between system location, complexity, and accessibility
and its being more exposed to maintenance errors. Transmission, flight controls, and
hydraulic systems come next with lower occurrence percentages of 10%, 5%, and 2%
respectively.
5.3.3.3 Helicopter sub-systems, components, and parts involved
Further details were obtained concerning sub-components of helicopter that
were mostly maintained in wrong ways. Again a clear relation can be highlighted
between the purpose, nature, shape, location, and fixation of a component or part and its
potentiality to suffer a maintenance error. Analysis, as indicated by Figure 5.3, showed
that two major groups of mechanical components were the most critically involved with
total percentage of occurrence equal to 13% each: The first group, which comprises
bolts, nuts, screws, and rivets, are found to be maintenance error - critical due to their
small sizes, easiness to be mixed with similar parts, critical values of tightening
torques required, confined work areas, difficult handling and / or visualization angles,
Engines
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Airframe
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Main rotor
32%
Tail rotor
17%
Transmission
10%
Controls
5%
Hydraulic
2%
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and many other human factor-induced issues. The other group which similarly attracts
maintenance errors comprises dynamic load carrier components that require precise
detailed removal, installation, and complicated alignment procedures, these include
gears, drive shafts, couplings, and spindles. ‘Tension –torsion straps’ (T-T’s) come last
with only 2% of the total occurrence population, this is attributable to the significant
number of helicopters that do not utilize these T-T straps, their low frequencies of
maintenance / inspection cycles, and the usually rigid ‘preventive maintenance’
procedures applied on them (Dhillon and Liu 2006).
Figure 5-3 Helicopter parts and components involved in accidents and incidents
for the given population
5.3.3.4 Types of maintenance errors committed
Analysis of the sample population gave clear identification of the types of
maintenance errors that led to those safety occurrences. The significance of determining
such types of errors stem from the fact that they, being the answer to the question ‘what
had happened’, represent at the same time clear indications for the answer to the ‘ why
it happened’ question. In other words: listing of these ‘errors types’ is a strong tool to
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Gears/ drive shafts/ couplings/ spindles
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help identify their causes. It is found that the most frequent maintenance error
committed for 23% of the given sample is the usual combination of ‘No or improper
inspection’ that led to the ‘defect(s) not detected’ error. The next most frequent error of
18% is the ‘skipping of maintenance procedure steps, Airworthiness Directives (AD), or
Service Bulletin (SB) requirement’. ‘Incorrect installation’, ‘parts/material omission’,
and ‘improper fitting/ torque values’ are the next most frequent errors with 14%, 12%,
and 6% of the total occurrences. A total of fifteen types of errors committed within the
whole given population of occurrences are represented in Figure 5.4. It is worth
emphasizing that Figure 5.4 denotes direct listing of errors types as factual events
before applying the human factors-based analysis during causal factors investigation in
the next stage of this study.
Figure 5-4 Types of maintenance errors committed in the given population of safety occurrences
Further, an interesting relation can be identified between helicopter systems,
components, or parts and the types of maintenance-error committed. This can be best
appreciated by considering the most frequently affected helicopter parts as indicated in
Figure 5.3, in conjunction with the most frequent types of errors as per Figure 5.4. In
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112
view of the first two groups of ‘fine smaller-sized’ mechanical components that
comprised bolts, screws, rivets, gears, couplings, and spindles, as given in Figure 5.3,
and considering the amount of detailed procedures, critical orientations, sophisticated
alignments, and torque values associated with their more frequent removals and
installations, then it is obviously logical to coincide these activities with the second and
third ranked types of errors committed, namely: ‘skipping procedures or technical
requirements’ and ‘erroneous installation’ as indicated in Figure 5.4. Similarly, the next
frequently affected helicopter parts given in Figure 5.3 are the major airframe
components such as tail boom, stabilizers, main blades, and control cables. These
‘large’ parts are of very low frequency of removal and installation. They are mostly
visually inspected or hand-touched / judged during daily or even most of the scheduled
maintenance. This sort of inspection / judgment is also applicable to the ‘fine’ parts as
well, the thing that gives rise to the number of overall visual inspection / hand judgment
applications. Thus it is totally perceivable to observe that such inspections are the most
frequent erroneous activities with often associated ‘undetected defects’ as recorded in
Figure 5.4 (First category of improper inspections and undetected defects). An overall
conclusion of this point is that: smaller frequently removed and installed parts are
always affected by procedures mal-application or improper installation errors, while the
rarely removed large airframe components are mostly exposed to improper inspection
types of maintenance errors.
5.4 Human factors-based analysis of helicopter safety
occurrences
5.4.1 Objectives of human factors-based analysis
The selected sample of helicopter maintenance-initiated safety occurrences is
then further analysed from human factors perspective. This analysis aimed at achieving
the following objectives:
a. Appreciating the influence of human factors on maintenance safety.
b. Appreciating the shares of organizations as well as individuals in maintenance
errors causation.
c. Determination of human-factors based root causes of aviation maintenance errors.
d. Recognition of various scenarios of maintenance errors propagation.
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e. Appreciating the exact nature of pre-conditions that promote safety occurrences.
f. Assessing the overall human reliability of aviation maintenance.
g. Listing of main performance shaping factors of aviation maintenance.
5.4.2 Flow of investigative human factors analysis
Reason (1997) introduced the ‘Defences in depth’ model of organizational
accidents in which the combination of improper organizational latent conditions and
unsafe acts performed by individuals usually leads to accidents. Having an
organizational accident occurrence, investigation can follow an opposite flow direction
from the last active failure that produced the immediate accident down to its roots in a
wider organizational concept, and that is how this model can be utilized as a human
factor analysis tool in organizational accidents perspective. The whole concept is
illustrated in the previous Figure 2.7. Accordingly, the given 58 helicopter safety
occurrences were analyzed starting from the most immediate individual failures and
down to the initiating roots of the maintenance errors that were pre-present within the
organizational level.
5.4.3 Introducing the ‘Specific Failures’, a proposed fourth order
for HFACS-ME taxonomy
The published powerful HFACS-ME taxonomy (Schimidt et al 1998, Schimidt
et al 2001, Crotty 2002, and Krulak 2004) gives detailed analysis for causes and factors
that contribute to maintenance-related accidents and incidents regarding human factors
concepts. The most detailed presentation of such an analysis goes down to the 34 list
scale of the third order categories as shown in Table 5.2. In other words, the immediate
causes and factors contributing to maintenance related safety occurrences are detailed to
a scale of 34 categories which describe all the expected latent or active failures.
Considering any of these third order categories, for instance ‘Inadequate Organizational
Processes’ or ‘Inadequate Documentation’, it is arguable that there are many factors or
conditions that can go wrong with the organization processes or aircraft documents.
This gives rise to the question whether there is any means for finer resolution that shows
further details regarding the immediate failures that exist prior to aviation maintenance-
related safety occurrences. As an answer, the following simple theory has been
developed:
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In fact, each of the 34 third order categories can be illustrated by a limited number
of examples. For instance, Schmidt et al.(1998) wrote: '' A manual omits a step in a
maintenance procedure, such as leaving out an O-ring that causes a fuel leak is a case
of (Inadequate documentation)''. So if the most frequent case examples such as the one
given above are gathered for each third order category, then these cases can be seen as a
set of most frequent and logic sub-divisions of this category. For instance, ‘Inadequate
Documentation’ category can be further specifically detailed into the following sub
divisions:
1. No / limited documentation available.
2. Documents not updated.
3. Alerts/ Service bulletin not provided.
4. Documents / CD’s unusable.
5. Documents contain conflicting information.
6. Documents contain insufficient information.
7. Documents not understandable.
8. Practical procedural step(s) omission.
9. Incorrect maintenance procedural sequence.
10. Required information / response delayed.
For more compactness, these ''sub-divisions’’ are to be known - for the purposes
of this study – as Specific Failures (SF’s).The same concept applies to all the 34 third
order categories. SF’s can either be latent conditions or active failures that immediately
precede maintenance-related safety occurrences, they represent greater detailed
definition of the causal factors leading to such occurrences, thus higher resolution of
analysis can be obtained. Following such an understanding, 197 specific failures were
only just introduced as per Table 5.2. These SF’s have been either inspired from
literature or genuinely introduced after thoroughly scanning sequences of the given
population occurrences. These SF’s are taken in this research to resemble a newly
introduced fourth order set of categories, which were then utilized (as bottom line) in
the first stage of the human factors –oriented analysis to determine the most frequent
immediate factors and conditions that ‘specifically’ preceded each of the higher third
order categories.
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Table 5-2 Breaking down HFACS-ME 3rd Order categories into Specific failures
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Table 5.2 . Breaking down HFACS-ME 3rd Order categories into Specific Failures (Continued)
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5.4.4 Constructing error causal factors databases
Two complementary overlapping sets of databases were constructed regarding
the selected 58 safety occurrences. These database constructions resembled a first step
of a deep and comprehensive secondary data-mining process as pre-highlighted in
Chapter 3. This was accomplished by revisiting the formal reports of maintenance-
initiated helicopter safety occurrences in a more human factors-oriented and specified
manner. It is an authentic feature of the HFACS-ME taxonomy to enable such belated
reviewing of formal concluded reports as long as they contain the actual description to
‘what happened’ and the overall information of the ‘associated contexts’ that
accommodated that happening. The databases were constructed in the following
sequence:
a. The 58 Helicopter accidents and serious incidents reports were re-analysed using
the upgraded HFACS-ME taxonomy of four orders. Each and every detail within
each of the reports was measured by comparing it to the list of the fourth order
197 SF’s in order to determine whether that detail fits with any of the SF’s. Vast
more improvement of analysis resolution was thus guaranteed if compared to that
which would have been obtained if the analysis was started just by the 34 third
order categories.
b. Detailed spreadsheets were then constructed to statistically analyse frequencies of
occurrence of each of the SF’s and whether there were any correlations between
them that may show any specific patterns or grouping. This is illustrated in
Appendix F.
c. The analysis was then taken one upper level to the collective 34 third order
categories of the HFACS-ME. A second set of spreadsheets database was
similarly built to investigate these categories. A benefit of this stage was to
compare its outputs with those similar analyses of other very rare works (Schimidt
et al 2001, and Krulak 2004) that only stopped at the resolution level of maximum
34 entries. The second set of databases is given in Appendix G.
d. The constructed spreadsheets of both the databases were used to statistically
determine the root causal factors and other influential human factors that
participated to the given safety occurrences under re-investigation.
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5.4.5 Analysis of human factors –based databases for
identification of aviation maintenance root cause factors
The secondary data analysis was continued by further investigating the
occurrence frequencies of various upgraded-HFACS-ME categories. In almost every
case of the 58 safety occurrences re-visited, it is found that the concluded causal
factor(s) in each report were not the root ones. The data mining process showed clearly
that deeper underlying factors or conditions were always there that initially set the track
to the undesired event to take place. This is a genuine target of this research, to
recognize deeper root causes of human errors that are usually committed during aviation
maintenance.
The analysis was conducted in an opposite route to the sequence of events that
preceded the occurrences as recommended by Reason (1997) and many other
publications. Thus immediate specific failures were investigated first, then they were
collectively classified to construct the third, second, and then first order higher
management set of causal factors. This can be further detailed as per the following
sections.
5.4.5.1 Most frequent Specific Failures (Proposed fourth HFACS-ME order
categories)
To answer the question ‘why’ regarding helicopter maintenance errors, the first
stage of the human factors-based analysis utilized the set of 197 Specific Failures as per
section 5.4.3 to determine the most frequent immediate factors and conditions that
specifically preceded each of the 58 analyzed safety occurrences. It is found that the
most frequent Specific Failure associated with the given population is ‘Required
information not available in relative documents’ with 5.1% of the total specific failures
entries of 493 that directly precede these 58 helicopter accidents and serious incidents.
‘Maintainer failure to recognize condition’, ‘no / poor documentation’, ‘non-existing
organizational procedures’, and ‘ maintainer inadequate skills’ are the following four
specific failures with 4.3%, 3.9%, 3.9%, and 3.7% respectively. Figure 5.5 shows the
most frequent 30 Specific Failures observed. The first 5 specific failures represent
20.9%, while the total 30 top listings represent 70.4% of the total sample entries found.
This is further illustrated through Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5-5 Most frequent 30 Specific Failures within the analysed 58 Helicopter safety occurrences
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Further study of Figure 5.5 provides more focused resolution as per exact
failures that led to the occurrences. The observed listings vary between management,
supervisory, workspace conditions, and maintainer erroneous acts. Maintenance
reliability can benefit from such specific listing by initialising the preparation and
implementation of specific solutions to each of the revealed exact short comings. In
another hand, a systematised organizational safety culture assessment can be derived
referring to the number and nature of the recorded specific failures for each case.
The total 493 entries were un-evenly distributed between the 58 population
cases. Figure 5.6 shows that only one occurrence took place due to a single specific
failure. On the other end, very high numbers of Specific Failures are similarly witnessed
in very few occasions as well. The most frequent cases that represent 65.5% of the total
population comprised between 3 and 9 specific failures for each case. It is thus seen that
the vast majority of the cases occupies the intermediate portion of the spectrum. This
coincides with Reason’s (1997) organizational safety space theory where the position of
an organisation within the safety space is a plain resultant of the interaction between its
intrinsic resistance and vulnerability to its operating hazards. Reason indicated that most
of the organizations are located within an intermediate position of the safety space.
Figure 5-6 Specific Failures distribution for the given population
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5.4.5.2 HFACS-ME third order analysis
The 34 third order categories were then used to analyze the given population in
the search for their root causes. Specific failures were studied for each occurrence to
indicate existence or non-existence of each relative third order category. A complete
third order classification was then identified for the whole population. Figure 5.7
highlights the ‘inadequate organizational processes’ as the most frequent causes of
maintenance errors at this level with 12.9% of the total selected sample. The next
frequent categories are ‘Inadequate documentations’ with 11.1% and ‘Maintainer
attention / memory- based errors’ at 10%. ‘Maintainer skill / techniques- based errors’
and helicopter ‘inadequate design’ groups come in the fourth and fifth ratings with 7.9%
and 7.5% respectively.
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14%
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Figure 5-7 HFACS-ME third order root causes classification of the given sample
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The obtained results (frequencies of occurrence) were passed, at the third order
level, through reliability assessment for coding and analysis accuracy. The same
HFACS-ME tool was used for a second independent rating, and then both ‘Cohen’s
Kappa’ and ‘percentage of agreement’ methods of inter-rater reliability assessment were
applied.
5.4.5.3 HFACS-ME second order analysis
Tracking the root causes upwards in both individual and managerial folds, the
obtained third level results were assembled systematically to indicate only 10 categories
at the second order level of the taxonomy as given in Figure 5.8. A clearer picture
indicating high presence of organizational malfunctioning can be observed: Logically,
the collective contributions of inadequate processes, documentation, design, and
recourses formed a dominant inadequate ‘Organizational conditions’ covering 35% of
the total second order level causal matrix. Next come the ‘maintainer errors’ category
with a 28% weight, those included memory, decision making, knowledge, skill, and
rule-based maintainer shortages. It is also clear that the measures applied at the MRO’s
covered by the given population are reasonably effective regarding the ‘working
equipment’, ‘crew coordination, and ‘maintainer’s health conditions’. Each of these
appears only at the low rate of 1%.
Figure 5-8 HFACS-ME second order root causes classification of the given sample
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5.4.5.4 HFACS-ME first order analysis
Analysis was further taken upwards to identify weights of causal factors deeply
rooted in upper management level or within maintainer’s conditions and behaviour. It is
found that 44% of the total causal factors involved in the sample occurrences have their
roots originated within ‘management’ sectors, this is concluded by joining the
‘organizational’ and ‘supervisory’ contributions from the previous second level. These
are mainly latent conditions of the system since almost all of the ‘organizational’
conditions and most of the ‘supervisory’ behaviour were always there for long times
within the MRO establishments involved. The next share of causal factors were rooted
within individual maintainers acts which are mostly active errors or violations that
immediately brought about the undesired outcomes, these acts cover 41% of the total
causes observed. ‘Working’ and ‘maintainer’ latent conditions represent origins for 8%
and 7% of the total sample cause factors involved respectively as per Figure 5.9.
Figure 5-9 HFACS-ME first order root causes classification for the given sample
5.4.6 Verification of the human factors-based analysis reliability
5.4.6.1 Basic concepts of inter-rater reliability analysis
Many writers have discussed theory and techniques of Inter-Rater Reliability
(IRR). Cohen (1960) discussed that in some situations in the clinical–social– personality
areas of psychology, it frequently occurs that the only useful level of measurement
obtainable in nominal sealing i.e. placement in a set of K unordered categories. Because
the categorization of the units is a consequence of some complex judgment process, it
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becomes important to determine the extent to which these judgments are reproducible,
i.e. reliable. The procedure which suggests itself is that of having two (or more) judges
independently categorise a sample of units to determine the degree, significance, and
sampling stability of their agreement. Gwet (2002a) showed that evaluating the extent
of agreement between two or more raters is common in social, behavioural and medical
sciences. He gave a reliability experiment where two raters (A and B) must classify N
subjects into one of two possible response categories i.e. (1 or 2) , (True or False), (Yes
or No) etc. The categories are assumed as disjoint (no overlap). The only possible out
come of such categorization can be illustrated in the following Table 5.3.
Table 5-3 Distribution of subjects by rater and response category (Gwet 2002 a)
Rater A
Rater B Yes No Total
Yes a b B(Yes) = a + b
No c d B(No) = c + d
Total A(Yes) = a + c A(No) = b + d N
Where, a: Total number of subjects classified as (Yes) units by both raters.
b: Total number of subjects classified as (Yes) units by rater B and as (No)
units by rater A.
c: Total number of subjects classified as (Yes) units by rater A and as (No)
units by rater B.
d: Total number of subjects classified as (No) units by both raters.
Adopting similar tabulation, many other writers (Harris 1994, Hsu and Field
2003, Huddleston 2003, Gwet 2002b, Ludwig 2005, Chin Lee and Harris 2005) gave
detailed formulations and examples for inter-rater reliability in the two frequently used
methods, namely, Cohen–Kappa (K) and percentage of agreement (%). General
formulation can be given, referring also to the above Table 5.3, as follows :
A. Cohen’s Kappa method
K = ( F1 - F2) / (N – F2) , K= 0.00 to 1.00
Where, F1 = a + d
F2 = [ (a + b)(a + c) + (b + d)(c + d) ] / N
N = a + b + c + d
The various degrees of agreement indicated by Kappa value K are given in
Table 5.4 below.
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Table 5-4 Degree of agreement between raters a according to K values ( Huddleston 2003)
K Value ranges Degree of Agreement between raters
0.08 – 1.00 Almost Perfect
0.60 - 0.79 Substantial
0.40 - 0.59 Moderate
0.20 - 0.39 Fair
0.00 - 0.19 Slight
≤ 0.00 Poor 
B. Percentage of agreement method
Percentage of agreement = [ (a + d) / N ] * 100 %
The levels of agreement indicated by the percentage of agreement between raters
are given in Table 5.5 as follows:
Table 5-5 Level of agreement between raters a according to percentage of agreement
(Huddleston 2003)
Percentage ranges Level of Agreement between raters
91- 100 Very high
81 – 90 High
71 – 80 Moderate
61 - 70 Fair
51 - 60 Slight
≤ 50 Poor 
The obtained results of the 34 third order categories discussed in the previous
section 5.4.5.2 were passed through reliability assessment for coding and analysis
accuracy. The sample reports were re-coded and analyzed by a second independent
experienced rater to assess these above obtained results. The same HFACS-ME tool was
used for the second rating activities, and then both ‘Cohen’s Kappa’ and ‘percentage of
agreement’ methods of inter-rater reliability assessment were applied. Details are given
in Table 5.6. The Kappa value for this inter-rater reliability assessment ranged between
0.483 and 1.0 with an average value of 0.766, similarly, percentages of agreement
between the raters ranged between 72.22% and 100.0% with an average of 94.77%.
Both the scales indicate substantial to very high rates (Cohen 1960, Gwet 2002a,
Huddleston 2003) of coding and analysis reliability.
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Table 5-6 Inter-rater reliability verification for the HFAC-ME analysis
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5.5 Fault tree analysis to identify maintenance errors causal
factors
5.5.1 Fault Tree Analysis: The basics
Fault trees are used to graphically represent system failures and their causes
(Stanton et al 2005). Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) indicated that a fault tree is a tree-
like diagram which defines the failure events and displays their possible causes in terms
of hardware failure or human error. This method was originally developed for the
analysis of complex systems in aerospace and defence industries and they are now used
extensively in PSA. They also indicated that typically within a fault tree diagram, the
failure event is placed at the top of the fault tree and the contributing events are placed
below. The tree is held together by AND / OR gates, which link contributory events
together. An AND gate is used when more than one event causes a failure i.e. when
multiple contributory factors are involved while an OR gate is used the failure event
could be caused by more than one contributory event in isolation. Sandom and Harvey
(2004) illustrated that fault trees trace backwards from the undesirable event to identify
all the potential causes that might contribute to it. The complexity of the tree diagram is
influenced by complexities of failures under analysis.
5.5.2 Objectives of building accidents Fault Trees in this
research
In this research, fault tree analysis was performed on some helicopter
maintenance-induced safety occurrences to facilitate achieving the following objectives:
a. Focusing understanding of maintenance error initiation and propagation scenarios.
b. Verifying the results of the HFACS-ME human factors-based analysis in regard of
the determined root causes of each safety occurrence. This in fact represents
genuine case of research ‘triangulation’ as discussed in chapter three. The firstly
concluded maintenance errors root causes would be further emphasized via
applying other parallel analysis techniques such as fault trees.
c. Appreciating various possibilities for ultimate prevention of safety-events
reoccurrences. This is achievable by recognizing various critical intervention
opportunities within the sequence of errors propagation that can be addressed in
order for these sequences to be stopped.
d. Enriching the researcher’s scholarship by developing more skills of both fault tree
theories as well as the associated practical software programmes.
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5.5.3 Conducting Fault Trees analysis
Analytical Fault Trees were built for a selected range of accidents and incidents
from the selected population of safety occurrences to further emphasise the concepts of
maintainer errors mechanisms and sequences that they follow. Accidents and incidents
were selected to various degrees of complexity. Maintainers’ performance procedures
that led to the safety occurrence were evaluated and compared against actual job cards
from the Eurocopter (2000) Maintenance Manual, being a typical recommended
reference manual for the helicopters involved in some of the occurrences under analysis,
these are short listed as per Table 5.7.
The analysis was carried out using the reliability software Relex Reliability Studio
2006. An illustrative sample Fault Tree diagram of G-PUMH helicopter case over the
North Sea is given in Appendix H. Results and analysis of these fault trees are further
discussed in chapter 6.
Table 5-7 Short list of helicopter safety occurrences analysed using Fault Tree technique
Manufacturer Type Model Code Location Date
Aerospecial S. Puma AS332L G-PUMH North Sea 27/9/1995
Aerospecial S. Puma AS332L G-PUMA S. F.G. Oil rig 06/3/1997
Aerospecial S. Puma AS332L G-PUMB Aberdeen airport 20/7/1998
Aerospecial S. Puma AS332L H-BHY Karratha/Australia 24/5/2004
5.6 Chapter summary
A total of 58 helicopter maintenance-induced safety occurrences were analysed
both statistically and on a human factors basis. Helicopters are found to be more
vulnerable to accidents and severe incidents such that they are mostly of fatal
consequences. Investigation yielded that main rotors, tail rotors, transmission systems,
and engines of rotorcrafts are the most critical and yet most exposed components to
maintenance errors. Furthermore, parts requiring higher cognitive or intellectual
concentration during assembly, installation, alignment, or adjustment are found more
potential to suffer problems that lead to major consequential undesired outcomes. Many
types of maintenance errors were listed, the most common one is improper execution of
various inspections with higher risks of associated defects being left undetected.
During the human factors-based investigation, more affirmation of the nature of
immediate causes directly foregoing the analysed occurrences is obtained. This was
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achievable by introducing an organized list of specific failures resembling each of the
HFACS-ME taxonomy third order categories. This analysis also concluded that a large
proportion of the studied accidents and incidents were brought about due to causal
factors that were deeply rooted within organizational and managerial levels. Individual
maintainer erroneous acts also gained major scores of such causal factors.
Finally, it is discussed that helicopter MRO’s and their workforce are different in
significant number of aspects to those of fixed wing airliners organizations. This is quite
tangible regarding the clear differences in types of maintenance errors committed which
are, in turn, subject to the different physical and operational natures of both types of
aircrafts. Similarly, the differences between MRO’s for fixed and rotary wing aircraft
were discussed.
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6 Retrospective Studies Finalization:
Learning from Past Errors
We work because it's a chain reaction, each subject leads to the next.
Charles Eames
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 The concept of organizational learning
Many writers who were involved in organizational safety and human reliability
fields highlighted the crucial need of various organizations to embark on some levels of
practicing Organizational Learning (OL). OL, which is increasingly approached by both
academics and practitioners, is universally being furnished in two fashions:
 Reactive OL, comprising adaptation of new organizational settings or work contexts
in reaction to previous events. This process is always observed as being more
involuntary in nature and is usually established after paying very high social and
economic penalties.
 Proactive OL, suggesting and adapting enthusiastic future-oriented changes of
organizational settings or work contexts in search for better performance. This is a
more cognitive process that calls for developments to be invented from the scratch.
These two folds of OL have been discussed in literature under multiple notions:
single loop and double loop, lower and higher, tactical and strategic, and lately, adaptive vs.
generative learning. The concept of single and double-looped OL was first introduced by
Argyris and Schon (1978,1996) who saw the proactive orientation as being of higher mental
activity that overpasses the single loop of the reactive learning. This is given in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6-1 The single vs. double loop organizational learning model (Argyris and Schon 1978, 1996)
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Carroll et al (2002) further utilized this thinking to develop a 4-staged OL model
that form a spectrum of processes, with extreme limits located at absolute reactive and
proactive ends. Figure 6.2 tells all about this.
Figure 6-2 The 4 - Staged model of organizational learning (Carroll et al 2002)
Carroll et al. called for more work to be accomplished towards enriching the OL
processes through more sophisticated overseeing-studies of organizational systems. This
would be achievable by investing deeper intellectual capital, thus leading to the
introduction of higher profile models.
This writer sees that Cacciabue (2004a) went a further step forward by
introducing the HERMES model. HERMES is the ‘matter-of-fact’ manifestation of the
overall pre-introduced concepts. The methodology sets practical procedures that join the
understanding of previous lessons (reactive, single looped, tactical, etc) to the planning
of future performance (proactive, double looped, strategic, etc).
This research, as a practical implementation of HERMES, captures the full sprit
of this expanded OL conceptualization when being dedicated to aviation maintenance.
The current work targets the digestion of past experiences (as discussed in the previous
chapters) and then utilizing the product to set solutions for the future (as will be
discussed within the following chapters).
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6.1.2 This chapter
This chapter is the intermediate junction between the two backward and
forward-oriented parts of this research. Graphically, this can be represented by the ‘in-
purpose encircled’ directive middle arrow of Figure 6.2 above. The chapter comprises
the transitional stage of summing up outputs from the retrospective studies which are, in
a parallel fashion, the starting initialization of the directions for the following
prospective studies. The chapter lists various deep causal factors of aviation
maintenance, their accountability as performance influencing factors, and their
associated patterns and scenarios of propagation. The chapter then sets the pace for the
required future treatment of these outputs.
6.2 Maintenance error initiators and promoters
6.2.1 Performance influencing factors, root causes, and the
Specific Failures within aviation maintenance
In addition to the accumulative results obtained through the sociotechnical
studies as well as root cause analysis, a comprehensive set of Performance Influencing
Factors (PIF’s) present at various degrees within aviation maintenance can further be
identified.. This set of PIF’s, being direct mapping of past and current organizational
situations, represents supplementary guidelines for future interventions development.
PIF’s are generally referred to as “the conditions that influence human
performance in a given context” (Kim and Jung 2003). These conditions are known in
literature in various terminologies such as PSF, context factors, performance affecting
factors, error producing conditions, common performance conditions, and some others
as well. They generally describe the overall interaction between human, technology, and
the surrounding organizational environment. The interlinking between these three inputs
within aviation maintenance is so complex and overlapping such that it becomes of
logic to take the PIF’s within this industry in a holistic collective manner.
Referring to the concept and definitions of error root causes as discussed in
section 5.1.1, it can be observed that the PIF’s are actually a complementary part that
form, with the root causes, the overall spectrum of human error initiators and promoters.
In other words, the human error within complex sociotechnical systems is initiated as a
result of a certain setting of root causes, then it is further catalyzed into a higher stage of
seriousness and severity due to the presence of a certain setting of PIF’s. The utilized
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HFACS-ME taxonomy in Chapter 5 works to identify these collective sets of root
causes and PIF’s. The associated fault tree and task analyses aim at further reinforce
these mechanisms of error initiation and propagation. Further in this orientation, it can
be seen that the list of 197 Specific Failures introduced also in Chapter 5 (re-presented
as well in Appendix I) thoroughly cover all the basic error-initiating and promoting acts
and conditions within aviation maintenance. The mentioned taxonomy addresses all
elements of the managerial, technical, and human ingredients of the industry. In fact,
these listed SF’s are either error root causes or PIF’s shaping the performance within
MRO’s. As discussed previously in section 5.1.1, the distinction between these two
categories in most cases is difficult due to the fact that a genuine root cause within a
given case can be a clear PIF within another and vice versa. A schematic illustration
relating the SF’s, root causes, and PIF’s is given in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6-3 Corelation of Sppecific Failures, Root Causes and PIF’s
By this final stage of the retrospective study, the initial SF’s listing of section
5.4.3 is accordingly accepted as the actual holistic mapping of all the root causes and
PIF’s, prevailingly found within MRO’s. These identified SF’s will thus be utilized for
the next prospective part of this work in accordance with the general requirements of the
applied methodology. To this end, only a compact set comprising the upper most
recurrent 30 SF’s is found to be of most critical dominating influence on performance
within MRO’s. Consequently, mainly these top 30 SF’s, re-listed in Table 6.1, will be
considered for the next prospective part of this research.
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Table 6-1 Concluded 30 SF’s for the rotorcraft maintenance industry
Serial
Most Frequent SF’s concluded by the retrospective study
(as recognized by rotorcrafts MRO’s)
1 Technical or other type of information is not available to maintainers
2 Maintainer’s failure to recognize condition of a/c, workplace, task, etc.
3 Non or weak existence of organizational procedures
4 No or only poor technical documentation is available
5 Documents not updated
6 Inadequate skills of maintainers regarding their assigned tasks
7 Organization failure to provide oversight
8 Organization failure to track performance
9 Maintainer bending of regulations or standard operating procedures
10 Supervisory failure to inspect work done or other maintainer’s duties
11 Maintainer poor techniques followed to carry tasks
12 Improper cross checks performed by maintainers to validate jobs
13 Organizational failure to enforce regulations
14 Maintainer procedural mistakes when following task sequences
15 Maintainer inadequate task knowledge
16 Practical step (s) omission in technical manuals, job cards or others
17 Aircraft poor layout or configuration
18 Poor organizational planning
19 Conflicting information provided within available documentation
20 Maintainer’s loss of situational awareness
21 Incomplete procedures within documents
22 Maintainers are distracted or interrupted during their work
23 Poor technical or other decisions taken by maintainers or supervisors
24 Maintainer’s inadequate aircraft knowledge
25 Inadequate organizational guidance
26 Aircraft design error
27 Aircraft parts are easily to be incorrectly installed
28 Vision to workspace is blocked (obstacles)
29 Maintainer’s improper procedures within workplace or on aircrafts
30 Maintenance tasks are complex or confusing
The above listing, based on occurrence frequency, tells again about the
intermeshing nature of the PIF’s within MRO’s. For instance, a condition that stems
from an individual’s perspective often indicates some organizational shortage at a
higher level. Similarly, drawbacks in designing an aircraft or any of its parts, or even
having defective technical documentation provisions, are coupled, in most cases, with
obvious maintainer’s mal functioning, or at least confused decision making.
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6.2.2 The special case of rotorcraft
It is of great interest to investigate whether the special characteristics of
helicopter have any influence on the managerial and individually-originated types of
maintenance errors compared to fixed wing aircrafts. In fact, it is found that helicopter
MRO’s and maintainers are significantly different, in many aspects, from the fixed-
wing aircraft maintenance personnel and organizations. Many factors leading to such an
understanding can be highlighted. These include the criticality arising from the single
load path to failure regarding the rotors and transmission systems, lack of redundancy,
and low chances of emergency survivability manoeuvres. Such issues and other similar
ones should undoubtedly influence the on-the-job personality, concerns, cautiousness,
and general behaviours of helicopter maintainers. The relatively small size of
helicopters limits the overall man-hours required compared to large aircrafts,
particularly during major scheduled maintenance, thus smaller sizes and numbers of
teams are logically expected. This should reduce all types of errors normally associated
with crew coordination, teams formation, shifts handovers, task assignments, and
supervisory and leadership shortages. Further, smaller groups of workers usually
develop more tight personal relationships, mutual trust, and easier adopted professional
and organizational qualities including-unfortunately- norms. The critical helicopter
systems also influences the overall capacity of technical paper work and maintenance
manuals procedures which are -in turn- usually critical, so any deficiency in such
procedures will give higher potential to error generation. Maintenance cycle frequencies
are higher for helicopter, nevertheless for its critical rotating components, thus more
exposure to errors is expected. In fact, a helicopter, not like a fixed wing airliner, is
naturally expected to suffer a number of snags after each flight, this is usually due to its
tough operational conditions. Hence, helicopter corrective maintenance lines are always
busier. These arguments may be firmly backed up by quick comparison between
Krulak’s (2004) results, mainly of fixed wing airliners as represented in the previous
Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, and by the findings of this study as given in Figure 5.8: Both
analyses utilised HFACS-ME third level classifications for safety occurrences in
coinciding periods and within similar overall organizational cultures. Concise
information extracted from the two figures is reproduced here in Table 6.2.
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Table 6-2 Most frequent causal factors of maintenance errors for fixed and rotor-wing aircrafts
Rank out of
34 categories
Fixed wing causal factors
(From Krulak 2004)
Helicopter causal factors
(This study)
1st Inadequate supervision Inadequate processes
2nd Judgement / decision errors Inadequate documentations
3rd Attention / memory errors Attention / memory errors
4th Inadequate processes Skill / technique errors
5th Knowledge / rule-based errors Inadequate design
6th Inappropriate operations Routine norm violations
7th Inadequate documentations Knowledge / rule-based errors
8th Inadequate communications Inadequate supervision
22nd *********************** Inadequate communications
It is noticeable that the supervisory problems are the main error causal factors
for the sample of majority fixed-wing airliners of high man-hours demand and large
numbers of workers, whereas such supervisory malfunctioning comes only at a late 8th
stage of importance for helicopters. In similar fashion, crew communication comes in
the 8th and 22nd stages of importance as causal factor for fixed wing and helicopter
maintenance workforce respectively. Conversely, while documentations problems are of
higher concern for helicopter, it comes only at a similar late 7th stage of importance for
the fixed wing aircraft maintainers. Also while Judgement and decision making
represents the second important causal factor for fixed wing maintenance errors, but it
does not show any major importance in the helicopter context as indicated by this study.
Helicopter maintenance primarily suffers from inadequate organizational processes as
dominant causal factors, these include inadequate regulations, oversight functions,
guidance, planning, tasks, and procedures. These same inadequate processes come at a
later 4th stage of importance for fixed winged airliner maintenance. Skill-based errors
are seen here only for helicopters as an indication of job criticality and/or complexity,
these errors also raise questions regarding the existence and effectiveness of relative
training programs and their available funds. Finally, it is further interesting to notice
that maintainer attention and memory errors are of typical weights as causal factors for
both groups, this is quite expected since memory shortages are common human nature
aspects.
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6.3 Maintenance errors initiation and propagation scenarios
The first comprehensive reactive part of this study concluded sophisticated
analysis of various scenarios that maintenance errors may follow during their causation,
initiation, occurrence, and propagation. Consequently more accurate understanding of
these and other points was obtained within the holistic branchy context of aviation
maintenance. A newly introduced Maintenance Error History (MEH) model, as
illustrated by Figure 6.4, summarises such an understanding, and describes various
stages of maintenance errors and the close intermeshing between them.
Studying the model in Figure 6.4, although significantly simplified, it can be
evidently seen that there are limitless numbers of variations in which a single aircraft
maintenance error can initiate, occur, and develop. The possibility of any of the four
here-listed collective error root cause categories to embrace an error initiator is always
open, and such possibility dramatically multiplies if more than one root cause category
is involved. The overall complexity in such a case becomes more tangible by recalling
the fact that each root cause category classifies limitless numbers of individual unique
root causes. Furthermore, again unlimited numbers of various combinations from the
immediate causal factors before each error occurrence can be assigned for each setting
of root causes combinations, thus the overall number of possible causation scenarios is
again infinite. Things get further complicated and varied by considering the diverse
chances of a committed error to be spontaneously detected and corrected, detected with
remedy delayed, delayed in detection, and the undesired cases when errors
surreptitiously propagate forward undetected at all.
It can thus be readily concluded that ‘aviation maintenance error scenarios of
initiation, occurrence, and propagation are infinite’ such that it is almost impossible to
accurately measure or practically predict when, where, and how a ‘next’ maintenance
error will take place. Consequently, this writer sees that it is totally non-logic as far as it
is impractical to invest huge efforts of backward and/ or forward organizational learning
capital trying to set future maintenance error occurrence predictors, instead, some other
innovative applicable solutions must be sought.
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Figure 6-4 Maintenance Error History (MEH) model of aviation maintenance error causation, occurrence, and propagation scenarios
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The aptitudes of ordinary human reliability methods, mainly built on tough
extended mathematics and probability calculations, seem questionable in providing true
practical solutions that a busy safety responsible employee of a MRO can readily and
trustfully apply to reduce and prevent his / her day o day threatening maintenance errors
trends.
6.4 Possible intervention attack points
A truly natural question that an analyser of Figure 6.4 may develop in mind,
after having digested all the complexity of the real world situations that that figure tries
to resemble, would be: ‘ What is the best optimum point that an innovative solution may
aim at to prevent or at least reduce aviation maintenance errors?’. A first glance will
show that if error initiators, namely root causes, could be eliminated, then that would
mean the logical possibility of having error-free aviation maintenance.
More precisely, huge efforts are always exhorted on developing tougher
measures for inspection validation, or investing big amounts of money to persuade
maintainers to concentrate more on their jobs. These and others as well have
continuously been considered and could undoubtedly be further applied, but
nevertheless, maintenance errors are still existent facts. The real answer would thus
better be to eliminate the errors’ fertilizing swamps (Reason 1997), the root causes that
vaguely, yet tangibly and uniquely exist within each and every MRO, or else within the
rest of the industry sectors. Targeting the root causes implies firm and willing-full
adaptation of strategic profile thinking:
 Acknowledging that root causes are out there, within each MRO.
 Acknowledging that by eliminating root causes, error-free performance can be
achieved.
 Developing theories classifying, assessing, and modelling these root causes.
 Building practical scientifically-approved applicable tools that work to eliminate
root causes in daily practice within industry.
These root causes, although very complex, but they are approachable. They are
the simple, normally obvious, continuing, hazardous, lived with, yet un-noticed
conditions and facts within a given maintenance organization. They are so close such
that they are not seen, at least by the ‘home people’, the management and other staff
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and employees. A MRO may have employed the wrong lesser number of maintainers
for many months or even years without noticing any of the continuous everyday risks
that are associated with such poor manning. On the contrary, every thing might have
been taken as ‘normal’ in accordance with the daily ‘normal’ work records. The deadly
fact in this particular case, which organizations need to appreciate, is that ‘normal’
doesn’t imply ‘safe’. To conclude, they are the root causes of maintenance errors that
must be challenged, not their generated consequences, in order for any intervention
strategy to be successful.
6.5 Characteristics of the required corrective measures
Building on the above, a successful set of corrective measures that can
effectively and efficiently influence preventing maintenance errors or at least reducing
them may unavoidably incorporate a handful of features that can satisfy the complexity,
dynamism, and randomness of the problem. The performed socitechnical research that
was discussed earlier, in particular the ethnographic part of it, showed the real industry
need for practical tools that can fill the gaps in this regard. For instance, the duplicate
inspection items lists usually issued by manufacturers, regulators, and MRO’s
organizations are still being finalized referring to mere previous almost habitual
experiences in most cases. No mature scientifically-supported methods could be spotted
as standing out in this orientation. The new generation solutions, consequently, should
ensure appropriate provisions for the satisfaction of the above and other concerns
through a number of ‘must have’ characteristics, a brief listing of which can be
presented as:
 Proactive solutions are needed, no further social or economical penalties are
allowed.
 Scientifically approved
 Such solutions must be practically applicable.
 Integrate-able within current SMS systems, no new infrastructures are required.
 Fight the root causes in the first place
 Free of complexity, no deep mathematics, overbearing paper work, or highly
sophisticated expert systems are involved.
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 Accommodate previous theoretical limitations and practical drawbacks like
uncertainty handling, subjectivity of analysis, transformability of models into user
tools, capital expert systems, complicated training plans, inter-industry
communication, finance, etc.
 Must be dynamic, upgradeable, comprehensive and yet suitable for each
individual organizations
 Can handle the problems given by the four categories of root causes (and their
sub-lists) in addition to aircraft design and error-prone features.
 Can handle all possible causal factors and all problem associated with job
validation and inspection.
 Make sound representation of OL at its higher (double loop, strategic, generative)
patterns
 Give theories, models in scientific background then set practical tools
 Economical, time saving
 Starting from current situation and goes gradually towards zero errors
 Help developing universal databases and standard of safety monitoring
 Joins manufacturers, regulators, MRO’s, as well as academia and other research
institutions.
 Etc.
These and other characteristics are taken as dictating guidelines for this research
work in its second prospective part as will be discussed through the coming chapters.
6.6 Chapter summary
This chapter is the intermediate channel between the two major parts of this
research. It lists the chief findings of the elongated retrospective studies and uses them
to predict and provide needed guidance for the following proactive research to be
furnished on those findings. The chapter showed that the scenarios for aviation
maintenance errors initiation, occurrence, and further propagation are infinite. Thus it is
concluded that only eliminating the basic root causes of errors will lead the way for a
successful error-free performance.
PART THREE
INVENTIVE PROSPECTIVE STUDIES
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7 Creative Modelling of the Aviation
Maintenance Monitoring Process
A thought is an idea in transit.
Pythagoras
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Thinking proactively
The emerging philosophy of ‘Proactive Safety’ has been called for by many
writers, after the habitual treatment of reactive accidents and incidents investigations
with their expected safety recommendations that usually follow (Braithwaite et al. 1998,
Liou et al. 2007, Edwards 2007, Shyur 2008). High-reliability organizations need to
espouse more ‘resilient’ orientations in their safety improvement plans, especially when
addressing critical complexity or uncertainty problems (Mearns 2009, Grote 2007a).
Such organizations are called upon to demonstrate proactive awareness towards minor
performance fluctuations that could indicate wider potential failures. It is now well
understood by the industry that human error can never be utterly prevented, nonetheless,
it can widely be confronted and reduced by acting proactively through multiple options
(Kontogiannis and Malakis 2009). “Reacting proactively means taking a more
comprehensive look at the human factors of supporting safe operation” (Burns 2006) as
a genuine improvement over the saturated simple error analysis procedures or
performance efficiency enhancements.
Building on the overall outcomes of the retrospective part of this research, the
next part of it will thus focus on developing tools that can be used by the industry to
further enhance aviation maintenance safety. According to the conclusions of Chapter 6,
two major requirements must be fulfilled by such tools:
 They must be proactive, to spare social and economical losses definitely
associated with reactive treatments.
 They must work to eliminate root causes of maintenance errors.
These two main objectives can be fully satisfied by introducing a proactive
scheme to continuously monitor existence, thus, furnishing the way to the elimination of
errors root causes. Figure 7.1 conceptualizes this thinking. Such proactive process can
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take place within two intermeshing cycles: The first one ensures the practical execution
of root causes detection, elimination, and thus performance improvements within
MRO’s, aircraft design offices, or during aircraft and other equipment manufacturing
processes. The other wider loop comprises all the scientific-based research and
development activities that produce tools for the industry to utilize. Hence, the current
research can be seen as a part of such collective industry-scientific movement.
Fee
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Figure 7-1 Conceptualization of proactive aviation maintenance safety
by eliminating maintenance errors root causes
A second glance to the main categories of aviation maintenance errors root
causes, as also discussed in Chapter 6, will assist the understanding of root causes as
being of two main foundations:
 Human-based root causes: Those which are directly induced by individuals or
collective teams or groups. These are root causes found within maintenance lines,
workplaces, hangars, factories, or initiated within management, legislators or
regulators offices.
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 Machine-based root causes: Those which are directly found / induced by hardware
including aircrafts, equipment, tools, material, etc. To this point, it can further be
seen that an indirect remote human influence can still exist within these hardware
groups of root causes, for instance, during design or manufacturing processes.
Accordingly, proactive intervention scenarios aiming at eliminating maintenance
error should strategically be designed to address these two main groups of root causes.
7.1.2 This Chapter
In this chapter, a new set of hypotheses, models, and practical tools are
introduced to proactively address the accumulation of crucial maintenance human error
causal factors within the aviation maintenance environment. The chapter discusses the
existence of root causes and the best strategies to eliminate them. This is the first part of
the prospective stage of this research.
7.2 Introducing the SWAMP Model of maintenance error
propagation
Experts have already compared human errors within safety-critical industries as
mosquitoes. This is quite reasonable since no one can ever tell when or where would be
their next ‘bite’. In fact, huge efforts have already been paid to produce an answer to
this simple, yet challenging question: What would be the scenario leading to the next
incident or accident within a given safety-sensitive organization? And consequently,
what measures can be taken to prevent such scenario? For the case of mosquitoes,
many protective methods, barriers, and sophisticated vaccinations are already in place,
but drying the insects’ initial fertilization and breading swamps will always remain to be
the optimum solution. It is high time now to think same-wise for the prevention or at
least reduction of human error-caused safety occurrences within high reliability
industries. We should try to proactively eliminate the ‘situations’ leading to human error
rather than trying to treat the human nature itself.
Based on both the well known Swiss Cheese and SHELL models of accident
causation and HMI (Reason 1997, CAA 2002b, ICAO 2005), a new human error
propagation model is introduced, in this research, as ‘The Swamp’ model which
explains the sequence of maintainer and supervisor errors initiation and propagation
(within a MRO) that always precede maintenance-related aviation incidents and
accidents. The model is given as per Figure 7.2.
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Figure 7-2 The 'Swamp' model of maintenance human factors- related error propagation
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This ‘Swamp’ model shows the sequence and propagation of safety-related
human maintenance errors through the behaviour of aircraft maintainer, supervisor,
crew or other associated personnel. The main component of the model being the
‘Swamp’, a persistent situation of latent conditions (intermittently disturbed and
exaggerated by some active failures) within the MRO that form a source of root causal
factors for human errors during aircraft maintenance activities. The existence of this
swamp is some where underneath the normal safety level of everyday practice (given in
Figure 7.2 as ‘ virtual safe performance level’) such that the dominant perception within
the MRO would always be: ‘everything is safe’ while it is actually not. The swamp,
being a mixture of numerous mutually interrelated error root causes, represents the basic
source of maintenance human error potentialities that can randomly and abruptly
develop into actual maintenance errors which produce incidents and accidents. The
influence of this swamp environment is continuously threatening the maintenance
process through its various stages: initial maintenance preparation, actual maintenance
practices, self-certification, supervision, advanced inspections, functional tests, and
even through to the operational phase.
A maintenance error can always exist, unseen, un-recovered, for short or even
long times after the aircraft is signed-off. Barriers and safe-guards already established
within each maintenance stage are always expected to trap any emerging errors and
directly eliminate them, thus setting the process to the ‘virtual’ safe level of
performance again. In case of non-existence or improper functioning of these barriers,
the committed maintenance error would propagate such that it can only be faced by the
next stage of defences (including those from operational and / or technical sides).
However, this would always be at the cost (risk) of exposing the aircraft to more severe
undesired outcomes if these errors in question failed to be captured once more. On the
other hand, if such errors are ‘hopefully’ trapped in this later stage, then more
complicated efforts would expectedly be required to re-establish the whole process to its
‘safe’ level again.
A major philosophy of this model is its conceptualization of the critical margin
between the daily accepted (familiar / normal) current level of safety practice (given in
figure as ‘virtual safe performance level) and the targeted absolute safety bottom line
with nil undesired outcomes (shown as ‘absolute safe performance level’). This margin
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is created due to the presence of the ‘swamp’. The swamp width in the illustration is
directly proportional to the real swamp’s size and influence within a given MRO in
reality. A direct result of this specific interrelation would be: If the swamp is dried up,
then this margin would ultimately vanish and the organization would perform (at least
theoretically) at the level of ‘absolute safe environment’.
Building on the previous Swamp theory, and recalling the two machine-based and
human-based families of error root causes, the following two hypotheses can further be
proposed as detailed materialization of the first research’s Hypothesis 1 stated
previously in Chapter 1 of this thesis:
Hypothesis 2:
‘An aviation maintenance task can be executed at a significantly higher level of safe
performance such that human-induced undesired outcomes would almost be nil if
possibilities of human error that can be initiated due to any design features associated
with that task are eliminated’.
Hypothesis 3:
‘An aviation MRO can operate at a significantly higher level of safe performance such
that human-induced undesired outcomes would almost be nil if the existing unseen
accumulation of mutually-interrelated root causes that lead to human maintenance
errors are eliminated’.
The objectives of this research work, in its prospective fold, is to introduce the
necessary models and tools that can satisfy these two hypotheses originated from the
above ‘Swamp’ model.
7.3 The Aviation Maintenance Monitoring Process (AMMP)
7.3.1 Introducing AMMP
To explore validity of the aforementioned hypotheses, a new hybrid
retrospective / prospective safety process is introduced: Aviation Maintenance
Monitoring Process (AMMP). The strategic AMMP concept, illustrated in Figure 7.3, is
an intermeshing coordination between various industry bodies, the major of these being
manufacturers and MRO’s. Nonetheless, other actors such as regulators and other
safety-oriented institutions can have their shares too. The concept is to continuously
monitor existence of human error triggers that may be rooted during design process, as
well as during maintenance practices at the MRO lines.
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Figure 7-3 Strategic layout of the Aviation Maintenance Monitoring Process (AMMP)
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Having identified the root causes in advance, they can then be eliminated
systematically, thus causing the aforementioned ‘Swamp’ to simultaneously shrink
down throughout the various sectors of the industry. The AMMP strategic proposed
layout is composed of three inter-linked industry stakeholders: The main AMMP
provider, aircraft design offices, and the MRO’s.
7.3.1.1 The main AMMP provider
This is intended to be a specialized body of high expertise, deep scientific
research capacity, and genuine skills in analysing past and current industry data that
describe aviation maintenance errors and their initiators. The body may be initiated and
launched independently or as a part of the current industry settings, for instance, within
a regulatory authority. This provider is tasked to methodically analyse and comprehend
the industry’s pool of data, theory, and professional knowledge in this field, and use the
overall thus digested information to build a set of user software packages that can be
used by both design and maintenance houses, with a main target of eliminating
maintenance errors root causes. The process is designed to be of a dynamic generative
nature, continuously tracking and upgrading the software packages and their application
zones. The current research is temporarily fulfilling this role of the AMMP provider.
7.3.1.2 The aircraft design offices
Using furnished inter-industry channels of information exchange, these offices
can make use of feedback from MRO’s, as well as other industry sectors, to ensure the
freedom of new designs (or those being upgraded) from any in-built error prone features
when seen from a maintainer human factors perspective. This can be achieved by
applying the AMMP proposed software in its design-oriented version. In fact this task is
a forward improvement by further capturing deeper maintainer human factors aspects to
be added to the well established ‘design for maintainability’ portfolios.
7.3.1.3 The MRO’s
By applying the proposed workplace version of AMMP software, quality
officers and other safety-oriented staff within a given MRO can directly measure the
existence of any of the maintenance errors root causes within their organization, thus
setting the pace for instantaneous remedies to be introduced thus eliminating such root
causes.
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7.3.2 AMMP Practicality
The AMMP, as a tactical process, as indicated by Figure 7.4, operates in two
simultaneous orientations: Design for maintainability and workplace safety. This can be
discussed as follows:
7.3.2.1 Design for maintainability continuum
The dilemma of promoting safety as a genuine part of complex safety-critical
systems designing processes has been the focus of many works (Kinnersley and Roelen
2007, Hale et al 2007). The proposed AMMP theorizes that, as a part of design (or re-
design) for maintainability, an aircraft designer needs to ensure that maintenance tasks
can be performed with ultimate smoothness, effectiveness, and freedom of human error
initiators with regard to human factors such as: access to job area, space limitations,
exposure and visibility, restriction to hand tools usage, angle of view to job area, human
body location during job execution (e.g. human body reach, tilting, or bending
possibilities), ventilation, temperatures, visual or audible caution indicators (e.g. labels,
signals, warnings), aircraft parts influence (e.g. in respect to weights, and sizes), etc.
These human error-promoter factors and hundreds of others as well, are to be
considered and to have their potentials of occurrence numerically identified as per each
and every subtask that a maintainer is expected to do. Identified risks are then
sequentially evaluated against sets of accumulative recommended reliability levels.
Aircraft design features that show high risk potentialities during expected maintenance
subtasks execution must be re-visited and necessary adjustments must be secured.
Design should only be finalized when such risks are brought under control for the given
subtasks.
Summing to a larger scale, each main maintenance task can then be evaluated
for risks of design-inherent human errors promoters by considering the accumulative
risks of its forming associated subtasks. Thus each maintenance task can be cleared
when such risks are collectively controlled as well. Consequently, by having all
expected maintenance tasks – as per the relative maintenance manuals – cleared in
regard to risks of design-induced human errors, the overall potentialities triggering such
errors will be reduced if not eliminated. The process is expected to continue such that
accumulative AMMP databases within industry will gradually lead to lower and lower
risks potentialities starting from current levels of safety performance.
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Figure7-4 Tactical layout of the Aviation maintenance Monitoring Process (AMMP)
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7.3.2.2 Maintenance line performance continuum (workplace)
Complementary to the concept within design regime, the factors that influence human
performance within a MRO line are considered in this continuum. These factors, taken
here as human-error causal factors, are direct manifestation of all individual and
organizational shortages and malfunctioning predictable within the given MRO. Each
causal factor is intelligently subdivided into a set of intermeshing sub-factors that are
individually evaluated for risks of promoting human error during maintenance practices.
Risks identified for each sub-factor are evaluated in contrast to a required level of
performance reliability. Sub-factors with high risks of initiating or exaggerating human
errors must be addressed for each given maintenance line within the MRO. Root causes
are then collectively evaluated for risks of existence within that MRO line. Necessary
measures are expected to be set to address those risks and gradually eliminate them.
7.3.3 Selecting fuzzy logic for AMMP
The concept of ‘fuzziness’, first introduced by Zadeh (Zadeh 1965), was
developed to facilitate accurate decision-making within uncertain environments.
Modern complex and dynamic systems within engineering, medicine, finance,
management, and others are all environments which are usually full of uncertainty and
subjective understanding. All are full of moments of ‘vagueness’ when critical decisions
are to be made depending mainly on flows of data that are neither certain, nor objective.
The critical constraint in this sense is that such data, although imprecise, ill-separable,
and vague, nevertheless, contains great amounts of useful information that can never be
put aside. Previously, in such cases, it was usually left to humans to, subjectively and
uncertainly, decide on issues of critical consequences depending merely on their own
merit and perceptions. Fuzzy logic and fuzzy mathematical tools were thus introduced
to eliminate the shares of uncertainty and subjectivity that used to accompany the
human cognitive processes when deciding within ‘fuzzy’ settings, thus providing for
better more accurate decisions. Kaufmann and Gopta (1988) wrote: “In human
sciences, data and processes may or may not be vague, may or may not be measurable,
may be subjective or objective. However, when a mathematical model is used in
decision-making process its validity must be questioned, especially if the actual model
must be reduced to one that is deterministic even when environment is fuzzy. If our
knowledge of the environment is imprecise, as happens in medical diagnosis,
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engineering, management decision-making, etc, the model must include the notion of
the level of presumption. Fuzzy numbers have been created to reflect the vagueness of
human perception and thus the notion of the level of presumption. These fuzzy numbers
thus reflect the human cognitive process.”
Coming back to the fact that aviation maintenance, with all its dynamic complex
inputs (most of them are far from being precisely measurable or even truthfully
predictable), is a real uncertain environment especially when it comes to the assessment
of safety performance or freedom from errors. It is thus appropriate to adopt fuzzy logic
and its tools for the purpose of proactively and accurately measuring the potentiality of
committing maintenance errors within the fuzzy aviation maintenance environment.
Through the two continuums of the proposed AMMP as described in the
previous section 7.3.2, actual data and processes concerning details of aircraft design
and manufacturing practices, as well as daily data, conditions, and performance terms
pertaining to MRO's contexts are analysed utilizing a newly developed comprehensive
sociotechnical user software – coded as ErroDetect.
7.3.4 Analytical Hierarchy Processes vs. Analytical Networks
Processes
Saaty (1980) first introduced the Analytical Hierarchy Processes (AHP) as an
effective tool to solve decision-making problems in complex multi-criteria settings,
where such problems could be structured in hierarchies. The main assumption here
being the clear functional independence of the upper levels of the hierarchy from the
lower ones, and thus from the more specific local criteria that govern each of these
levels. With such independence secured, the AHP inter-relations between various levels
and criteria are, by definition, unidirectional without any interdependence linking
between various ingredients in the upper and lower parts. This is typically indicated by
Figure 7.5. The AHP techniques are used for treating many decision-making tasks
(Chang 1996, Tolga et al 2005). However, lots of decision-making problems cannot
practically be structured in pure unidirectional hierarchies due to the presence of
genuine interactions between upper and lower parts having various higher factors
depending, in any way, on some of the factors from the lower sections. In these later
cases, the dependence between factors must be considered.
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Figure 7-5 Typical simple AHP diagram to select one of three independent alternatives
Figure 7-6 Typical simple ANP diagram to select one of three interdependent alternatives
Saaty again introduced the Analytical Networks Processes (ANP) as a
generalized setting of the AHP, to accommodate inter-dependence between various
factors influencing the decision-making process (Saaty, 1996). This is schematically
illustrated by Figure 7.6. The ANP’s are used when it is difficult to specifically
determine whether any of the various levels and criteria involved in the decision making
process are of higher or lower importance, of dominant or following nature, or of direct
or hidden influence. In such complex cases, normal hierarchical frames with linear
vertical relationships are vague. Only ANP approaches are of exact suitability to build
inter-related frames that support proper decision making in fuzzy environments.
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A typical application of fuzzy ANP methodology was conducted by Dagdeviren
et al (2008) who used the ANP approach to assess safety performance in a work system
setting by determining the Faulty Behaviour Risk (FBR) of workers within given
organizations. They concluded that complex work systems should generally be analyzed
from a holistic perspective where all influential attributes must be acknowledged,
especially those involving qualitative concepts like “safety cultures, sensory adaptation,
tendency of risky behavior, competition, management–worker relationships”, etc.
For this research purposes, the pre-mentioned developed software: ErroDetect,
forming the core of AMMP application, is based on fuzzy ANP’s as described by Chang
1996, Deng 1999, Kahraman et al. 2006, and Dagdeviren et al 2008. Necessary
mathematical formulations of the model are structured building on the fuzzy philosophy
and arithmetic as indicated by Zadeh 1965, Kaufmann and Gupta 1985, 1988, and Cox
1999). The full mathematical model adopted for this research will be analysed in details
in the next chapters. The software can be used most expectedly either by aircraft
designers, or by safety officials in MRO’s. Regulators can further use some audit-
oriented versions of ErroDetect as universal design and performance tools in the future.
7.3.5 What is to be monitored?
As indicated before, AMMP works, in its two complementary continuums, to
effectively monitor the seen and / or inherent existence of maintenance human errors
root causes. Variables that are exactly monitored are briefly illustrated through the
design and workplace ANP models given in Figures 7.7 and 7.8. By implementing
AMMP, many varieties of information and situations can be scanned for hidden root
causes and causal factors. This starts from the design for maintainability inputs and
downstream to MRO’s data including manpower, team formation, training sessions,
qualifications control, work flow (performed work jobs per given period of time),
material flow, hangar specifications, material and tool control, etc.
As indicated in section 7.3.4, ANP’s are typically formed from three or more
levels of influential constraints that govern the decision-making activity. For the design
for maintainability continuum, as shown in Figure 7.7, the ultimate goal of the ANP
structure, shown in the first level, is to determine the error potentiality during execution
of a given task (X) that can be committed by maintainers due to root causes associated
with aircraft or supporting equipment design. The second level of the structure
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comprises the nine main tasks that are partially or collectively included within every
maintenance activity.
Figure 7-7 Fuzzy ANP - Design and manufacturing: Assessing the existence of potential
maintenance errors root causes inherent within design as a part of ‘design for maintainability’
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Figure 7-8 Fuzzy ANP-Workplace and maintainer: Assessing existence of potential maintenance
errors root causes inherent within MRO workplace or maintainer conditions
These main tasks are significantly inter-related within each other in one side,
and of total influence on the first goal level on the other. Then each main task is further
subdivided into a number of sub-tasks which form, again in collective or partial settings,
the third raw of the ANP structure. The sub-tasks, in turn, have three folds of inter-
linkages: Each set of sub-tasks stemming from a single given main task are mutually
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dependent within each others. Thus they are globally inter-dependent with other sub-
tasks from the rest eight other main tasks. Finally, these sub-tasks influence the overall
main goal as well. It can thus be seen that this ANP structure is holistically addressing
the overall inter-dependence of various tasks and subtasks in forming potential
environments in which design-induced maintenance errors root causes may exist.
Similar understanding can be observed from Figure 7.8 in which the second part
continuum of AMMP, namely the workplace and maintainer continuum, is represented
by another ANP. Here the main goal is to determine the potentiality of existence of root
causes associated with MRO’s workplace conditions and maintainers’ behaviors. The
second level comprises main root errors, indicated here as main causal factors, that
might be present, and the third level is formed by a list of sub-root causes as well. The
two previous Figures 7.7 and 7.8 indicate all the error root causes that were concluded
from the previous retrospective part of this research, which must be monitored for
existence. Accordingly, suitable remedies may be sought.
7.3.6 How were the Fuzzy ANP’s constructed?
The two fuzzy ANP’s shown in the previous Figures 7.7 and 7.8 were obtained
as a result of two main features of the applied methodology:
 The methodology instructs to apply brainstorming and free inventive thinking at
the crucial intersecting stage just between the two retrospective and prospective
parts of the current research. This thinking should make ultimate use of the
obtained theoretical and practical pool of knowledge in the subject matter in order
to scratch new structures that provide solutions for the spotted gaps.
 The first part of the research study provided sufficient data and information in
regard to maintenance error root causes, error propagation, task analysis, PIF’s ,
an overall understanding of the problem and the expected remedies.
It was thus natural to construct the two ANP’s referring to the above notions. In
fact, literature showed importance of freely establishing the ANP’s, in cases like those
handled by the current research, from the scratch so that they form bases to build future
solutions on. Practically, the current ANP’s were constructed according to this roadmap:
 The 197 SF’s that led to helicopter maintenance-related accidents and serious
incidents were identified. The importance of the top 30 of them was emphasized
as major root causes.
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 These SF’s (root causes) are found to practically form the overall PIF’s that shape
the performance within MRO’s.
 The maintenance task analysis simultaneously conducted showed various stages of
maintenance activities and their hierarchal dependencies.
 Integrating the obtained knowledge regarding the maintenance PIF’s with the task
activity hierarchies resulted in the construction of the required ANP’s diagrams.
The overall sequence of these stages within the applied methodology has already been
illustrated before through Figure 3.5. This figure as well shows the next steps after the
determination of the ANP’s, namely: the construction of the RCES, building
ErroDetect, and finally the practical verification of the AMMP within industry.
7.4 Technical framing of AMMP software
7.4.1 Building the Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES)
Practically, ErroDetect is based on the Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES)
which is a systematic combination of 870 different assessment criteria for checking the
existence of maintenance human errors root causes. RCES is designed, with direct
reflection from the retrospective analysis findings, and then in-built within the software,
thus significantly mapping large spectrum of the expected scenarios of human error
initiation and propagation that can be triggered by any of the design, manufacturing, or
maintenance workplace conditions malfunctioning.
Having set the two ANP’s, a comprehensive sophisticated set of fuzzy
mathematical logic operations are formulated as per the pre-mentioned references.
Table 7.1 shows the overall scheme used to build the RCES.
Table 7-1 Building scheme of aviation maintenance human errors RCES
Comparators ANP- Design ANP- Workplace
Goal Detection of error initiators
in design as per each job card
Detection of error initiators in MRO
as per each maintenance line
Main triggers
for errors
Main maintenance tasks
(9 within each job card)
Causal factors
(6 within each MRO line)
Partial triggers
for errors
Sub maintenance tasks
(total of 61)
Sub-causal factors
(total of 26)
RCES
assessing
criteria
Each sub-task is weighted by
10 assessing criteria
(total of 610 )
Each sub-factor is weighted by 10
assessing criteria
(total of 260)
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7.4.2 Sample assessing criteria: design and work place
perspectives
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show samples of the criteria inbuilt within ErroDetect for
both design and workplace perspectives respectively. Wider informative sets of these
criteria for the design practices are given in Appendix J as well.
Table 7-2 Samples of the criteria in-built within ErroDetect for design perspective
Main maintenance task: Installation or repairs
Sub maintenance task: Install or repair mechanical fits, joints, fixers,
brackets, couplings, bearings, etc.
Associated assessing criteria for the exact given subtask:
1. Potentiality of error if subtask involves critical alignment, orientation, or critical
joining (especially for bearings, couplings, etc.)
2. Potentiality of error if sub-task involves composite structure repairs, integration, or
joining techniques.
3. Potentiality of error during repair works within this sub-task due to compactness,
poor accessibility to work area, or if this area is greasy, oily, hot, dark, or remote.
4. Potentiality of error during cutting exact shapes including rounded corners of sheet
metal, metal bars, or composites. Or during applying anti-crack techniques.
5. Potentiality of error if the subtask involves riveting (rivets part numbers,
distribution, application techniques, sealing), or during welding (for approved
applications).
6. Potentiality of error during applying required torques (low or high) due to work
area compactness, location, or the need to use wrench extensions.
7. Potentiality of error during applying shrink fits, pressing fits, or piercing techniques
(bearings) (e.g. When heating and cooling processes are involved within very short
period of application).
8. Potentiality of error when applying adhesives, sealants due to part shapes, location,
access, compactness, inclination, etc.
9. Potentiality of installing a part in the wrong orientation if it can easily be installed
either ways, or possibility of cross wiring, or wrong cable orientation.
10. Potentiality of error if similar but different components (different part numbers) can
easily be applied (rods, brackets, bolts, nuts, screws, rivets, safety locks, guiding
marks, sheet metals, windscreens, etc.)
162
Table 7-3 Samples of the criteria in-built within ErroDetect for workplace perspective
Main causal factor: Organizational processes
Sub causal factor: Task design
Associated assessing criteria for the exact given sub-factor
1. Lack of the overall understanding of the importance of proper task design (within
middle and high management).
2. Potentiality of error because not all necessary elements regarding task design are
considered (i.e. maintenance procedural sequence, multi-trade jobs, man-hours
needed (possibility of multi-shifts), tooling and equipments, materials, degree of
job precision, worksheets issuing, applying relevant service bulletins,
airworthiness directives, or safety letters, etc).
3. Potentiality of error due to complexity of maintenance procedures (e.g. if complex
jobs are not given proper consideration during task design and / or worksheet
preparation).
4. Potentiality of error due to non-clarity of worksheets or wrong (confusing)
sequence of maintenance steps.
5. Potentiality of error because no additional consideration are given during task
design for high-precision jobs such as 'shrink fits with few microns of precision'
(e.g. associated worksheets of such jobs are not given in different (emphasised)
format, or proper quality assurance measures are not set within procedures of
these jobs).
6. Possibility of error re-occurrence due to lack of recording, analysing and learning
from previous task design shortcomings, using such experiences to improve
performance, and to monitor such improvements.
7. Potentiality of error because task design is not assigned as a definite responsibility
to a definite unite within the MRO
8. Potentiality of error due to non-conformity of operational worksheets (job
instructions) with general approved maintenance procedures (e.g. if instructions
are confusing, conflicting, or practically-inapplicable).
9. Potentiality of error due to improper consideration of long-jobs requirements (e.g.
multiple shifts handovers) in task design.
10. Possibility of error due to lack of feedback channels (formal and informal) from
maintainers to management concerning task design, workloads, and shifts (e.g.
weak or no provisions for suggestions or complaints).
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7.4.3 Why a user software?
The overall strategic philosophy of the AMMP is to integrate the knowledge
gained on aviation maintenance error causation and development into the daily live-
world within aircraft design bureaus and busy MRO’s hangars. This integration is a
major requirement of the regulator and a keen demand of the industry practitioners
(ARP5150 2003). One major way to achieve such integration is through the innovative
introduction of user software that covers all the possible error initialization scenarios,
thus illuminating the way leading to their elimination.
The factors that dictated the introduction of ErroDetect as an interactive user
program can be briefly discussed as follows:
 The AMMP, as a newly introduced concept, stands on the establishment of a
software that is readily applicable by designers and safety officers within
MRO’s to help them proactively detect maintenance error root causes, a user
computer-based package is thus needed, not a single-run localized problem
solver.
 The code must be a practical one, with industry users kept in mind when it is
being structured and built.
 The package is a daily data register, thus it is expected to generate multiple
settings of databases describing maintenance error generation industry wise.
 User software better provides for the continuation of the AMMP process even
after this current research is concluded. This is a major objective of this work.
7.5 Chapter summary
It is high time to further enrich the human factors knowledge pool further
thinking proactively for the prevention, or at least reduction, of human error-caused
safety occurrences within high reliability industries like aviation maintenance. A new
set of hypotheses was then formulated that led to the introduction of the industrial
proactive AMMP. AMMP is a holistic hybrid retrospective/ prospective integrated
process that may be simultaneously and collectively implemented by main industry
stakeholders.
The suggested AMMP is a new concept with practical industry-oriented tools
that work to fill the challenging need of proactively identifying scenarios leading to next
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probable incidents or accidents within a given safety-sensitive organisation. and thus
support setting measures that can hinder such scenarios. The suggested concept can be
directly adopted by aircraft designers, manufacturers, as well MRO’s. The aim is to
proactively monitor the existence of human error root causes that are initiated during
design practices, manufacturing processes, or at later stages due to workplace or
workforce conditions. As a result, such causal factors can be gradually eliminated to
reduce the overall risk of maintenance errors. The process is based on a Root Causes
Existence Scale (RCES) and a comprehensive socio-technical user program built
applying the fuzzy analytic network process. A total of 870 different assessment criteria
were designed and then in-built within the software thus mapping the outcomes of the
retrospective error causal factors investigative studies.
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8 Mathematical Formulation: Design of AMMP
Software using Fuzzy Logic Analytical
Network Processes
“Essentially, such a framework provides a natural way of
dealing with problems in which the source of imprecision
is the absence of sharply defined criteria of class membership
rather than the presence of random variables”
L. A. Zadeh-Fuzzy logic introducer
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 The importance of Fuzzy Logic
In response to the ever increasing complexity of modern life, the world is
becoming less and less predictable. Consequently, our perception of uncertainty is
growing day after day. Human reliability within aviation maintenance context is an
obvious case where such uncertainty persistently exists to various degrees of intensity.
This uncertainty, vagueness, or fuzziness is most encountered when it comes to human
reliability assessment within a given maintenance line, or during executing a specific
maintenance task. Fuzzy sets theory and arithmetic (Appendix K) are now considered as
promising tools to provide for such assessment to be accurately and effectively
performed. As discussed in section 2.6.1 before, a major drawback of current works in
human reliability assessment and enhancement is the recurrent dependence on experts’
interpretation of sociotechnical work contexts, with all the expected subjectivity and
uncertainty that frequently accompany such analyses. The importance of fuzzy logic
thus stems exactly from this point: The ability to provide analysis and decision-making
tools that are free, both of subjectivity and vagueness of the decision-making criteria.
Although fuzzy logic has received high attention recently, as a result of the
booming fuzzy logic-based products that filled a big gap in technology, nevertheless,
this emerging science is increasingly gaining access to the expert and informed decision
making systems. Cox (1999) wrote: “Coupling fuzzy logic with expert system
technology provides a mechanism for producing fuzzy models that address important
classes of problems in information decision support. Fuzzy expert systems model the
world in terms of the semantics associated with the underlying variables, thus providing
a much closer relationship between real world phenomena and computer models”.
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8.1.2 Fuzzy Logic vs. Probability
Although some works in literature, as well as so many scientific faculties, take
the fuzzy logic to be a form of probability, or consider them both to represent and
measure the same uncertainty phenomena, or at least think of them both as having some
common origin, but nevertheless, the clear fact is that fuzzy logic is not probability, nor
has any joined origins with it. Cox (1999) again attributed this common confusion that
many people develop between the two concepts to a set of similarities that both the
concepts share. Another major reason for such confusion is the “long formal history” of
probability when compared to the “short and rather obscure history” of fuzzy logic, a
fact that leads many scientists and mathematicians into that confusion, especially, for
instance, when comparing fuzzy logic with the subjective Bayesian probability.
The current research adopts the fuzzy logic concept since it is a closer
representative of the real world of human reliability within aviation maintenance, rather
than the well known probability inputs to this and similar fields. This can further be
clarified through Table 8.1 that lists various similarities and differences between the two
concepts (Zadeh 1965, Kaufmann and Gopta 1986 and 1988, Cox 1999).
Table 8-1 Brief comparison between probability and fuzzy logic
Probability Fuzzy logic
Similar Features (Externally seen properties)
Measures a form of uncertainty Measuring a form of uncertainty
Encodes the degree of uncertainty with a
metric scale between (0) and (1)
Encodes the degree of uncertainty with a
metric scale between (0) and (1)
Describes event spaces utilizing sorts of
Gaussian functions distributions
Describes event spaces utilizing sorts of
Gaussian functions distributions
Differences (actual distinguishing properties)
Measures a specific kind of uncertainty
in which the likelihood of an outcome of
a discrete event is tested. This event
outcome either happens or not.
Measure a different kind of uncertainty in
which the degree or extent to which an
event occurred is looked for.
The outcome happens clearly and
unambiguously
The occurred event may involve some
ambiguity and uncertainty
Deals with randomness in a large
population. The uncertainty here is in
respect to the occurrence of an event
within this given population
Involves the ambiguity coupled with the
actual description of an event. These
ambiguities are usually continuous valued
criteria where the boundary between
different semantic groups is not precisely
distinct.
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Table 8-1 Brief comparison between probability and fuzzy logic (Continued)
Probability Fuzzy logic
Differences (actual distinguishing properties) (Continued)
In the encoding scale: the value of (0)
implies that the event can’t happen,
and the value of (1) indicates that the
event is certain to happen.
In the encoding scale: the membership
values of (0) or (1) both denote a complete
certainty of the occurred event. Precisely,
the membership of value (0) indicates that
the output is completely not representing the
event concept, while the membership of
value (1) indicates that the output is totally
representative of the event concept.
Intermediate values show various degrees of
ambiguity of how the outcome should be
interpreted.
Based on frequency distribution
within a given random population
Based on calculus of compatibility. It
describes events which have continuously
varying values by assigning partitions of
these values with a semantic label.
8.1.3 This Chapter
This chapter explores the utilization of fuzzy logic concepts, techniques, and
their exploitation in addressing human reliability issues associated with aviation
maintenance errors. The proposed AMMP, as discussed previously, is targeting the
assessment of existence of root causes leading to such errors within ‘ideal’ uncertain
and vague environments such as those of the aviation maintenance industry. The usual
subjectivity, always present within explorers’ and experts’ opinions when judging such
existence, is yet another vital factor that led, with the first, to the selection of fuzzy
analysis modus operandi to be the main practice of the programme ErroDetect New
algorithms are introduced within this research to further affectionate the established
tactics in this regard, and to significantly reduce the need of complicated and costly
systems of experts, thus setting a more industry-oriented product.
It is highly essential to emphasize that the very elongated complex mathematical
content of this chapter, although totally applicable to the proposed ErroDetect software,
but in fact the targeted user is never expected to go through any of these calculations at
any stage of the programme application. The user interface, including their expected
assessment input, is targeted to be very focalized and simple, while all the complicated
calculations are to occure absolutely at the software background.
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8.2 Triangular fuzzy numbers
8.2.1 Definition
According to Zadeh (1965), Kaufmann and Gopta (1986, 1988), and Cox
(1999), A Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN )
‘A’ is a special category of fuzzy numbers
that is defined by the triplet: a, b, and c
where
a : denotes the smallest possible value of A
b : denotes the most promising possible
value of A
c : denotes the largest possible value of A
Figure 8-1 A typical triangular fuzzy
number
A can be denoted in many ways as follows:
i. First representation:
( , , )A a b c 8-1
ii. Second representation:
( , )a bA
b c
 8-2
iii. Third representation:
TFN is defined also in terms of membership functions as:
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( ) ,
( ) ,
( ) 0 ,
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c b
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iv. Fourth representation:
TFN is given in terms of ‘α-cut’ level value as:
( ( ) , ( ) )A a b a c b c      8-4
a cb x
µA(x)
1.0
0.5
0.0
A
a
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8.2.2 Arithmetic Operations of TFN
Since ( , , )A a b c then let 1A and 2A be two TFN’s given as:
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
( , , )
( , , )
A a b c
A a b c


, and  : Ordinary number such that R
Thus the arithmetic operations joining them are given as follows:
Addition:
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( , , )A A a a b b c c     = Triangular fuzzy number 8-5
Subtraction:
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( , , )A A a a b b c c     = Triangular fuzzy number 8-6
Scalar multiplication:
( , , )A a b c        = Triangular fuzzy number , 0  8-7
( , , )A c b a        = Triangular fuzzy number , 0  8-8
Other operations:
The multiplication, divisions, inverse products of two TFN’s can be approximated by a
resultant TFN’s as in the following lines:
Multiplication:
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , )A A a a b b c c      Triangular fuzzy number 8-9
Division:
1 1 1
1 2
2 2 2
(:) ( , , )a b cA A
c b a
  Triangular fuzzy number 8-10
Inverse:
1 1 1 1 1( , , )A
A c b a
    Triangular fuzzy number 8-11
Minimum and maximum of two TFN’s:
Recalling (8.4), A given pair two TFN’s can be given as
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( ( ) , ( ) )
( ( ) , ( ) )
A a b a c b c
A a b a c b c
 
 
    
    
8-12
It can be seen that 1 2,A A are represented here in (x,y) mode not the triple (x,y,z) mode.
If the values of 1 1 1 1( ), ( )b a b c  …,etc are substituted, then:
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1 1 1 1 2
2 2 3 1 4
( , )
( , )
A a k c k
A a k c k
 
 
  
  
8-13
1 2 3, ,k k k ,…. constants
Thus, the minimum (written as 1 2min( , )A A or 1 2A A ) and maximum (written as
1 2max( , )A A or 1 2 )A A of the two TFN’s can be defined as:
Minimum:
1 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 4[( ) ( ), ( ) ( )]A A a k a k c k c k             = fuzzy number 8-14
(Not necessarily triangular)
Can be determined according to varying value of  from 0 to 1 as follows:
i. For each value of  compare between ( 1 1( )a k  and 2 3( )a k  and select the
least value.
ii. Similarly select the least value between 1 2( )c k  and 2 4( )c k  .
iii. Set the two selected minimal values to compose the (x,y) terms of 1 2A A .
Maximum:
1 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 4[( ) ( ), ( ) ( )]A A a k a k c k c k             = fuzzy number 8-15
(Not necessarily triangular)
Similarly this can be determined according to varying value of  from 0 to 1 as:
iv. For each value of  compare between ( 1 1( )a k  and 2 3( )a k  and select the
largest value.
v. Also select the largest value between 1 2( )c k  and 2 4( )c k  .
vi. Set the two selected maximal values to compose the (x,y) terms of 1 2A A .
8.3 Constructing the fuzzy mathematical model of AMMP
8.3.1 Essential model build up
Step 1: Construction of the Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES)
The Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) is a comprehensive sociotechnical
fuzzy structure built applying the fuzzy ANP theory. RCES is the major component of
the generic (AMMP). ANP structures were already composed as given by Figures 7.7
and 7.8 for both design and workplace continuums respectively. The composed RCES
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collectively comprises main root causal factors, sub-root causal factors, and 870
associated assessing criteria: 10 for each sub-factor. For simplicity and compactness,
only the workplace fold will be discussed in the following mathematical modelling. The
same principles are totally applicable for the design section.
Step 2: Determination of the potentiality of existence of each sub-root causal factor
by assessing the influence of each of its 10 associated criteria.
This is a newly introduced algorithm. The programme user should have the
ability to consider the importance of each of the 10 criteria associated with each sub-
causal factor, and to give a single unique judgement whether a given criterion exists
when the real conditions of the MRO under investigation are explored. The vital
importance of the fuzzy logic here is its inclusive power of accommodating any traces
of subjectivity that may encounter the user’s thinking. Through evaluating an ‘interval
of confidence’ instead of a single value, the overall assessment is expected to be a
subjectivity-free evaluation. Each group of 10 criteria, though different and varying in
strength and directness of describing the given sub-factor, works collectively to indicate
the presence of that sub-factor and the potentiality of maintenance error that may
develop due to its existence within that certain MRO.
A. The only single task that the user has to perform is to judge the influence of each
criterion when put in contrast to the actual MRO conditions, the software will
automatically execute all the other remaining parts of the procedure. No traditional
system of experts is needed. A given criterion should be assigned one of the
following options as per Table 8.2 below.
Table 8-2 Options for assessing a given criterion as a potential root causal factor
Options of a given criterion as a potential error
root causal factor
Code
1 Criterion is of no existence/ influence as a potential error root causal factor n.a.
2 Criterion is of very weak influence as a potential error root causal factor VWI
3 Criterion is of weak influence as a potential error root causal factor WI
4 Criterion is of moderate influence as a potential error root causal factor MI
5 Criterion is of high influence as a potential error root causal factor HI
6 Criterion is of absolute influence as a potential error root causal factor AI
B. These qualitative descriptors are changed into a fuzzy linguistic scale which is then
represented by a series of intermeshing TFN’s (Dagdeviren et al 2008) as indicated
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by Figure 8.2. Both the linguistic scale and its fuzzy representation are given jointly
in Table 8.3. The ‘thinking’ of the software user can thus be expressed numerically
in fuzzy format that can be further processed for the following applications.
Figure 8-2 Fuzzy linguistic scale for the numerical evaluation of the qualitative judgement
of the assessing criteria
Table 8-3 Linguistic scale for the criteria of importance
Code Linguistic scale for
importance
Triangular fuzzy
scale
Reciprocal triangular fuzzy
scale
n.a. No influence n.a. n.a.
VWI Very weak influence (a, b, c) (1/c, 1/b, 1/a)
WI Weak influence (b, c, d) (1/d, 1/c, 1/b)
MI Moderate influence (c, d, e) (1/e, 1/d, 1/c)
HI High influence (d, e, f) (1/f, 1/e, 1/d)
AI Absolute influence (e, f, g) (1/g, 1/f, 1/e)
C. Each of the 10 criteria is thus expressed numerically in a fuzzy number:
( , , )i i i iA a b c , i = 1,2, …, n.
Where, n is the number of the criteria (out of total 10) that actually have
importance varying from very weak to absolute influence.
D. Applying Equations 8.5 through 8.9, an overall potentiality of existence of the sub-
factor to which these criteria belong can be obtained through calculating their mean
fuzzy number Asub-f as follows:
1 1 1
( / , / , / )
i n i n i n
sub f i i i
i i i
A a n b n c n
  

  
    8-16
or
( , , )sub f sub f sub f sub fA a b c    = Triangular fuzzy number 8-17
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E. The final potentiality of this sub-factor (Psub-f), as a sub-root cause that may develop
maintenance errors within this MRO, can be obtained through defuzzification
(Cox1999), i.e. reducing the representative fuzzy number, as per Equation 8.17, to
only one single numerical value as follows:
( ) / 3sub f sub f sub f sub fP a b c      = scalar quantity 8-18
F. The process is repeated for the rest of the 26 sub root causal factors.
Step 3: Determination of potentiality of existence of each main root causal factor
referring to existence of its sub-root causal factors
A. The overall potentiality of existence of each of the main root causal factors can then
be obtained by calculating the mean fuzzy number Amain-f of the whole set of sub-
factors belonging to it as follows:
1 1 1
( / , / , / )
j j j
j m j m j m
main f sub f sub f sub f
j j j
A a m b m c m
  
   
  
    , j = 1, 2, …, m 8-19
Where, m is the total number of the sub root causal factors (belonging to this given
main root causal factor) that have actually been found to have any potentiality of
existence within the given MRO. Equation 8.19 can further be written as:
( , , )main f main f main f main fA a b c    = Triangular fuzzy number 8-20
B. The final potentiality of this main-factor (Pmain-f), as a main root cause that may
develop maintenance errors within this MRO, can similarly be obtained through
defuzzification as:
( ) / 3main f main f main f main fP a b c      = scalar quantity 8-21
C. The process is repeated for the rest of the 6 main root causal factors.
Step 4: Building ‘pair-wise comparison’ matrices of existence potentiality of main
root causal factors as given by the ANP- workplace structure.
This step accommodates the second major newly introduced algorithm. The
pair- wise comparison matrices are effective means to calculate local weights of
importance (existence) of the root causal factors. These matrices also show possible
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inter-relations and mutual impact of the factors on each others. In previous literature,
such matrices were constructed manually through direct application of the collective
cognitive thinking of a system of experts. This process is now performed by utilising the
inputs from previous steps, and a newly introduced algorithm as follows:
A. It is temporarily assumed that there is no mutual dependence among the 6 main
factors described as per Step 3. For generalization, the total number of main root
causal factors is taken to be ‘k’.
B. A difference matrix for mutual comparison between the k main factors is composed
as per Table 8.4:
Table 8-4 Difference matrix for comparison of main root causal factors potentialities
OP D MP AD S R
Organizational Processes (OP) D11 D12 D13 D1k
Documentation (D) D22 D2k
Maintainer Preparation (MP) D33
Aircraft Design (AD) D44
Supervision (S)
Resources (R) Dkk
C. Numerical differences between existence potentialities of factors are calculated as:
( ) 0, 1,2,...,
( ) 1, 2,...,
( 1), ( 2),...,
main f main fi j
main f main fi j
P P i k
j i
Dij
P P i k
j i i k
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
    
8-22
D. The total range of differences is calculated as :
Total range Max D Min Dij ij  8-23
E. This total range of differences is divided into 5 equal bands as per Figure 8.3.
Figure 8-3 Total range of potentiality differences and its inner bands
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F. The lower and upper limits for each band are given by:
1
5
q q
q q
Minvalueof Band Max value of Band
Total rangeMax valueof Band Min valueof Band
 
 
, q = 1, 2… 5 8-24
Where,  is an infinitesimal numerical increment of the order 10-6
G. The importance of any one of the main root causal factor (main-f1) when mutually
compared to another main factor (main-f2), as indicated by the difference of their
potentialities of existence, is obtained by assigning this difference to any of the 5
bands discussed above. This is arranged as follows:
Table 8-5 Mutual comparison bands of differences between main factors
Code Interpretation of mutual comparison differences between
main factors
1 EI Factors (main-f1) and (main-f2) are of equal importance, (Dij = 0)
2 Band 1 (main-f1) is of very weak importance over (main-f2)
3 Band 2 (main-f1) is of weak importance over (main-f2)
4 Band 3 (main-f1) is of moderate importance over (main-f2)
5 Band 4 (main-f1) is of high importance over (main-f2)
6 Band 5 (main-f1) is of absolute importance over (main-f2)
H. This variation of importance of main factors as potential root causes of maintenance
errors within the given MRO is thus represented by a series of intermeshing TFN’s
as indicated by Figure 8.4. Both the linguistic scale and its fuzzy representation are
given jointly in Table 8.5.
Figure 8-4 Fuzzy linguistic scale for the relative importance of main root causal factors
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Table 8-6 Linguistic scale of importance
Code Linguistic scale for
importance
Triangular
fuzzy scale
Reciprocal triangular
fuzzy scale
JE Just Equal (b, b, b) (1/b, 1/b, 1/b)
Band 1 Very weakly more important (a, b, c) (1/c, 1/b, 1/a)
Band 2 Weakly more important (b, c, d) (1/d, 1/c, 1/b)
Band 3 Moderately more important (c, d, e) (1/e, 1/d, 1/c)
Band 4 Highly more important (d, e, f) (1/f, 1/e, 1/d)
Band 5 Absolutely more important (e, f, g) (1/g, 1/f, 1/e)
I. Thus fuzzy matrix of pair-wise importance of the main root causal factors can be
built using fuzzy numbers Aij and their reciprocals 1/ Aij calculated in
accordance with Equation 8.11. This is illustrated as the following Table 8.7
Table 8-7 Pair-wise comparison of importance of main root causal factors for the given MRO
OP D MP AD S R
Organizational Processes (OP) (1,1,1) A12 A13 A14 A15 A16
Documentation (D) 1/ A12 (1,1,1) A23 A24 A25 A26
Maintainer Preparation (MP) 1/ A13 1/ A23 (1,1,1) A34 A35 A36
Aircraft Design (AD) 1/ A14 1/ A24 1/ A34 (1,1,1) A45 A46
Supervision (S) 1/ A15 1/ A25 1/ A35 1/ A45 (1,1,1) A56
Resources (R) 1/ A16 1/A26 1/ A36 1/ A46 1/ A56 (1,1,1)
Step 5: Building ‘pair-wise comparison’ matrices of existing potentiality among
each group of sub-root causal factors as given by the ANP- workplace
Similarly to all procedures of step 4, pair-wise comparison matrices can be
constructed for each group of sub factors using the potentialities obtained in step 2.
These are given in Tables 8.8 to 8.13 as follows:
Table 8-8 Pair-wise comparison of importance for sub-factors
associated with the main factor ‘organizational processes’
R OPR PT G PWS TD P
Regulations (R) (1,1,1) A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17
Oversight Provision (OPR) 1/ A12 (1,1,1) A23 A24 A25 A26 A27
Performance Tracking (PT) 1/ A13 1/ A23 (1,1,1) A34 A35 A36 A37
Guidance (G) 1/ A14 1/ A24 1/ A34 (1,1,1) A45 A46 A47
Planning (PWS) 1/ A15 1/ A25 1/ A35 1/ A45 (1,1,1) A56 A57
Task Design (TD) 1/ A16 1/A26 1/ A36 1/ A46 1/ A56 (1,1,1) A67
Procedures (P) 1/ A17 1/A27 1/ A37 1/ A47 1/ A57 1/ A67 (1,1,1)
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Table 8-9 Pair-wise comparison of importance for the sub-factors
associated with the main factor 'Documentation'
AD DQ DU FM
Documents Availability (AD) (1,1,1) A12 A13 A14
Documents Quality (DQ) 1/ A12 (1,1,1) A23 A24
Documents Updating (DU) 1/ A13 1/ A23 (1,1,1) A34
Feedback to Manufacturer (FM) 1/ A14 1/ A24 1/ A34 (1,1,1)
Table 8-10 Pair-wise comparison of importance for the sub-factors
associated with the main factor 'maintainer preparation'
QVU KSD HFT
Qualification Validity/Update (QVU) (1,1,1) A12 A13
Knowledge/ Skill Development (KSD) 1/ A12 (1,1,1) A23
Human Factors Training (HFT) 1/ A13 1/ A23 (1,1,1)
Table 8-11 Pair--wise comparison of importance for the sub-factors
associated with the main factor 'aircraft design'
ADE MA MTC
Aircraft Design Error / Shortage (ADE) (1,1,1) A12 A13
Maintenance Accessibility (MA) 1/ A12 (1,1,1) A23
Maintenance Task Complexity (MTC) 1/ A13 1/ A23 (1,1,1)
Table 8-12 Pair-wise comparison of importance for the sub-factors
associated with the main factor 'supervision'
TDA IF UP
Task Delegation / Assignment (TDA) (1,1,1) A12 A13
Inspections Failures (IF) 1/ A12 (1,1,1) A23
Uncorrected Problems (UP) 1/ A13 1/ A23 (1,1,1)
Table 8-13 Pair-wise comparison of importance for the sub-factors
associated with the main factor ' resources'
MNP MTP ET SP WF WC
Manning Provision (MNP) (1,1,1) A12 A13 A14 A15 A16
Material Provision (MTP) 1/ A12 (1,1,1) A23 A24 A25 A26
Equipment/ Tools (ET) 1/ A13 1/ A23 (1,1,1) A34 A35 A36
Spare Parts (SP) 1/ A14 1/ A24 1/ A34 (1,1,1) A45 A46
Workplace Facilities (WF) 1/ A15 1/ A25 1/ A35 1/ A45 (1,1,1) A56
Workplace Conditions (WC) 1/ A16 1/A26 1/ A36 1/ A46 1/ A56 (1,1,1)
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Step 6: Determination of local weights for main root causal factors using Fuzzy
Synthetic Extent Analysis of the fore ANP
Using the fuzzy ANP approach introduced by Chang (1992,1996 ) and
confirmed by Dagdeviren et al (2008), the local weights can be determined through four
steps. The following mathematical formulation applies:
A. Evaluating fuzzy synthetic values of pair-wise comparison matrices:
Concept of fuzzy synthetic extent:
Let:
 1 2 3, , ,..., nX x x x x be an object set 8-25
 1 2 3, , ,..., mG g g g g be a goal set 8-26
Objects 1 2 3, , ,..., nx x x x are subjected individually to an extent analysis for each
goal 1 2 3, , ,..., mg g g g , then m-extent analysis values can be obtained for each object in
the following order:
1 2, ,..., mgi gi giA A A , i = 1,2, 3, …, n
where all the jgiA , j = 1,2,3,…,m are TFN’s.
Value of fuzzy synthetic extent:
Let:
1 2, ,..., mgi gi giA A A be values of extent analysis of i-th object for m goals. Using Equations
8.5 through 8.11, the value of fuzzy synthetic extent with respect to i-th object is
defined as:
1
1 1 1
m n m
j j
i gi gi
j i j
S A A

  
 
   
 
  8-27
Or
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( , , ) ( , , )
m m m m n m n m n
i j j j i i i
j j j j i j i j i
S a b c a b c

        
 
   
 
      8-28
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1( , , ) ( , , )
m m m
i j j j m n m n m n
j j j
i i i
j i j i j ii
S a b c
c b a  
     
   
  
8-29
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Thus a fuzzy synthetic extent system of all factors can be constructed in the following
structure:
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5
5 5 5
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
OP synth synth synth
D synth synth synth
MP synth synth synth
AD synth synth synth
S synth synth synth
R synth synth synth
S a b c
S a b c
S a b c
S a b c
S a b c
S a b c






, all triangular fuzzy numbers 8-30
B. Evaluating the degree of possibility for a convex fuzzy number to be greater than
another fuzzy number:
The ability to compare between values of fuzzy numbers is required so as to
calculate local weights of the factors that were previously described by pair-wise
comparison matrices, and then have been converted into fuzzy synthetic systems like
the one given by Equations 8.30. Formulations to compare two fuzzy numbers are:
If 1 1 1 1( , , )A a b c and 2 2 2 2( , , )A a b c , then the degree of possibility of 2A to be
greater than 1A is defined by the vectors 2 1 1 2( ) ( )V A A andV A A  as:
2 1
2 1 1 2
1 2
2 2 1 1
1 ,
( ) 0 ,
,
( ) ( )
b b
V A A a c
a c otherwise
b c b a
 
 
  
   
 
 
    
8-31
Thus to compare the two fuzzy numbers, both values of 1 2( )V A A and
2 1( )V A A are required.
C. Evaluating the degree of possibility for a convex fuzzy number to be greater than a
group of other fuzzy numbers (obtaining vectors of comparison between factors
given in synthetic form of Si ):
To get more generalized form of comparison, and using formula 8.31, the degree
of possibility of a convex fuzzy number A to be greater than a group of fuzzy
numbers , 1, 2,3,...,iA i k can be defined using vectors as:
 1 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )
min ( ) , 1, 2,...,
K k
i
V A A A A V A A and A A and and A A
V A A i k
    
  
8-32
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D. Evaluating the local weights of factors:
Local weight of various factors can be obtained using Equations 8.30, 8.31, and
8.32. These equations can be joined collectively by assuming:
1
( ) min ( ) , 1,2,..., ,i i kd A V S S k n k i    8-33
Then the local weight vector is given by:
1 1 1 1
1 2( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))
T
nW d A d A d A 8-34
Where ( 1, 2,..., )iA i n are n elements.
By normalizing Equation 8.34, the local weight vector of the main factors is given as:
1 2( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))
T
nW d A d A d A , W is a non-fuzzy number 8-35
The local weights can be calculated for the main root causal factors as given in Tables
8.14. as follows:
Table 8-14 Local weights of main root causal factors for the given MRO
Main Factors Collective Weight Vector
Local
Weights
Normalized
Local Weights
Organizational Processes W=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An)) d (A1) d (A1) /TW
Documentation W=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An)) d (A2) d (A2) /TW
Maintainer Preparation W=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An)) d (A3) d (A3) /TW
Aircraft Design W=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An)) d (A4) d (A4) /TW
Supervision W=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An)) d (A5) d (A5) /TW
Resources W=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An)) d (A6) d (A6) /TW
Total Weights TW 1.0
Step 7: Determination of local weights for sub-root causal factors using Fuzzy
Synthetic Extent Analysis of the fore ANP.
Similar to the procedure followed in step 6, local weights can be calculated for
each group of sub-factors as given in Tables 8.15 to 8.20.
Table 8-15 Local weights of sub-factors associated with main factor 'organizational processes'
Sub-factors Collective Weight Vector
Local
Weights
Normalized
Local Weights
Regulations WOP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))OP d (A1)OP (d (A1) /TW)OP
Oversight Provision WOP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))OP d (A2)OP (d (A2) /TW)OP
Performance Tracking WOP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))OP d (A3)OP (d (A3) /TW)OP
Guidance WOP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))OP d (A4)OP (d (A4) /TW)OP
Planning WOP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))OP d (A5)OP (d (A5) /TW)OP
Task Design WOP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))OP d (A6)OP (d (A6) /TW)OP
Procedures WOP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))OP d (A7)OP (d (A7) /TW)OP
Total Weight (TW)OP 1.0
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Table 8-16 Local weights of sub-factors associated with main factor 'Documentation'
Sub-factors Collective Weight Vector
Local
Weights
Normalized
Local
Weights
Documents Availability WD=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))D d (A1)D (d (A1) /TW)D
Documents Quality WD=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))D d (A2)D (d (A2) /TW)D
Documents Updating WD=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))D d (A3)D (d (A3) /TW)D
Feedback to Manufacturer WD=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))D d (A4)D (d (A4) /TW)D
Total Weight (TW)D 1.0
Table 8-17 Local weights of sub-factors associated with main factor 'Maintainers preparation'
Sub-factors Collective Weight Vector
Local
Weights
Normalized
Local Weights
Qualification Validity WMP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))MP d (A1)MP (d (A1) /TW)MP
Knowledge/ Skill WMP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))MP d (A2)MP (d (A2) /TW)MP
Human F. Training WMP=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))MP d (A3)MP (d (A3) /TW)MP
Total Weight (TW)MP 1.0
Table 8-18 Local weights of sub-factors associated with main factor 'Aircraft design'
Sub-factors Collective Weight Vector
Local
Weights
Normalized
Local
Weights
Aircraft Design Error WAD=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))AD d (A1)AD (d (A1) /TW)AD
Maintenance Access WAD=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))AD d (A2)AD (d (A2) /TW)AD
Task Complexity WAD=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))AD d (A3)AD (d (A3) /TW)AD
Total Weight (TW)AD 1.0
Table 8-19 Local weights of sub-factors associated with main factor 'Supervision'
Sub-factors Collective Weight Vector
Local
Weigh
ts
Normalized
Local
Weights
Task Delegation . WS=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))S d (A1)S (d (A1) /TW)S
Inspections Failures WS=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))S d (A2)S (d (A2) /TW)S
Uncorrected Problems WS=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))S d (A3)S (d (A3) /TW)S
Total Weight (TW)S 1.0
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Table 8-20 Local weights of sub-factors associated with main factor 'Resources'
Sub-factors Collective Weight Vector
Local
Weights
Normalized
Local
Weights
Manning Provision WR=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))R d (A1)R (d (A1) /TW)R
Material Provision WR=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))R d (A2)R (d (A2) /TW)R
Equipment/ Tools WR=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))R d (A3)R (d (A3) /TW)R
Spare Parts WR=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))R d (A4)R (d (A4) /TW)R
Workplace Facilities WR=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))R d (A6)R (d (A5) /TW)R
Workplace Conditions WR=(d(A1), d(A2),…, (An))R d (A6)R (d (A6) /TW)R
Total Weight (TW)R 1.0
Step 8: Evaluation of dependencies among the causal factors and determination of
their interdependent weights.
This is the third newly introduced algorithm within this mathematical model to
fulfil the partial target of automating the decision making processes that is associated
with the inter-factors comparisons. Through this algorithm the dependence among main
factors (represented in Figures 7.7 and 7.8 by vertical errors between factors) is
determined by evaluating impact of each factor on every other factor through pair-wise
comparison as well. In this stage a more sophisticated set of enquiries will be used for
the pair-wise comparison such as: ‘‘What is the relative importance of ‘documentation’
when compared with ‘maintainer preparation’ on controlling (affecting) ‘organizational
processes’ in the given MRO?’’. By answering such questions, a complete set of inner
dependence matrices describing the mutual influences between main factors can be
built, thus representing the actual real-world conditions of factors interdependency.
A. Introducing the Index of Factors Mutual Influence (IFMI)
Let A be one factor of weight of importance WA among a set of K factors with total
combined weight of importance WT.
Let Bi , i = 1, 2, …, K be another factor of weight of importance BiW within
the same set, then the index of influence of A on Bi, written as / iA BI , can be indicated
by comparing the proportions of BiW to WT in the two cases of WT including and
excluding WA . Mathematically:
/
i i
i
B B
A B
T A T
W W
I
W W W
 

, i = 1, 2, …, K 8-36
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This IFMI is perfectly constructive in directly comparing between main factors
using their weights, as potential root causes, obtained as per Table 8.14. By
mathematically evaluating the index of influence that each factor exerts on the others,
a complete true mapping of real dynamics of the mutual interaction of factors can be
achieved. The full scope of the IFMI’s can be illustrated as per matrix of Table 8.21.
Table 8-21 IFMI matrix of main root error causal factors
OP D MP AD S R
Organizational Processes n.a. IOP/D IOP/MP IOP/AD IOP/S IOP/R
Documentation ID/OP n.a. ID/MP ID/AD ID/S ID/R
Maintainer Preparation IMP/OP IMP/D n.a. IMP/AD IMP/S IMP/R
Aircraft Design IAD/OP IAD/D IAD/MP n.a. IAD/S IAD/R
Supervision IS/OP IS/D IS/MP IS/AD n.a. IS/R
Resources IR/OP IR/D IR/MP IR/AD IR/S n.a.
B. Building inner dependence pair-wise comparison matrices
Mutual inner dependence comparison matrices were then constructed to explore
the influence of main factors on each others using the IFMI matrix of Table 8.21. The
importance of ‘documentation’ when compared to ‘maintainer preparation’ in
influencing the ‘organizational processes’ is the net difference between the two indices
ID/OP and IMP/OP. These differences, when assigned to various bands like the ones given
in step 4, can allow for the use of a similar fuzzy linguistic scale to generate the relative
weights of the factors when their mutual inner dependence is considered, thus more
accurately representing the real world situations within MRO’s. This third batch of
fuzzy matrices of pair-wise, mutually-dependent, importance of the main root causal
factors are built using fuzzy numbers Zij and their reciprocals 1/ Zij calculated in
accordance with sequence described in step 4.
Table 8-22 Inner dependence matrix of importance of main root factors
as they mutually influence the factor: ‘Organizational Processes’
D MP AD S R
Documentation (D) (1,1,1) Z23 Z24 Z25 Z26
Maintainer Preparation (MP) 1/ Z23 (1,1,1) Z34 Z35 Z36
Aircraft Design (AD) 1/ Z24 1/ Z34 (1,1,1) Z45 Z46
Supervision (S) 1/ Z25 1/ Z35 1/ Z45 (1,1,1) Z56
Resources (R) 1/Z26 1/ Z36 1/ Z46 1/ Z56 (1,1,1)
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Table 8-23 Inner dependence matrix of importance of main root factors
as they mutually influence the factor: 'Documentation'
OP MP AD S R
Organizational Processes (OP) (1,1,1) Z13 Z14 Z15 Z16
Maintainer Preparation (MP) 1/ Z13 (1,1,1) Z34 Z35 Z36
Aircraft Design (AD) 1/ Z14 1/ Z34 (1,1,1) Z45 Z46
Supervision (S) 1/ Z15 1/ Z35 1/ Z45 (1,1,1) Z56
Resources (R) 1/ Z16 1/ Z36 1/ Z46 1/ Z56 (1,1,1)
Table 8-24 Inner dependence matrix of importance of main root factors
as they mutually influence the factor: ‘Maintainer Preparation’
OP D AD S R
Organizational Processes (OP) (1,1,1) Z12 Z14 Z15 Z16
Documentation (D) 1/ Z12 (1,1,1) Z24 Z25 Z26
Aircraft Design (AD) 1/ Z14 1/ Z24 (1,1,1) Z45 Z46
Supervision (S) 1/ Z15 1/ Z25 1/ Z45 (1,1,1) Z56
Resources (R) 1/ Z16 1/Z26 1/ Z46 1/ Z56 (1,1,1)
Table 8-25 Inner dependence matrix of importance of main root factors
as they mutually influence the factor: ‘Aircraft Design’
OP D MP S R
Organizational Processes (OP) (1,1,1) Z12 Z13 Z15 Z16
Documentation (D) 1/ Z12 (1,1,1) Z23 Z25 Z26
Maintainer Preparation (MP) 1/ Z13 1/ Z23 (1,1,1) Z35 Z36
Supervision (S) 1/ Z15 1/ Z25 1/ Z35 (1,1,1) Z56
Resources (R) 1/ Z16 1/Z26 1/ Z36 1/ Z56 (1,1,1)
Table 8-26 Inner dependence matrix of importance of main root factors
as they mutually influence the factor: ‘Supervision’
OP D MP AD R
Organizational Processes (OP) (1,1,1) Z12 Z13 Z14 Z16
Documentation (D) 1/ Z12 (1,1,1) Z23 Z24 Z26
Maintainer Preparation (MP) 1/ Z13 1/ Z23 (1,1,1) Z34 Z36
Aircraft Design (AD) 1/ Z14 1/ Z24 1/ Z34 (1,1,1) Z46
Resources (R) 1/ Z16 1/Z26 1/ Z36 1/ Z46 (1,1,1)
Table 8-27 Inner dependence matrix of importance of main root factors
as they mutually influence the factor: ‘Resources’
OP D MP AD S
Organizational Processes (OP) (1,1,1) Z12 Z13 Z14 Z15
Documentation (D) 1/ Z12 (1,1,1) Z23 Z24 Z25
Maintainer Preparation (MP) 1/ Z13 1/ Z23 (1,1,1) Z34 Z35
Aircraft Design (AD) 1/ Z14 1/ Z24 1/ Z34 (1,1,1) Z45
Supervision (S) 1/ Z15 1/ Z25 1/ Z35 1/ Z45 (1,1,1)
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C. Calculation of relative importance weights of causal factors
Applying the full mathematical sequence discussed previously in step 6, the
relative importance weights of the main causal factors, that map their inner dependence,
can be listed as well.
D. Construction of master matrix for main root causal factor interdependent weights
The above calculated relative importance weights for the main causal factors are
used to construct a master Relative Importance Matrix RIW in the following shape:
11 1
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, (n = 6 for the current analysis) 8-37
E. Calculation of interdependent weights of the main causal factors
The final interdependent weights of the n causal factors can then be calculated
through multiplying the relative importance weights matrix RIW above by the local
weights of the n factors obtained before as in Table 8.13. This can be indicated as
follows:
W relative importance X W local = W interdependent
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Step 9: Determination of Global Weights for causal sub-factors and
Global weights of the sub-factors are obtained by multiplying local weights of these
sub-factors (Tables 8.15 to 8.20) with the interdependent weight of the main factor to
which they belong (as obtained by Equation 8.38). This can be illustrated by system of
Equations 8.39.
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8.3.2 Automating the expert’s role
The above described procedure is built taking into account many vital
considerations that crucially influenced the model structure. Some of these are:
1. Human factors research has always been described as being of limited direct
practical benefits to industry due to significant variations between the agendas of
both researchers and industry professionals. This is thoroughly discussed in
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previous chapters of this thesis. Research works and theories tend to rely heavily
on selective ‘laboratory-conditioned’ situations of which the utilization of
complicated and costly systems of experts is a major feature. Industry seems to
be keener to have specific focused solutions that can be used within the real
hangar atmosphere. This research, in bridging the gap between these two worlds,
paid sincere attention to eliminate, as far as possible, the direct need for experts
systems. Instead, the role that such systems usually do is transferred to the pre-
built algorithms within the AMMP mathematical model.
2. The fuzzy logic concepts, being totally dedicated to accommodate subjectivity
and uncertainty, are found through this research to be of high capability and
flexibility to handle the ‘automation’ of the roles of experts groups. Using the
RCES criteria and introducing new fuzzy algorithms within the model, it is only
required now to have the initial assessing inputs of the user. No further
judgements or evaluations are required. The model can sequentially provide for
such judgements and evaluations.
3. The adopted methodology, in its prospective part, calls for the creativity of the
researcher in order to transfer the learned backward-oriented knowledge,
including limitations of previous solutions, into inventive future plans.
Eliminating the need for traditional experts systems is a satisfier to such call.
4. By building such a practical tool as ErroDetect, this researcher is demonstrating
a trial to master both the fluency in the relatively-new fuzzy logic applications as
well as the ability of building lengthy sophisticated software codes.
8.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter the main mathematical model of the AMMP process is thoroughly
discussed. The model, comprising excessive sequential formulations and tabulations, is
built to receive a sole input by the process applicant. This input is a direct assessment of
the overall evaluation of the given aircraft design, or an accurate mapping of a given
MRO and its position within the safety space. The core of the input process uses the
pre-discussed 870 RCES criteria. The expected product is an overall evaluation of the
content of root causes, promoting aviation maintenance errors, that may be embodied
within design or hidden within a MRO environment.
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9 Building and Verification of AMMP
Software and Process
The longer mathematics lives the more abstract - and therefore,
possibly also the more practical - it becomes.
E.T. Bell (1883 – 1960)
9.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the activities carried out, as part of this research, to
structure, build, test through simulation, and verify within-industry the ErroDetect
software, which is the core element of the AMMP concept and practice.
9.2 Construction of AMMP software (ErroDetect)
9.2.1 Overall layout of ErroDetect package
As part of the prospective pillar of the applied research methodology, the
ErroDetect software is built referring to the following featuring guidelines:
1. The package is composed of two similar, yet independent software codes serving
the design and workplace folds of the AMMP concept. The layout of each code is
structured following the relative fuzzy ANP diagram as per Figures 7.7 and 7.8.
2. The package is built using the well-spread Microsoft Office Excel Spreadsheets.
This is to give more flexibility during software design, and to provide users with
software that is built in an environment which they thoroughly know. 12 different
spreadsheets are used for the Design code, while 9 different spreadsheets are used
for the workplace one.
3. The fuzzy logic calculations are performed through sequential layers of complex
inter-referred equations, matrices, and tabulations. The calculations are
automatically propagated starting with the user unique input (using the previously
discussed 870 assessment criteria of the RCES), and ending with numerical and
graphical representation of the weights of each potential error root cause that may
be embodied within design or hidden within the MRO’s atmosphere.
4. Although the package is structured mainly for the purposes of this research at the
current time, but it is designed to be at the maximum flexibility and ‘user-friendly’
features that the available research time allowed to incorporate. The software is
always available for further promotions if it is to be fully industrialized later.
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9.2.2 Detailed structure of ErroDetect package
The two parts of the ErroDetect package are similar in general layout, thus only
the workplace code will be described here in details for simplicity and compactness of
the thesis. The workplace code is composed of 4 basic sections:
1. Logo and introduction page.
2. User input pages
3. Calculations page.
4. Final numerical and graphical report
The Logo and introduction page, partially shown in Figure 9.1, gives brief instructions
for users, and describes the methodology in which the software performs.
Figure 9-1 ErroDetect-Workplace Version 1.11 software home page
The user is tasked then to use the following 6 input pages (individual yet
interlinked spreadsheets) to inter his/ her unique single input task. Each page is devoted
to one of the 6 main root causes of the ANP given in Figure 7.8. Initial assessment
weights of individual sub-causal factors are obtained as a result of the evaluation of the
10 criteria associated with each sub-factor, thus concluding the initial assessment of the
specific main root cause by the end of its devoted page.
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The calculations are simultaneously performed as the input process progresses.
The calculation page uses inputs from the 6 previous spreadsheets and performs all the
successive operations discussed in chapter 8 leading to an accurate map of root causes
presence within the MRO under investigation. The overall weights of importance of
these root causal factors (mapping their existence) are given numerically and
graphically in the final report page. A typical ErroDetect description of the safety
behaviour of certain MRO is given as seen in Figure 9.2.
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Figure 9-2 Typical existence of main error root causes detected within a given MRO
using ErroDetect-Workplace Version 1.11 software
9.3 ErroDetect simulation
In order to further exhibit the AMMP concept and to demonstrate the sensitivity
of its ErroDetect tool, two isolated groups of serious helicopter incidents are utilized as
a base for a reverse-directed error causal factor prediction process using the software.
The two simulation case studies illustrate ErroDetect implementation for both design
and workplace folds respectively.
9.3.1 Case Study 1: ErroDetect simulation within design and
manufacturing organizations
Three helicopters of identical type in UK and Spain (AAIB 2001a, b, FSF 2001)
suffered a loss of control that led each of them to crash as a result of fracturing of their
attachment bolts of swash plates scissors links. In all cases, a very short time before
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each accident occurred, the swash plate scissors link had been incorrectly assembled
and installed. The accidents involved fatality and extensive aircrafts destruction.
Consequently, an investigative survey of the fleet within UK showed that several other
helicopters of the same type have their scissors links incorrectly assembled and installed
as well, both during maintenance or even from the very initial assembly at the
manufacturer facilities. Detailed examination of the main rotor heads of the three
crashed helicopters revealed that the rotating scissors linkage of each aircraft had
become detached as a result of a failure in the bolt that attached the lower link to the
rotating swash plate. This resulted in sudden loss of control accompanied by abrupt
drop of lift that led to high rates of falling descend. In all the mentioned three cases, the
lower scissor links have been installed back to front in the incorrect orientation.
Schematic configuration of the assembly is given by Figure 9.3.
Figure 9-3 Schematic diagram of swash plate assembly for case study 1 (AAIB, in FSF 2001)
Further factual information regarding the three accidents and the relative
maintenance that preceded them are given in Table 9.1. Thorough investigations
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concerning these maintenance activities revealed significant shortages in regard to this
type design as well as its relative technical maintenance manuals. This is deeply
discussed in Table 9.2.
Table 9-1 General factual information of accidents analysed in case study 1
Aircrafts EC-Gxx G- Jxxx G- Txxx
Manufacture
date
1998 1998 1999
Accident date July 1999 January 2000 June 2000
Total flying hrs 300 -------- 271
Cause of last
maintenance
-------- Combined annual /100
hrs inspection
An ‘A’ check due to
excessive play in swash
plate scissors linkage
bearings
Flying hrs after
last maintenance
2 hrs 0
min
0 hrs 45 min 3 hrs 10 min
Severity Fatal Substantial damage to
fuselage and rotors
Extensive damage to
aircraft
There is physical evidence shown by the technical investigations that even if the
lower link is correctly installed, some undesired contact can take place between the cup
washer and the link especially at high pitch settings. Although this has no direct
influence on maintenance sub-tasks effectiveness, but the case definitely involves an
incorrect design feature with potential damage to aircraft parts during operation.
The next step was to upload trends of causal factors listed in the last column of
Table 9.2 as input descriptors of the manufacturer’s malfunctioning in regard to design,
manufacturing processes, and associated aircraft maintenance documentation into the
ErroDetect software. Exact numerical input to the software is given in Table 9.3. A
comprehensive detailed analysis showing impact of the aircraft’s design on maintenance
is thus obtained as per Figure 9.4. This figure represents direct mapping of the hidden
potentialities of maintenance human errors that can uncontrollably results of the various
above named triggers. If this software is fed, at an early stage during prototype
finalization, with the direct descriptors of the design features and any complementary
documentation that are to be used by the aircraft operators in regard to each aircraft part
and associated expected maintenance, then a thorough prophetic prediction of the kind
given in Figure 9.4 can be obtained, in advance, that early highlights the areas prone to
give problems during related foreseen maintenance activities.
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Table 9-2 Error prone features of design that triggered maintenance human errors in case study 1
Maintenance-Related Activities or Facts Directly Before The Accidents Influence on maintenance
sub-tasks
Associated inherent
shortage areas
(maintenance error causal
factors initiators)
1. Lower link was reportedly difficult to remove from the swash plate bolt
Reason may be corrosion of the bolt. This resulted in damage to spherical
bearing during lower link removal.
Removal:
a. Difficult removal.
b. Associated parts damage
Design :
a. Material selection
(Manufacturer).
b. Accessibility
(Manufacturer).
c. Anti-corrosion
Techniques
(Manufacturer).
2. Lower scissors link had been installed back to front such that the spherical
bearing at the base of the link, through which passed the attachment bolt,
was restricted in its range of movement. The result of this incorrect
installation will be:
a. contact between the cub washer and outer face of the lower link
b. the spherical bearing will run out of travel.
c. Ultimately the main bolt fractures at the point where it emerges
from the swash plate
Installation:
a. incorrect installation
Design:
a. Part can easily be
incorrectly installed
(Manufacturer)
3. Relevant diagram in Maintenance Manual doesn’t show sufficient details
of the lower link that could assist an engineer in identifying the correct
orientation during installation. The manual contains no other written
guidance as to the correct installation
Installation:
a. Incorrect installation.
Documentation:
a. Insufficient details in
maintenance manuals
drawings (Manufacturer).
b. No written guidance
(caution) on the correct
installation
(Manufacturer).
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Relevant diagram in Maintenance Manual doesn’t show sufficient details of
the lower link that could assist an engineer in identifying the correct
orientation during installation. The manual contains no other written
guidance as to the correct installation (continued)
Installation:
a. Incorrect installation
(continued)
c. No relative information in
the working task sheets
(MRO).
4. The only clue given in the Manual that might help indicating incorrect
installation is to compare such installation on aircraft with the shown
diagram in the manual. However, this clue would not preclude correct
installation of the hinge bolt even if the link itself is in an opposite
orientation.
Inspection:
a. Incorrect / ineffective
inspection (self
certification or by
supervisor)
Design:
a. No physical clue built
within assembly that can
indicate incorrect
installation
(Manufacturer).
5. There is an error in the instructions where the beveled washer (included in
the attachment of the link to the swash plate bolt) is called item no 29
when it appears as item 25 in the diagram.
Removal / Installation:
a. Incorrect removal and /
or installation
Documentation:
a. Wrong (conflicting)
information within
manual (Manufacturer).
6. The design of the scissors linkage is unique to this type. The lower link on
earlier versions is asymmetric in planform and thus can’t be installed
incorrectly.
Installation:
a. Incorrect installation
Design:
a. Non-symmetric design of
the lower link. Thus
orientation is critical
(Manufacturer).
7. The Part and Batch numbers are embossed on the inboard side of the link
for the previous versions, whereas the equivalent numbers appears on the
outboard face of the link for this type (This would result in confusion for
mechanics accustomed to link numbers being always to the inboard face
during installation). The manufacturer confirmed the correct installation
orientation only after reference to production drawings.
Installation:
a. Incorrect installation
Design:
a. Non-familiar design of
the lower link compared
to similar previous
versions (Manufacturer).
b. No physical clue to
correct orientation of
parts assembly
(Manufacturer).
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8. The close metallurgical and physical examination of the broken bolts
indicated that for all the given cases:
a. The bevel washer had been installed incorrectly at the inboard part
of the bolt instead of being at the outer part as indicated in the
figure. This is probably the case since the aircrafts was built.
b. The thin washer was incorrectly installed during the last
maintenance in the outer side of the bolt instead of being in the
inner part as indicated in the figure.
c. Due to the beveled washer (with 4 mm thickness) being installed
incorrectly in the inner side of the bolt, thus the lower link was
incorrectly displaced outwards with this distance. This induced an
un-noticed bending load to the bolt.
d. The misplacement of the beveled washer resulted also in the main
bolt retaining nut being thread-bound, consequently part of the
specified assembly torque in the Manual was expended in
tightening the nut to the end of the bolt’s threaded portion. This
left the stack-up assembly loose. This, in turn, induced relative
fretting between the assembly components.
Installation:
a. incorrect initial assembly
at the factory.
b. Incorrect assembly
during the maintenance
c. Loose assembly (Bolt’s
nut is thread –bound).
Documentation:
a. Insufficient information
on the correct assembly
layout (Manufacturer).
Manufacturing processes:
a. Poor quality control and
quality assurance of the
manufacturing processes
(Manufacturer).
Design:
a. Insufficient length of the
bolt thread allowance
(Manufacturer).
9. Further enquiries showed that other three additional cases within the UK-
based fleet (total of 8 at the time of enquiry) have their swash plates joints
incorrectly installed. In all the total 5 cases, the bevelled washer has been
incorrectly placed at the inner part of the assembly. Evidence concluded
that these aircrafts apparently left the factory in this incorrect
configuration.
Installation:
a. Incorrect initial assembly
at the factory.
Documentation:
a. Insufficient information
on the correct assembly
layout (Manufacturer).
Manufacturing processes:
a. Poor quality control and
quality assurance of the
manufacturing processes
(Manufacturer).
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Table 9-3 Numerical input to ErroDetect v.1.12 – Design software in regard to design shortages of case study 1
Main maintenance
tasks
Sub-maintenance tasks
Numerical value (1 to 5) entered for each assessing
criterion (C1 to C10) as per RCES - Design
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
Preparation for
maintenance
Task assignment / Responsibility allocation 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
Aircraft documents / Task job cards 0 5 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
A/c location, orientation, levelling 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Required standard tools / Special tools 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Required equipments, devices, testers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Workshops shelves, part stands, hoists 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maintenance
preliminary steps
Identification of a/c targeted systems / parts 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
A/c jacking, hoisting, supporting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Required hydraulic/ pneumatic supplies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electric / electronic facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fuels, lubricants, gases 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maintainer positioning, using walkways, etc. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Accessing, cowlings, covers, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Initial checks, observations, etc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Parts removal /
Paints and sealants
stripping
Discharge liquids, gases/ Power off 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Removing access-blocking items 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Removing job-targeted items 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4
Stripping paints, sealants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Applying covers, seals, fixtures, orientation indicators,etc 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
Apply removed parts indicators, warning signs, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apply shelf control/ bags, labels, tags, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Recording removed, loosened parts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parts cleaning
Clean removed parts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Clean associated parts on the a/c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Overall a/c cleaning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 9-3 Numerical input to ErroDetect v.1.12 – Design software in regard to design shortages of case study 1 (Continued)
Table Main
maintenance tasks Sub-maintenance tasks
Numerical value (1 to 5) entered for each assessing
criterion (C1 to C10) as per RCES - Design
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
Detailed checks,
readings,
measurements
Check safety locks, guiding marks, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Read gauges, indicators, displays, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Check parts play, fitness, wear, dents, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Measure dimensions, weights, movements, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Measure cable tension , rods alignments, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inspect structures, surfaces, joints, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Check wiring, sockets, connections, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Measure currents, voltages, impedances 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Check signal distortion, interference, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Check fluids viscosities, purity, colours, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perform diagnostic functional tests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apply NDI, NDT, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Troubleshooting /
Analysis /
Decision making
Applying trouble shooting procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revising, setting, observing criteria for decision making 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decide: Accept, repair or correct, replace 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Topping /
Charging /
Installation /
Fixing / Sealing /
Adjustment
Fluid topping / flow pressure, temperature adjusting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cable / pulley configuration, tension, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adjust currents, voltages, signals, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fix pipe-works / Seal leakages, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repair / replace electric, electronic parts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repair / replace structural parts, surfaces 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repair / replace fits, joints, bearings, etc 5 0 3 0 0 5 0 0 5 0
Repair / replace power plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repair / replace a/c systems components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repair / replace rotary system parts 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0
Re-fix removed access-blocking parts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 9-3 Numerical input to ErroDetect v.1.12 – Design software in regard to design shortages of case study 1 (Continued)
Main maintenance
tasks
Sub-maintenance tasks
Numerical value (1 to 5) entered for each assessing
criterion (C1 to C10) as per RCES - Design
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
Inspections /
Functional tests /
Air tests
Apply visual inspection, observation 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 5
Apply checks by hand-feel, hearing, smelling. etc 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0
Apply functional tests 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 2
Apply ground run / air test 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Final steps
Apply final cleaning on a/c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Remove warning tags , indicators, etc, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Re-fit accessories, covers, cowlings, etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apply tool and material control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Remove stands, walkways, dummy equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Update aircraft logs and documentations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Figure 9-4 Detailed description of the design influence on each maintenance subtask as obtained by ErroDetect-Design for case study 1
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Figure 9.4 tells that this current design and the corresponding related
maintenance documentation are of potential, according to the configuration in which the
aircraft is released to service, to trigger human maintenance errors regardless of the
situation within the MRO’s or the competences and skills of the maintainers. It can thus
be concluded from this case study that if this software had properly been applied during
design for maintainability or prototype production phases, then the designers would
have received a warning that this swash plate lower link will trigger maintenance errors
during removal and installation as long as the corresponding manuals are as given
before this series of accidents took place. This is clearly conveyed through Figure 9.4
above.
9.3.2 Case Study 2: ErroDetect simulation within aviation MRO’s
The incident involved a helicopter transporter flying over the North Sea with 17
passengers and crew when there was a sudden onset of severe airframe vibration that
put the flight at risk. Subsequent examination of the helicopter revealed that a tail rotor
blade flapping hinge retainer had fractured on one side. The formal investigation (AAIB
1995) identified the following main causal factors:
“1. Maintenance inspections conducted over a period prior to the incident flight did not
detect a developing surface crack in the Blue tail rotor blade flapping hinge retainer,
despite additional work on the associated tail rotor drive shaft assembly to rectify a tail
rotor vibration problem, which was detectable as a trend recording within the Health
and Usage Monitoring System some 50 flying hours previously and was the subject of
an associated alert 5 hours before the incident.
2. The inspection provisions within the aircraft Maintenance Manual and associated
Maintenance Requirements did not specify periodic visual inspections of such retainers,
since they had been designed and certificated on a 'safe life' basis”.
Further human factors-oriented analysis as per the pre-mentioned retrospective
studies is conducted on this incident. Findings revealed a number of ‘specific failures’
that led, collectively, to the incident. An overview of the ‘context’ of these failures
which were dominating within the MRO before the incident is given in Table 9.4 which
also shows main parties involved in the associated errors initialization as the MRO
management (organization), supervisors , designers , and maintainers. Numerical input
to the software is provided in a similar manner to that of case study 1.
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Table 9-4 Specific Failures which were dominant within the MRO before the incident of case study 2
Dominant specific failures before incident HFACS-ME 3rd order categories Main parties involved in maintenance error initialization
Fail to provide oversight Inadequate processes Organization management
Fail to track performance Inadequate processes Organization management
procedures incomplete Inadequate processes Organization management
Non existing procedures Inadequate processes Organization management
No/ poor documentation Inadequate documents Organization management
Conflicting information Inadequate documents Organization management
.Information not available Inadequate documents Organization management
Delayed informing response Inadequate documents Organization management
Lack of parts/ equipment Inadequate resources Organization management
Inadequate facilities Inadequate resources Organization management
Failure to inspect Inadequate supervision Supervisors
No corrective actions Uncorrected problems Supervisors
Corrective action delayed Uncorrected problems Supervisors
Ignoring risks Supervisory misconduct Supervisors
Workspace illumination Lighting Organization management
Constrained position Confining work area Designers
Not directly visible Obstructed working area Designers
Inadequate support equipment Inaccessible work area Designers
Loss of situational awareness Attention / memory Maintainers
fail to recognize condition Attention / memory Maintainers
procedural mistakes Attention / memory Maintainers
omitted procedural step Attention / memory Maintainers
maintainer poor decision Decision making Maintainers
misdiagnosed situation Judgment Maintainers
improper procedures Decision making Maintainers
improper cross check Skill / techniques Maintainers
falsifying inspections exceptional violation Maintainers
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Transferring these circumstances which were either in-built within the aircraft design or
cast dominant within the MRO for long time before the incident into input codes for the
ErroDetect software, a comprehensive detailed description of the MRO management
and workplace conditions is obtained as given in Figure 9.5.
Figure 9-5 Detailed description of the MRO conditions before the incident as obtained
by ErroDetect -workplace for case study 2
This figure illustrates direct mapping of the situation before the incident occurred. This
early prognostic alert would have been obtained in advance if the AMMP tools were
efficiently applied then. The result shows clearly that there was malfunctioning within
the involved MRO regarding the provision for adequate inspection practices, furnishing
of proper documentations, and maintaining effective links with manufacturer, all of
which played vital roles that led to the incident. If such a predictive tool can be applied
regularly in MRO’s, and simultaneously added to the design for maintainability
assessing tools during aircrafts design, then a complete cycle of human error-triggers
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sensors can be secured. This will resemble a dynamic proactive monitoring process that
works to detect existence of any maintenance human error initiators.
9.4 ErroDetect verification
9.4.1 Objectives behind ErroDetect within-industry verification
By the end of its simulation approval phase, the AMMP as a concept with its
ErroDetect tool were further pushed for verification under real-world professional
environment conditions. The verification process aimed at the following objectives:
 Backing-up the sensitivity results obtained during the simulation stage, and
indicating whether the concept and its tools have any usefulness, relevance, and
applicability within industry.
 Exploring operational features of the software such as clarity of layout, clarity of
contents (especially the core 870 assessing criteria), flexibility of usage, time
required for completion, etc.
 Discovering any inbuilt or foreseen weaknesses within theory and practicalities
relating to the AMMP and its software.
 Exploring scope for future applications of the process and whether the industry is
keen to invest in such type of thinking.
 Further emphasizing the application of adopted research methodology which calls
for the integration of theoretical modelling into practical living solutions.
 Achieving some major objectives of this research such as research mastering
satisfaction and enhancing aviation safety by introducing practical tools.
9.4.2 Initial assessment and feedback from industry
The completed versions of ErroDetect as well as the overall AMMP model were
presented for initial assessment and evaluation by a number of active industry
stakeholders. The main AMMP model structure, the theory on which it is built, its
targeted objectives, and its practical aspects, nevertheless its core software, all were
thoroughly described, explained, and practically demonstrated to subject matter experts
from academia and research centres, aviation safety consultants, MRO’s as well as
aircraft manufacturers. Initial assessment and industry-reflective feedback were
received from: AAIB-UK, EU Joined Research Centre- Ispra- Italy, Baines Simmons
Aviation Safety Consultants Ltd-UK, Human Factors Group of The Royal Aeronautical
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Society -UK, Human Factors Team of Boeing Commercial Airplanes Company – USA,
Eurocopter-UK, European Safety and Reliability Conference ESREL09, Czech Rep. An
overall collective account of these feedbacks indicated that both the theoretical model
and its practical applications were satisfactorily understood, appreciated, accepted, and
encouraged by the industry to help fill the current aviation maintenance safety gaps.
In the above sequence, the design package of ErroDetect software was
compared, by Boeing experts, to another Excel-based software application that is being
currently used by the human factors team, as part of design for maintainability, within
Boeing company-USA. Having acknowledged that ErroDetect provides deeper insight
analysis when it comes to considering the human factors surrounding each maintenance
task and sub-task separately, these experts indicated their satisfaction that the proposed
AMMP and its ErroDetect tool are promising steps in the direction of proactively
identifying and eliminating design-induced maintenance error causal factors.
9.4.3 Practical application within helicopter MRO
After the initial positive feedback from the industry, the model and its software, in
the workplace and maintainer preparation version, were both put to practical verification
within real working context. This is discussed through the following sections
9.4.3.1 Selected Organization
The selected organization is a UK-based MRO’s facility of a major helicopter
manufacturer. Being a part of a bigger manufacturing organization, the selected facility
performs, in addition to the normal line maintenance functions of usual MRO’s, some
major design and modification activities on various types of helicopters. It is thus
clearly observed that the facility plays a double-role operations with both maintenance
and design orientations being in place. Thus, the quality department responsible for
safety of operations within this facility performs a more sophisticated role covering both
customs. The quality department is composed of a number of employees with various
integrated rich skills in line operation safety, airworthiness and certification
requirements, staff training and development, safety-related occurrences investigation,
for-management consultation, quality control and assurance, and other aspects as well.
The selected organization enjoyed excellent relations with Cranfield, and consequently
both parties, in addition to the current researcher, arranged for the ErroDetect practical
application and evaluation at the facility under a mutually agreed confidentiality policy.
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9.4.3.2 Methodology
The verification process was performed in the following sequence:
1. Thorough explanation of the AMMP as a theory and strategic model was provided
for the quality department employees of the facility. This is followed by a
practical demonstration and detailed hands-on training on the ErroDetect such that
all members of the team were made fully aware of the process and software. This
first interaction of the employees with the software resulted in useful remarks and
additional requirements raised by them to be further embodied in the software.
2. Necessary time was taken to ensure that all the new requirements were carried out
on the software to make it more profession-friendly, and to cover additional areas
called upon by the industry practitioners.
3. The software was then put for practical application at the facility. Two different
options of application were given for the quality department team:
 Team members should apply the software independently as individual users,
then results can be discussed collectively and points of variation in results
can be subjected to further group evaluation till final out put is concluded
 Team members can apply the software collectively by discussing each point
thoroughly, reaching a conclusive shared opinion about it, and then
providing a single final input regarding that point. Thus a collective single
final output will be obtained.
4. The quality department team decided to take the second method of application due
to the fact that they will need more joined efforts to grasp a proper handling of the
RCES criteria being only newly introduced within the industry. However, they
emphasized the opinion that the first option of application will be the logical
solution once practitioners are more accustomed with the software.
5. There was no interference from the researcher or any other group on the software
application process in order to keep highest levels of accuracy and transparency of
the evaluation process. The facility took the necessary time to independently run
the application process and provide its results.
6. The application process involved mainly the ErroDetect-Workplace version at this
stage of the research. The design-oriented version is left to be later applied at the
design bureau of the parent manufacturer organization. However, the design-
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focussed interests within the selected facility were totally present during the
software application process.
9.4.4 Results of the selected MRO assessment using ErroDetect
The ‘Final Report’ page of the applied ErroDetect record for this MRO/design
facility shows the overall mapping of the maintenance error root causes existing within
the organisation as indicated by Figure 9.2 before. More detailed graphical results were
obtained as follows in Figure 9.6 to 9.12. The first page of the completed software
applied at the selected MRO organization is partially given in Appendix L.
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Figure 9-6 Existence of organizational root sub- causal factors within the selected facility
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Figure 9-7 Existence of documentation root sub-causal factors within the selected facility
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Figure 9-8 Existence of maintainer preparation root sub-causal factors within the selected facility
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Figure 9-9 Existence of aircraft design root sub-causal factors within the selected facility
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Influence of Supervision Sub-factors in Maintenance Errors
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Figure 9-10 Existence of supervision root sub-causal factors within the selected facility
Influence of Resources Sub-factors in Maintenance Errors
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Figure 9-11 Existence of resources root sub-causal factors within the selected facility
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Figure 9-12 Global existence weights of root sub-causal factors within the selected facility as
obtained by ErroDetect-Workplace version 1.12
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9.4.5 Verification Analysis and Conclusions
9.4.5.1 Verification results analysis
The graphical results obtained through this verification process at the selected
highly-profiled aviation maintenance facility, as shown in previous sections, give exact
mapping of the level of safety performance that the organization enjoys. These
graphical results can be interpreted, as a typical case of aviation MRO, in the following
sequence:
Recalling the first general description of the organization’s situation as indicated
by Figure 9.2, it can obviously be seen that this organization faces critical shortcomings
within the functioning of the mid-level employees playing the supervision roles. These
supervisory malfunctioning represents 29% of the overall gaps of safety performance
within the organization at the time of evaluation. This, in turn, is clearly to have its
impact as well on the continuous preparation and development of maintainers as well as
the accurate decent provision and application of sound overall organizational processes.
In fact, it is an interesting feature of this software to clearly emphasize the
critical, yet unseen, inter-relations between various interactive factors within the
organization under focus. This current inter-relation between supervision and the two
other factors is quite logical when emphasizing that supervisors are the dynamic core of
work that bridges the higher strategic policies to the base-level of work execution. Any
drop in the level of supervision function within a MRO will automatically adversely
influence the upper and lower ends of the organization functionality. A deficiency in the
required organizational resources may also be seen to have participated by almost 19%
of the overall drawbacks that this figure shows. One direct feedback from the quality
department in this selected facility is their plans to use this mapping to convince their
higher management on the next probable areas of investment in order to reduce the
proactively foreseen gaps within safety performance.
The Figures 9.6 to 9.11 further illustrate details of drawbacks and gaps within
each of the 6 overall safety-mapping areas given in Figure 9.2. The weights of factors
given within these 6 figures are global weights comparing collectively the overall listing
of the 26 root sub-factors of the workplace ANP model. It is seen from Figure 9.6 that
the organization have some deficiency in the technical aspects of maintenance tasks
designing as well as administrative difficulties in the overall work planning capacity.
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Lagging in planning and work design will undoubtedly impose a collective impact on
regulation enforcement, oversight, and overall performance tracking. Thus again, clear
mutual interaction between various safety-influencing factors can repeatedly be
observed.
In another orientation, although problems expected from technical
documentations and documentary system in general are relatively low as indicated by
the overall mapping, but details of Figure 9.7 indicate a low quality of the available
documentation provisions. This will again recall the fact of the limited available
resources as previously discussed. An interesting feature, that this figure shows as well,
is the low performance of information transfer between this specific facility and its main
parent manufacturer organization in regard to safety-related issues. In fact, this specific
facility, being of double-role nature, performs internally most of the major or frequent
technical assistance calls or manufacturer-oriented consultations and feedbacks. Thus
they have lesser external flow of safety-related information with the main parent
manufacturer bureaus if compared to a normal MRO that functions as a maintenance
facility only. This is another indication of the sensitivity of the software to exactly
describe actual features of a given organization.
Figure 9.8 indicates a deficiency in human factors-oriented training provided for
maintainers and supervisors within this facility. It is also seen that both qualification
and aircraft knowledge features of the maintenance staff are of lesser importance as
potential sources of maintenance errors. This is again of reasonable logic since this
facility, being a part of a major manufacturer organization, is in fact bound to invest in a
higher calibre of workers if compared to normal MRO’s. Another interesting feedback
from the quality team at the facility was that they rarely recognized the lack of human
factors training provision for the maintenance staff to be of such potentiality to cause
future problems. This totally back-up the previous findings of the ethnographic study
part of this research which indicated a lack of human factors-oriented scientific
considerations and applications within the facilities of aviation manufacturers, and their
dependence merely on previous experiences when deciding for human factors-related
issues such as duplicate inspection items.
Figure 9.9 highlights maintenance task complexity as a major adverse impact of
aircrafts’ design features on maintenance safety. Aircrafts design errors or shortages
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come in the second rating. In fact, the output information displayed by this figure
represents a typical core subject matter of information exchange between MRO’s and
aircrafts manufacturers in regard to maintenance errors triggers. It was of special
interest for this particular facility, being involved in aircraft design activities as well, to
observe the influences of task complexity and design shortages on maintenance safety.
The presumed ability of handling such design-related issues internally within the facility
significantly reduced the volume of the out-going information to the major
manufacturer, this comes in total harmony with the fact indicated by Figure 9.7 that the
exchange of safety-related information with manufacturers is weak.
Figure 9.10 approves the factor of task assignment and duty delegation to
maintainers as a major deficiency of the supervisory system within the organization.
This has already been conveyed before by the main comprehensive mapping of Figure
9.2. In fact a deeper focus of analysis can further explore this phenomenon within this
specific facility as a natural upshot of its double-role functionality. Being a part of a
major manufacturing company dictated, from one side, highest levels of performance
from higher management of the facility in a major strategic scale to handle sophisticated
duties such as aircraft designing, redesigning, and certification processes, and in the
other side gave clear approval and reasonable capacity for hiring maintainers of higher
technical qualifications to reflect the standard of technical work a manufacturer usually
targets. This only left the mid-section of the hierarchy, which is mainly the supervisory
layer, without much elevated performance capabilities. The quality department team
were really interested in having the ErroDetect software as a tool that helped to uncover
this unthought-of weak point within the overall organizational layout.
Figure 9.11 shows a significant deficiency in manning provision within the
maintainers workforce. This is quite coinciding with the limitation in resources that was
discussed before, and with the fact that only maintainers with higher qualifications, and
thus of higher wages, are expected to join the organization. Material provision and
workplace facilities come in the next levels of importance as potential root causes of
maintenance errors. However, this facility, still being a part of a major manufacturing
company, can never consider resources to be its major cause of potential safety
difficulties, as will be clearly observed when all factors are put in mutual contrast as
shown in Figure 9.12.
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Figure 9.12 joins the global weights of importance that the communal 26 root
causal factors encompass within the facility under evaluation. True proportion of
importance of each factor as a potential root cause can be clearly distinguished when
factors are put to the same scale. Supervisory roles of maintenance task assignment and
maintenance work inspection are the most critical safety gaps within this facility with
respective 13% and 10% shares of the total spectrum of potential problems. Human
factor training is the next deficiency comprising 8% of the total weight. Aircraft
knowledge, supervisors not correcting safety-critical problems, and manning provision
come next in importance. It is clear that this facility is having lesser problems when the
factors further involve higher management roles such as procedures incorporation,
guidance, oversight, regulation enforcement, etc. It was consequently planned by the
quality department to start enhancing safety within the facility by addressing the first
three weak points, then moving to the next most critical factors in the list.
9.4.5.2 Overall conclusive results of the application process
The second, yet crucially important, part of ErroDetect verification process
within the industry is the overall feedback, on the AMMP concept and its facilitating
software, that was collected before and after its application. This feedback is obtained
during the interviews and open discussions held with the quality department team at the
selected facility. An overall collective account of this feedback can be summarized as
follows:
1. The industry is really looking for proactive safety tools to help ensure safe
performance. All the current methodologies that they espouse now for safety
enhancement are reactive. The AMMP is a promising concept in this direction. It
is of real relevance to current aviation industry safety enhancement needs.
2. The AMMP strategy can easily be integrated within the existing network of
information transfer channels between manufacturers, MRO’s, and regulators.
3. The software is totally satisfactory in regard to clarity, content, easiness and
flexibility of use, and required time of application.
4. The output of the software application really highlights areas of shortages that can
develop maintenance errors.
215
5. The graphical mapping of the organization safety performance obtained by the
software can help management informed-decision making in regard to future
investments in safety enhancement.
6. The software helped uncover hidden latent conditions of potentiality to develop
maintenance errors which were never thought to be existent.
7. The software is very efficient regarding application costs. It is almost of no
additional expenses to have the program running since it utilizes the usual Excel
environment, and only simple limited training is needed to describe the whole
concept and set users ready for the application.
8. The AMMP concept and the ErroDetect software are both recommended for
further development to be practically applied by the aviation maintenance
industry.
9.5 Chapter summary
The up-to-date results of AMMP simulation through actual accidents and
incidents case studies are highly promising. The system, with 870 different error causal
factor assessing criteria, works as a sensor station to proactively detect high risk
situations involving aircrafts, maintenance workplace, or humans working there-in,
thus, gradually eliminating such situations. The whole process is then put to practical
application to be further verified within aircraft design and maintenance organizations.
An aviation MRO facility of a certain major helicopter manufacturer was selected to
evaluate the full scope of the AMMP and to run its ErroDetect software in real world
live conditions. Verification results were obtained and thoroughly analysed and
discussed. The AMMP and its software were found to be of direct relevance, ans
promising abilities to address current gaps in the aviation maintenance error
management.

PART FOUR
RESEARCH DISCUSSION,
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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10 Research Discussion, Conclusions, and
Recommendations
If I have seen farther than other men,
it is because I stood on the shoulders of giants.
Sir Isaac Newton
10.1 Introduction
10.1.1 The final act: putting it together
This chapter sums up the full account of this research. Having the notion of aviation
safety as a focus, this research challenged the problematical human factors intrusions that
colour aviation maintenance, being a dynamic and demanding industry as it is. The
influence of human factors in aviation safety in general, and in its maintenance strand in
particular, is immense. Humans are the foremost line of defence against errors and their
deadly consequences, alas, they are also the source of these errors themselves, a prisoner’s
dilemma that this study tried to handle and to contribute to its solution. According to
Mitchell and Carroll (2008), such a targeted solution “is often demonstrated through theory
development, presenting new perspectives upon accepted theories, and developing new
knowledge”.
This research comprised many folds of activities packed into two main streams of
study: backward-oriented investigations of previous maintenance–induced safety
occurrences and future-aimed introduction of new tools that can help eliminate such
occurrences. The previous chapters of this thesis described in details all ingredients that
shape various behaviours, being faulty or successful, of aviation maintainers, their
supervisors, and their higher managements within work environment. This chapter is
devoted to finalize this research by putting all data, information, theory, modelling, and
practical interventions covered during this research into one mould that can best cast these
ingredients in an irrefutable conclusive harmony. A main aim of this chapter is to further
demonstrate a required level of scholarship which can always be expected of a research
targeting both academic satisfactions forcefully coupled to industrial functionality.
10.1.2 The HERMES influence
Paltridge (2002) identified four categories of writing styles universally used for
degree theses, including those of doctoral research: Simple traditional, complex traditional,
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topic-based, and research article compilation thesis configurations. Each category has its
own features, applications, and validating circumstances. These styles differ significantly in
their overall layouts and internal building structures, regardless of the degree sought or
discipline of knowledge encountered. The criteria for selecting a writing category
principally depend on the nature of the research itself, background theory, materials and
methods, and number of topics involved. This current research, when weighed in contrast to
these exact specific criteria, is never found to fit reasonably into any of the pre-mentioned
categories. A fifth category is thus needs to be additionally suggested to accommodate the
structure and appearance that this thesis is presented in. This thesis can best be an actual
evident manifestation of the various activities conducted within the current research, only if
it is designed in synchronization with the size, sequence, and inter-linkage of these
activities. It is thus quite logical for this thesis to follow the events flow governed by the
HERMES methodology, the core terms-of-conduct adopted by this study. This is again
noticeable in the setting of this last conclusive chapter where two main streams of overall
strategic analysis are present to represent the retrospective and prospective parts of the
methodology. An all- contained conclusion then follows. The methodology influence on the
writing style is thus undoubtedly significant. The call for adopting a new thesis layout
strategy, that is a methodology-based, is thus sensibly backed-up.
10.1.3 This chapter
As above signified, this chapter encompasses a comprehensive discussion of this
research as seen from the two main perspectives of the applied methodology. This
discussion is intended to accomplish a deep secondary mining of findings, where tactical
analysis and local discussions scattered through out the previous chapters are to be
collectively re-visited in a more strategic vista. An inclusive conclusive account then
follows to finally state what this research contributed to aviation safety in particular and to
knowledge in general.
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10.2 Research Discussion
10.2.1 Strategic discussion of the retrospective studies
A series of backward investigative studies on the causation and mechanisms of
human errors within aviation maintenance settings formed the first part of this research. An
overall analysis regarding the theories, methodologies, conduction, and results of these
studies can be presented as follows:
1. The sociotechnical context of aviation maintenance was understood as the entire
mutual influence of, and between, humans and technology put together within a
dynamic working environment. The interaction between maintainers and aircrafts
forms a unique predicament, a special throng of behaviours, when contrasted to other
sets of sociotechnical systems. Human malfunctioning within this setting can be
detected and addressed as swiftly and assuredly as changing the face of a washer to
the correct orientation in the last second as it is being inserted over a bolt. Alas, such
malfunctioning, in the same moment, can easily pass-by undetected if that same
washer goes over that bolt in the wrong orientation, thus producing an erroneous
assembly which can cause a fatal accident. Huge involvements of human health and
cognition, human behaviour, human capabilities, aircraft design, work pressures,
organizational management and resources, governmental regulations, and so many
others ingredients could have caused that washer to go, within that assembly, in the
right or wrong orientations, with potential respective safe or fatal flights down
stream. Causation and propagation scenarios of aviation maintenance errors are thus
found to be very diverse and complex both to understand and to intervene.
2. The work within aviation maintenance industry is heavily regulated through aircraft
airworthiness technical requirements, and authenticated personnel qualifications and
certification processes. Both of these streams mainly targeted assurance of standard
procedures and practices within the maintenance work context such that safety - as a
whole - is granted. Any deviations from the nominated standards form a potential
procreation yard for maintenance error producing conditions and factors. The social
component, the human capital members within MRO’s, are the most vulnerable fibre
within this network. Their qualifications, professional characteristics and
competences, health and physical capabilities, emotions, work habits, norms, living
pressures, inter-personal relations including vertical and horizontal organizational
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relations, etc. all form either concrete pillars of quality and safety or exasperating
deficiencies of inferiority and injury. Appreciating the impact of the ‘cultural
pyramid’, enveloping maintainers, their supervisors, and higher management within
each specific MRO, on their behaviours can help, among other attributes, putting the
human performance at the required level of excellence, thus help achieving error-
free aviation maintenance.
3. MRO’s are located within Reason’s safety space (Reason 1997) in accordance to the
overall resultant of their safety-related performance. Potential root causal factors of
maintenance errors are the major safety-threatening hazards for a MRO.
Accordingly, a MRO applying necessary measures to early detect and eliminate such
hazards of these potential root causal factors is located to the ‘safe’ side of the safety
space, while those organizations vulnerable to these root causal factors are
undoubtedly operating in the ‘unsafe’ zone of the space.
4. Performance within a MRO’s, although being a self-contained context, but it is
highly influenced by external organizations such as parent companies, MRO’s
clients, aircraft manufacturers, suppliers, and regulators. The impact of such
organizations, positive or negative, and the role played internally by the specific
MRO’s management either prevent or lead collectively to what is known as the
‘organizational accidents’: aviation safety-related occurrences that have their root
causes deeply inherent within one, a combination, or all of these organizations. The
maintainer who directly triggers an erroneous maintenance activity is the last and
least to be blamed – if ever – in such circumstances.
5. Extended ethnographic study of aviation maintenance within this research showed
direct influence of a set of factors and ingredients on the overall adequacy of
maintenance activities and their conformity with standards. Such factors include full
complexity of human cognition, physiology, and behaviour, organizational
management, aircraft design concepts and manufacturing features, aircraft operation
conditions, and the dominant surrounding economic and political environments.
Each of these factors can generate limitless numbers of conditions and actions that
can cause maintenance errors.
6. Aviation maintenance tasks have immense influence on the maintenance error
causation scenarios as well. Maintenance tasks conceptualization, design, delegation
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and execution are four tight sequential inter-linked cycles that either help securing
safe performance or set the scene for errors to be committed. A well philosophised
and designed maintenance task can never guarantee or enhance safety if it is
assigned to the wrong worker. Similar results are expected if a qualified maintainer
is tasked to implement a poorly designed job. Fighting and preventing maintenance
errors must always be approached in a strategic view and a whole collective
understanding of these maintenance tasks cycles.
7. Helicopters have their specific characteristics when contrasted to fixed-winged
aircrafts. This variation involves aircrafts designing, manufacturing, operating, and
consequently, maintaining. The criticality of rotorcrafts safety issues can be
obviously established when recalling the high percentage of fatal accidents that
involved 57% of the total maintenance-induced safety occurrences covered by this
study. The importance of determining types of maintenance errors that are usually
committed transpires from the fact that they, being the answer to the question ‘what
had happened’, represent at the same time clear indications for the answer to the
‘why it happened’ question. In other words: listing these ‘errors types’ is a strong
tool to help identify their causes. Further, an interesting relation can be identified
between aircraft systems, components, or parts and types of maintenance-error
usually committed on them. It is found that smaller frequently-removed and installed
parts are always affected by mal-application of maintenance procedures or by
improper installation errors, while the rarely removed large airframe components are
mostly exposed to improper inspection types of maintenance errors. Such approaches
for errors types identification and their assignment to various parts and systems of
aircrafts are crucial foundations for any strategic vision targeting future
interventions.
8. Human factors-based analysis of helicopter safety occurrences helped valuing the
influence of human factors on maintenance safety as well as identifying individuals’
and organizations’ shares of maintenance error causation, thus furnishing the base to
identify associated root causes and propagation scenarios of maintenance errors. It is
found that 44% of the total root causal factors involved in the studied occurrences
have their roots originated within management sectors compared to 41% attributed to
maintainers’ acts. Some of these maintainers’ acts, all the same, can be linked to
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some managerial malfunctioning as well, thus further enlarging the managements’
share in error causation. It is thus arguable that if MRO’s managements are to further
elevate their performance to higher levels of perfection, then huge proportions of
maintenance errors may be brought under control.
9. An absolute human reliability within complex sociotechnical systems such as
aviation maintenance has always been questionable. Aviation maintenance is a
dynamic critical environment for human / machine interaction (HMI). Consequently,
any solutions that target maintenance error elimination must address both the human-
associated elements, the maintainer and all the conditions that influences his/her
activities and behaviour, and the machine-associated element, the aircraft design and
its resultant hard and software.
10. Accidents fault trees were built within this research to provide deeper understanding
of maintenance errors propagation scenarios. Due to the highly sophisticated nature
of maintenance activities, significant amounts of precautions and regulations were
introduced within the daily maintenance procedures, as in-built defence lines, in
order to ensure adequateness of work during sequential progressing of these
activities. Unfortunately, such local defence lines may be breached when an error is
committed, thus it can continue on without being detected. Fault trees were
constructed to show various possibilities of error initiation and propagation. It is
found that each single error face multiple chances in which it can be detected and
corrected. Figure 6.4 was composed to illustrate an overall strategic outcome of these
fault trees. Having a maintenance error continuing to exist up to the time the aircraft
is released to service indicates multiple collapses of the quality assurance systems
both those in-built within direct maintenance procedures or others external to them.
11. The newly introduced concept of the ‘specific failures’ preceding each of the
committed maintenance errors provided higher resolution of their root causal factors.
These specific failures, the main of these given by Table 6.1, can be taken as deeper
manifestation of the performance influencing factors within aviation maintenance..
Future intervention theory and practices suggested by this research are totally built
on these findings. A complete reactive /proactive organizational learning process can
thus be claimed.
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10.2.2 Strategic discussion of prospective studies
Findings from the first investigative part of this research formed a foundation for the
next innovative part of it. A series of newly introduced hypothesis’, models, and tools
constitute this second part’s prospective studies. An overall strategic analysis of this fold of
the research can be presented as follows:
1. It is high time to think proactively both as individuals and organizations. Aviation
maintenance industry, like other complex sociotechnical contexts, is eagerly looking
forward for proactive solutions that can enhance safety without paying huge social
and economical penalties usually associated with reactive learning. Practically
applicable tools that can help proactively prevent maintenance errors or detect them
in advance are rare if not totally inexistent. Such forward-oriented solutions require
taking a more inclusive hold of the human factors impacting the HMI operations and
utilizing such knowledge in developing theories and applications leading to
performance efficiency and safety enhancements.
2. To conceptualize the contrast between current actual level of safety within every
day’s performance and the future targeted error-free maintenance practice, the
SWAMP Model of maintenance error propagation is introduced. The margin
between current reality and future aim is formed and framed by the Swamp: a
combination pool of all possible root causal factors that can promote maintenance
errors. Drying up this pool, by proactively eliminating root causes, will vanish that
margin ‘and the organizations would perform (at least theoretically) at the level of
absolute safe environment’.
3. Root causal factors of maintenance errors are to be early detected and eliminated
through the proposed Aviation Maintenance Monitoring Process (AMMP): An
interactive coordination between various industry stakeholders, the major of these
being manufactures and MRO’s. The concept is to continuously monitor existence of
human error root causes that may be triggered during initial design or later
modification process, as well as during actual maintenance practices at the MRO
lines. Having error root causes identified in advance, they can then be eliminated
methodically, thus forcing the aforementioned ‘Swamp’ to shrink down throughout
the various sectors of the industry. Both elevated spirits and volumes of information
and knowledge exchange between these sectors are required. The AMMP is really
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waited to gallop from the academic research envelop it is designed within, to the
open industry application world of aviation maintenance. This is a sound approval of
the general conceptualization governing the ‘industry – research’ relation within a
holistic organizational learning as that illustrated by Figure 7.1.
4. Selecting fuzzy logic to handle the core mathematical formulation of the AMMP
model can be justified referring to the ability of this freshly introduced mathematical
concept to eliminate-out shares of uncertainty and subjectivity that used to
accompany human cognitive processes when deciding within ‘fuzzy’ environments,
thus providing for superior more accurate decisions. Maintenance errors are utterly
unpredictable, thus a total context of uncertainty will always envelop any trial to
evaluate possibilities of a maintenance error to be committed within a given MRO
setting. In addition, an observer to such a setting can hardly control the subjectivity
that may attend his decisive evaluations. It was thus perfectly natural for this
research to pick-up the fuzzy logic when building the AMMP model, thus ensuring
production of results that are free of uncertainty or subjectivity traces when users are
set to evaluate the presence of error root causes within a given design or at a certain
MRO maintenance line.
5. Building the Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES), the core of the AMMP software,
facilitated monitoring existence of root causes. As can partially be seen in
Appendices J and K, the 870 assessment criteria inbuilt within the RCES covered all
potentialities that can initiate maintenance errors. These potentialities are direct
mapping and response to the previous retrospective findings. Existence of any root
cause can be determined within a specific maintenance line or as a feature of a given
design by contrasting these to the associated group of criteria from among the 870
available. This process, conducted in terms of fuzzy logic milieu, ensures early
detection of root causes and other error promoting situations. The proactive sense of
treatment can thus be guaranteed. These criteria are dynamic. As application of the
whole AMMP concept within industry progresses, new listings of emerging
conditions may be added to the current cycles of root error promoters. Also, some
current root causes may be permanently eliminated, industry-wise, in the future due
to newly invented technologies or additionally adjusted regulations or enhanced
procedures. Both cases dictate a continuous reviewing of the RCES content of
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assessment criteria as the overall industry learning develop and get more mature in
understanding and fluent in implementation of the whole process..
6. AMMP concept is verified through simulation of its core user programme;
ErroDetect, and by fully applying this software to the real live conditions within
industry. A first case study involved testing the design version of the software by
conducting an examining evaluation of the swash plate design of a given rotorcraft
type. The sensitivity of the software in detecting inbuilt root error promoter features
within design is backed-up. This software is premeditated to be utilized by designers
as part of the ‘design for maintainability’ process where doubtful features are pointed
out in advance. In this occasion the programme was successful in pointing to a mere
potentiality of wrong-oriented installation of a specific part. A similar application of
the workplace version of the programme gave accurate description of the error-
promoting conditions inherent within a specific MRO line. In both cases the software
showed high flexibility to absorb all the different indicators that it received as inputs,
and high precision in determining the folds and features of potential error-generating
tendencies.
7. ErroDetect was then set to be tested in real MRO conditions. A rotorcraft
manufacturer and maintenance provider was carefully selected to implement the
practical evaluation of the whole concept with particular focus on the software itself.
Results of the verification process were satisfying and promising. Tactics and details
of this evaluation process and various abilities of the software have already been
discussed within section 9.4 of this thesis. However, this verification process proved
the strategic importance of such proactive thinking that can generate future-oriented
tools such as the proposed AMMP. The AMMP is found to be promising in filling
the gap, and in satisfying the industry needs, some of these being:
 The need for strategic proactive thinking, as well as collective industry-wise
cooperation in regard to maintenance error elimination. This involve far more
effective and efficient channels of information exchange than the currently
available ones.
 The need for practical solutions than can easily be integrated within the
existing safety management systems. The industry currently is not keen, and
can not go, for any additional costs to enhance safety. The return on the very
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limited investment that the industry needs to pay to master a solution like the
proposed AMMP will be very high.
 The need for a solution that can easily be standardized and adopted, in total
flexibility, by the industry as a whole. The proposed concept already joins
efforts from manufacturers, maintenance organizations, and regulators in order
to mutually control maintenance error root causes initiation.
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10.3 Research conclusions
10.3.1 Achieving research objectives
This research claims to have satisfied its written objectives as follows:
1. Human factors theories and models, error management systems, error
classification schemes, and other related aspects are methodically studied in the
general settings of aviation, aviation maintenance, and in particular deeper focus
on helicopter maintenance. A comprehensive grasp of the ins and outs of
aviation maintenance error causes and effects is obtained.
2. The concept of maintenance error root causes is further studied. Complicated
theories and complex methods are consulted and applied such that mechanisms
of error initialization and propagation are totally understood. On top, new models
are introduced within the research to set the scene for further achievements in
this field.
3. An industry-oriented Aviation Maintenance Monitoring Process (AMMP) is
introduced as a strategic concept comprising practical tools to proactively
eliminate root causes of maintenance errors. This process, with its dedicated
software coded ErroDetect, can be used to:
 Monitor and early detect the existence of maintenance error root causes in
both individual and organizational levels within MRO’s.
 Readily help practitioners in scientifically identifying the items suggestible
for the ‘Duplicate Inspection’ lists for each aircraft type.
 Early detect existence of maintenance error root causes that may be inbuilt
within design features of aircrafts. The AMMP process can thus be adopted
as genuine part of the ‘design for maintainability’ practices.
4. The AMMP process is completely simulated and practically applied within
industry for verification. Obtained results are satisfactory.
10.3.2 Answering research hypotheses
The current research introduced the following hypotheses for verification:
Hypothesis 1: ‘Human factors errors within aviation maintenance industry can be more
effectively managed by applying proactive monitoring and early error detecting techniques
at both organizational and individual levels.’
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Hypothesis 2: ‘An aviation maintenance task can be executed at a significantly higher level
of safe performance such that human-induced undesired outcomes would almost be nil if
possibilities of human error that can be initiated due to any design features associated with
that task are eliminated’.
Hypothesis 3: ‘An aviation MRO can operate at a significantly higher level of safe
performance such that human-induced undesired outcomes would almost be nil if the
existing unseen accumulation of mutually- interrelated root causes that lead to
maintenance human errors are eliminated’.
These hypotheses attempted the conceptualization of possible treatment of human
factors-induced errors during aviation maintenance via proactive means. The hypotheses
further suggested an approach for proactive monitoring of error root causes existence, when
being embodied within aircraft design features, or inherent within maintenance workplace
facilities.
Recalling the comprehensive studies conducted throughout this research, and
building on the collective output of the theorization and practical applications of the Swamp
and AMMP models, it can be concluded that all the three above mentioned hypotheses are
verified to be correct.
10.3.3 Research originality and relevance features
The current research enjoys several elements of originality as well as multiple series
of new introductions. A brief listing of these can be presented as follows:
1. Originality of this work is fundamentally ensured by the fact that aviation
maintenance industry is facing a serious gap in proactive strategies and tools that can
treat maintenance errors. The proposed AMMP is the first in its both concept and
applications in this regard.
2. The already-fresh HERMES methodology is applied within the context of aviation
maintenance safety enhancement in the first occasion through this research.
3. No previous thorough investigations in maintenance error causation and treatment
within rotorcraft maintenance organizations could be detected prior to this work.
4. Other major newly introduced concepts and tools within this research are:
 The Research Front End Design (RFED): Generic systemic procedural
methodology for early planning of research works within industry or for
academic purposes.
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 The ‘Specific Failures’, a newly introduced error causal factors classification
scheme of 197 categories that resemble a new fourth order added to the well
established HFAC-ME taxonomy of maintenance error classification.
 The Maintenance Error History model (MEH) of maintenance error causation,
occurrence, and propagation scenarios.
 The Swamp Model of maintenance error initiation and propagation.
 The Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES): An extended listing of 870 different
criteria for assessing potentiality of existence of maintenance error root causes.
 Various newly introduced algorithms within the fuzzy mathematical formulation
of the Errodetect software targeting the significant automation of the normal
experts’ systems role that recurrently dominated previous fuzzy ANP
applications.
10.3.4 Contribution to knowledge
The current research work claims to have added the following contributions to the
pool of human knowledge:
1. Setting bases of new knowledge of maintenance error causation, initiation and
propagation that comprised the introduction of the generic MEH and Swamp models.
2. Introducing the AMMP strategic concept for proactive treatment of aviation
maintenance errors, thus significantly improving aviation safety.
3. Introducing ErroDetect user software for early detection of aviation maintenance
errors root causes that can initiate within aircrafts and associated equipment design,
or due to workplace conditions within MRO’s.
4. Introducing new algorithms within fuzzy logic arithmetic to resemble the role of
expert’s systems, thus significantly elevating practicality and flexibility of such
fuzzy ANP applications.
10.3.5 Managing research challenges
The application of HERMES in this research was faced by many challenges, the
earliest of these was the need to modify the original methodology layout in order to
accommodate the present research requirements. This was first suggested by the researcher
and then approved by Cacciabue, the original methodology initiator, and his team at the
European Union’s Joined Research Centre-Italy. This modification consequently gave rise
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to a new challenge to the adapted methodology being the first to be thus implemented.
Another difficulty was in-built within the methodology itself, in fact, HERMES is a multi-
teamwork-oriented protocol due to its well branched and diverse activities that need to be
simultaneously addressed, thus it proved out to be very challenging for a single researcher to
cope.
The most critical conundrum that faced the application of this methodology broke
out at the phase of data collection. It was very difficult to get formal helicopter accidents
reports that are written with satisfactorily reflection to human factors issues, consequently
only 58 reports could be used for data analysis out of a total number of 804 thoroughly
reviewed reports. The wide spectrum and diversity of HERMES sub-components
necessitated serious upgrading and enrichments to the researcher’s abilities and know-how
such that such these sub-components may be satisfactorily handled, for instance, a formal
accident investigation qualification was obtained first in order to better understand accidents
occurrence mechanisms and accident reports writing and analysis. A tactical problem faced
the execution of the inter-rater reliability for the analysed reports. It was critically
suppressing to allocate experienced co-workers with approved qualification in the yet new
HFACS-ME taxonomy and associated report coding and analysis.
A major practical challenge as well was to initiate and develop necessary links with
industry, throughout the research stages, in order for the required exchange of information to
take place. The summit of this mutual cooperation with industry was reached as the selected
aviation maintenance organizations managed to allocate the necessary provisions within
their daily activities and staff workforce to practically apply the designed AMMP in the
course of its verification.
Each of the afore-discussed challenges and the ways they were tackled represents an
indispensable learning opportunity, the flexibility of HMI models selection and application,
the non-availability of co-workers, the desperate data hunt, the required analysis reliability
affordability, and the innovative introduction of additional analytical tools.
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10.4 Research Recommendations for future work
This research work, although having achieved all its objectives, but the question it
tried to answer calls for even more efforts to be further realized in order for a true aviation
maintenance safety enhancement to be secured. This writer considers the following areas as
being eligible for further focussing:
1. A holistic front of proactive thinking regarding treatment of maintenance errors must
be further crystallized and disseminated within various industry sectors involved, thus
furnishing more absorbent environments for practical proactive tools such as those
created by this research.
2. The AMMP strategy and its ErroDetect tool are to be changed into some industry
standardized practices that can ensure early detection of maintenance errors root
causes. This can be achieved by any sector of the industry: Regulators, manufacturers,
MRO’s, or even private providers.
3. Accumulative reliability databases are to be established throughout the industry as
indicated by AMMP strategy. Such reliability databases are the collective memory of
the industry in respect to most safe level of performance achieved industry-wise at any
given time. The momentary level of safe performance can be considered as the
foundation for further safety enhancements that must be targeted for next future
practices, consequently, a continuous progression for safer aviation maintenance can
be sustained.
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Appendix A
Interviewing Main Active Informants from the Aviation Industry
A-1 Interviewing aviation accidents investigators
The basic set of launching questions to aviation accidents investigators were as
follows:
1. Does an accident site usually tell directly whether maintenance errors were
involved? Are there any specific symptoms proposing a probable maintenance
malfunctioning?
2. Do maintenance errors have fixed specified routs of propagation and
consequences?
3. What are the most frequent types of maintenance errors that found to be
involved in aviation incidents and accidents?
4. What are the most frequent causes that led to maintenance errors that promoted
such accidents and incidents?
5. Can maintenance errors be monitored or detected in advance? And how?
6. How do investigators acknowledge the concept of maintenance error causal
factor? From what level in the organizational structure do these causal factors
firstly emerge?
7. What types of taxonomies or other tools that accident investigators use to up-
track maintenance errors causal factors? Can a comparison be held between
these taxonomies and tools in regard to their effectiveness and relevance?
8. What controls the degree of human factors depth of analysis within aviation
accidents and incidents investigation reports? What are the investigators’
perceptions of the role that human factors play in maintenance errors initiation?
9. What are the normal procedures that is usually followed by the investigating
authority when a definite individual, or a group of individuals, are found to be
responsible for a certain maintenance error that promoted incident or accident?
10. What is the investigators’ evaluation of the approach of learning from previous
mistakes and experiences, in a reactive orientation, to prevent incidents and
accidents re-occurrences? What other approaches can they think of?
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A-2 Interviewing aviation MRO’s safety managers
The basic set of launching questions to aviation MRO’s safety managers were as
follows:
1. What are the general maintenance safety and maintenance error prevention
measures currently in action within the general organizational SMS’s or in
parallel to them?
2. What is the specific nature of these measures? Are they reactive, proactive,
hybrid, or of other nature?
3. What are the shortage areas within these measures currently in place that
occasionally cause safety concerns or at least need to be re-addressed for further
enhancement?
4. What are the most frequent types of maintenance errors that these organizations
witness? What are the main causes behind these errors as seen from the internal
perspective of the own organisations’ safety- responsible personnel?
5. How do these MRO’s handle specific maintenance safety-critical issues in regard
to various aircrafts types such as the management and control of Flight Safety
Sensitive Maintenance Tasks (FSSMT) and the consequential determination of
the duplicate inspection items and vital points lists?
6. What new tools, procedures, measures that, if introduced, may further help
reducing maintenance errors rates and risks? What are the characteristics of such
tools, and what, in general, is expected out of their proposed introduction into the
active safety systems throughout the industry?
7. How can such proposed safety advancements be integrated within the current
active safety systems without the need for major changes in the organizational
layout, in the workplace infrastructures, or without imposing additional time or
financial costs?
8. How far developed and effective are the links between these MRO’s and their
aircrafts’ manufacturers? What types of difficulties do these links face? What
developments are required for their improvements?
9. What are the internal activities that address human factors impact on
maintenance safety? How far are such activities developed and effectuated?
What is the degree of human factors understanding and appreciation in the daily
life within workplace?
10. Where do these safety officers place their organizations within the safety space?
What type of organizational culture do they think that their organizations enjoy?
What further efforts that they intend to exert in order to further enhance
maintenance safety within their organizations?
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A-3 Interviewing main helicopter manufacturers
The basic set of launching questions to main helicopter manufacturers were as
follows:
2. What are the procedures that the given manufacturer applies when determining
the independent inspection items (III) and the vital points lists within
maintenance tasks of a type?
3. What provisions / options are given to the operators to apply the
manufacturer’s III lists or to add other items to them? What measures should
the operators apply in such cases?
4. What are the procedures / measures that the manufacturer applies to eliminate
any maintenance error-prone features at the design phase or afterwards?
5. What are the procedures for preparing a maintenance manual, job cards,
logbooks, and log cards? What is the current policy for manuals amendments
and if there is a fixed frequency periods for such amendments.
6. What are the maintenance issues that Westland requires or expects the
operators to give feedback on?
7. What channels are there for feedback from operators regarding technical and
other issues of aircraft maintenance?
8. How far is Westland satisfied by the current mutual interaction with the
operators (maintenance organizations) (regarding information flow and
feedback as well as correct application of Westland’s requirements and
recommendations as a manufacturer)? What are the future targets for such
issues?
9. Are there any maintenance proactive monitoring activities that Westland
requires, recommends, or expects? What are the general ideas / structures of
such activities?
10. What Safety measures does Westland highlight during providing the ‘type
maintenance’ training to maintenance crews? Any specific activities / rules
that are given during such training to prevent maintenance errors?
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Appendix B
Aviation Maintenance Sociotechnical Relations Chart
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Appendix C
Partial Representation of Maintainer Task Analysis using HTA Method
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Appendix D
58 analyzed maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
S
No A/C
Registration
Country Occurrence
Date
Report
Reference
S
No A/C
Registration
Country Occurrence
Date
Report
Reference
1 G - PUMH UK 27-Sep-95 EW/C95/9/4 30 G - ZAPS UK 8-Mar-00 EW/C2000/3/3
2 C-GFHO Australia 13-Dec-95 Bell 205,30257 31 G - SAEW UK 21-Apr-00 EW/C2000/04/05
3 N196CH USA 10-Apr-96 SEA97FA001 32 G - JRSL UK 14-Jan-00 EW/C2000/01/01
4 N9579F USA 23-Apr-96 LAX96FA177 33 G - TVAA UK 17-Jun-00 EW/C2000/06/06
5 N598F USA 28-Jun-96 MIA96FA168 34 N355DU USA 16-Oct-00 MIA01FA006
6 C-GTWH Canada 16-Oct-96 A96 35 ZK - HVY New Zealand 15-Jan-01 CAA-ZK 01/44
7 N465JR USA 5-Nov-96 SEA97LA025 36 C-FHFS Canada 15-Jan-01 A01P0003
8 G - PUMA UK 6-Mar-97 EW/C1997/03/02 37 C-FRHO Canada 15-Mar-01 A01P0047
9 N909CP USA 15-Apr-97 NYC97FA076 38 C-GXYM Canada 8-Nov-01 A01P282
10 N5105N USA 10-May-97 LAX97LA176 39 G - BJVX UK 16-Jul-02 EW/C2002/07/04
11 N30005J USA 21-May-97 SEA97LA117 40 C-GGHG Canada 15-Aug-02 AO2P0179
12 N4250N USA 20-Jun-97 LAX97LA218 41 G - ODNH UK 7-May-03 EW/C2003/05/02
13 N482SA USA 27-Aug-97 FTW97FA330 42 C-GPOS Canada 6-Jun-03 A03P0136
14 N896W USA 27-Aug-97 SEA97FA196 43 VH-OHA Australia 20-Jun-03 200302820
15 G – BCLC UK 19-Nov-97 EW/C1997/11/04 44 G - BXXW UK 6-Aug-03 EW/C2003/08/03
16 G - PUMK UK 9-Mar-98 EW/C1998/03/06 45 C-GEAP Canada 17-Aug-03 A03P0247
17 N90230 USA 23-Mar-98 LAX98GA127 46 VH-BHY Australia 29-Aug-03 200303804
18 N95MS USA 16-Jun-98 LAX98LA200 47 VH-UXF Australia 28-Sep-03 2003304074
19 C-GHJL Canada 17-Jun-98 A98P0156 48 VH-EWH Australia 1-Oct-03 200304105
20 N64KL USA 18-Jul-98 LAX98FA236 49 N286M USA 20-Nov-03 SEA04LA019
21 G - PUMB UK 20-Jul-98 EW/C1998/07/05 50 C-FZQF Canada 8-Mar-04 A04Q0026
22 N8171U USA 14-Aug-98 CH98FA313 51 G - TASS UK 10-May-04 EW/C2004/05/02
23 N30SV USA 20-Aug-98 CH98FA323 52 N115ES USA 14-May-04 ATL04TA116
24 G – ATBG UK 26-Aug-98 EW/C1998/08/10 53 VH-PHF Australia 14-Jun-04 200402194
25 G – USTA UK 27-Mar-99 EW/C1999/03/02 54 VH-MPI Australia 21-Jun-04 200402243
26 C-GTUI Canada 28-Apr-99 A99W0061 55 N2566W USA 2-Aug-04 MIA04FA115
27 N100PL USA 25-Sep-99 LAX99FA317 56 G - DERB UK 15-Nov-04 EW/C2004/11/03
28 N904PD USA 25-Oct-99 LAX00GA025 57 N4029Q USA 27-Nov-04 SEA05FA019
29 N8144M USA 27-Nov-99 MIA00FA030 58 N331TA USA 11-May-05 DFW06LA027
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Appendix E
Factual analysis of 58 analyzed maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
Cases Registration Type Engines Acc/Inc Date Country
Total
On Board Severity
Case 1 G - PUMH Aerospecial AS332L Super Puma Two 27-Sep-95 UK 17 No injury
Case 2 C-GFHO Bell 205 One 13-Dec-95 Australia(Ca-reg) 1 Fatal
Case 3 N196CH Boeing Vertol BV-107 II Two 10-Apr-96 USA 3 Fatal
Case 4 N9579F Hughes 269 C One 23-Apr-96 USA 2 Fatal
Case 5 N598F Hiller FH-1100 One 28-Jun-96 USA 2 Fatal
Case 6 C-GTWH Bell 214B-1 Two 16-Oct-96 Canada 2 Serious injury
Case 7 N465JR Garlick TH-1L One 5-Nov-96 USA 1 Fatal
Case 8 G - PUMA Aerospecial AS332L Super Puma Two 6-Mar-97 UK 18 No injury
Case 9 N909CP MBB-BK117- B2 Two 15-Apr-97 USA 4 Fatal
Case 10 N5105N Hughes 369D One 10-May-97 USA 4 Fatal
Case 11 N30005J Hiller UH-12E One 21-May-97 USA 1 Fatal
Case 12 N4250N HUghes 369 SH One 20-Jun-97 USA 2 Fatal
Case 13 N482SA Southwest Florida Aviation SW204 One 27-Aug-97 USA 1 Fatal
Case 14 N896W Southern Aero UH-1B One 27-Aug-97 USA 1 Fatal
Case 15 G - BCLC Sikorisky S - 61 N Two 19-Nov-97 UK 14 Fatal
Case 16 G - PUMK Aerospecial AS332L Super Puma Two 9-Mar-98 UK 17 No injury
Case 17 N90230 Bell 205A-1 One 23-Mar-98 USA 6 Fatal
Case 18 N95MS Hughes 369 HS One 16-Jun-98 USA 1 Fatal
Case 19 C-GHJL Sikorsky S- 76A Two 17-Jun-98 Canada 10 No injury
Case 20 N64KL Sikorsky CH-54A Two 18-Jul-98 USA 3 Fatal
Case 21 G - PUMB Aerospecial AS332L Super Puma Two 20-Jul-98 UK 2 No injury
Case 22 N8171U Hiller FH-1100 One 14-Aug-98 USA 1 Fatal
Case 23 N30SV Bell 222 Two 20-Aug-98 USA 3 Fatal
Case 24 G - ATBG Sikorisky S - 61 N Two 26-Aug-98 UK 10 No injury
Case 25 G - USTA Agusta A109 A Two 27-Mar-99 UK 2 No injury
Case 26 C-GTUI Aerospatial AS355 F1 Twinstar Two 28-Apr-99 Canada 2 No injury
Case 27 N100PL Karman HH-43F One 25-Sep-99 USA 2 Fatal
Case 28 N904PD Macdonnell Douglas 500N One 25-Oct-99 USA 2 Fatal
Case 29 N8144M Bell 212 One 27-Nov-99 USA 2 Fatal
Case 30 G - ZAPS Hughes 269C One 8-Mar-00 UK 3 Fatal
Case 31 G - SAEW Aerospecial AS355 F2 Two 21-Apr-00 UK 3 No injury
Case 32 G - JRSL Agusta A109 E Two 14-Jan-00 UK 3 Minor injury
Case 33 G - TVAA Agusta A109 E Two 17-Jun-00 UK 3 Minor injury
Case 34 N355DU Aerospecial AS355 F2 Two 16-Oct-00 USA 1 Fatal
Case 35 ZK - HVY Bell 204 UH - 1F One 15-Jan-01 New Zealand 1 Fatal
Case 36 C-FHFS Sikorsky S - 61N Two 15-Jan-01 Canada 2 Serious injury
Case 37 C-FRHO Schweizer 269B One 15-Mar-01 Canada 1 No injury
Case 38 C-GXYM Aerocopter SA 315B LAMA One 8-Nov-01 Canada 1 Fatal
Case 39 G - BJVX Sikorsky S - 76A+ Two 16-Jul-02 UK 11 Fatal
Case 40 C-GGHG Aerocopter SA 315 LAMA One 15-Aug-02 Canada 3 Minor injury
Case 41 G - ODNH Schweizer 269C One 7-May-03 UK 2 No injury
Case 42 C-GPOS Bell 206B One 6-Jun-03 Canada 3 Serious injury
Case 43 VH-OHA Robinson R22 Mariner One 20-Jun-03 Australia 2 Fatal
Case 44 G - BXXW Enstrom F28A One 6-Aug-03 UK 3 No injury
Case 45 C-GEAP Bell 204B One 17-Aug-03 Canada 1 Fatal
Case 46 VH-BHY Aerospecial AS332L Super Puma Two 29-Aug-03 Australia 8 No injury
Case 47 VH-UXF Robinson R22 One 28-Sep-03 Australia 2 Fatal
Case 48 VH-EWH Bell 206B One 1-Oct-03 Australia 1 No injury
Case 49 N286M Karman K-600 One 20-Nov-03 USA 1 Fatal
Case 50 C-FZQF Schweizer 269C-1 One 8-Mar-04 Canada 2 No injury
Case 51 G - TASS Schweizer 269C One 10-May-04 UK 2 Serious injury
Case 52 N115ES Hughes 269 A One 14-May-04 USA 2 Fatal
Case 53 VH-PHF Bell 206B (II) Jetranger One 14-Jun-04 Australia 5 No injury
Case 54 VH-MPI MD helecopters MD 520N One 21-Jun-04 Australia 2 No injury
Case 55 N2566W Robinson R22 Beta One 2-Aug-04 USA 2 Fatal
Case 56 G - DERB Robinson R22 Beta One 15-Nov-04 UK 2 No injury
Case 57 N4029Q Robinson R22 Beta One 27-Nov-04 USA 2 Fatal
Case 58 N331TA Arrow F OH - 58A One 11-May-05 USA 1 Fatal
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Appendix E
Factual analysis database of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
Cases Occurrence Summary Defected Systems
Defected
components Error Key word
Case 1 Flapping hing retainer of one tail rotor blade fractured Tail rotor Hing retainer Detection
Case 2 Engine accessory drive gearbox failure Engine Gears Installation
Case 3 Flight control jammed due to un-installed cotter pin Flight control Cotter pin Omission
Case 4 Partial Engine power loss Engine Exhaust valves Procedure
Case 5 Failure of tension-torsion bar of tail rotor blade Tail rotor TT bar Procedure
Case 6 Tail rotor drive shaft broke after maingearbox transmission spindle failure Transmission system Spindle Procedure
Case 7 Vertical stabilizer failure and loss Air frame Spar cap Diagnosis, Inspection
Case 8 Bolts of Tail rotor drive shaft cover falled off Air frame Bolts Defected parts
Case 9 Vertical fin failure Air frame Rivets Unauthorised parts
Case 10 Engine power loss - Component failure Engine
Compressor stator
vane Inspection
Case 11 One main rotor blade separation during flight Main rotor Main blade spar Procedure, Inspection
Case 12 Flight control cyclic trim failure Flight control Trim electrical switch
Modification, Unauthorised
parts,Procedure
Case 13 Main rotor system separation due to main blade fatique failure Main rotor Main blade spar Repair,Inspection
Case 14 Fatique fracture of the main roter mast Main rotor Main rotor mast Standards
Case 15 Winch cable jammed. Air frame Cutter chisel blade Installation
Case 16 Heli-raft covers separated in flight. Air frame Screws Fitting
Case 17 Tail rotor separation due to tail roror blade fatique fracture Tail rotor Tail blade Inspection
Case 18 Tail rotor drive shaft broke due to improper shimmying Transmission system Shimms Fitting
Case 19 Tail rotor pitch change unit failure Tail rotor Pitch change rod Inspection,Omission
Case 20 Main rotor blade spar separation Main rotor Main blade spar Repair
Case 21 Engine oversped, power turbine output shaft destroyed. Engine Bolts Omission
Case 22 Tail rotor failure due to tail blade debonding Tail rotor Tail blade Inspection
Case 23 Main rotor swash plate outer pin failure Main rotor Pin Fitting
Case 24 Tail rotor control cable fractured. Tail rotor Control cable Installation
Case 25 Tail rotor gearbox torn out. Tail rotor Tail blade Detection
Case 26 In-flight fire Air frame Battery cables Omission, Detection
Case 27 Horizontal stabilizer failure Air frame
Stabilizer attach
fitting Detection, Unauthorised parts
Case 28 Separation of forward thruster control cable fitting Flight control Control cable Inspection
Case 29 Main rotor blade pitch change horn and grip attachment failure Main rotor Main blade horn Detection
Case 30 Central frame rear cluster fitting fractured in flight Air frame Cluster fitting Repair, Procedure
Case 31 Tail rotor pitch change unit out of function Tail rotor Pitch change rod Omission
Case 32 Bolts of swash plate scissors link attachment fractured Main rotor Bolts Installation
Case 33 Bolts of swash plate scissors link attachment fractured Main rotor Bolts Installation
Case 34 Failed main rotor gearbox oil pump Main rotor Gearbox oil pump Procedure, Release
Case 35 Hydraulic system failure due to pressure line crack Hydraulic system Pressure tube Fitting
Case 36 Main rotor transmission failure Main rotor Shimms Installation
Case 37 Tail rotor drive decoupling Transmission system
Shaft splined drive
coupling Omission,Procedure,Detection
Case 38 Input freewheel unit and drive shaft assemply ( transmission) failure Main rotor Input freewheel unit Procedure
Case 39 Main rotor blade failure and main rotor assembly separation Main rotor Main blade spar Unauthorised materials
Case 40 Engine power loss - Component failure Engine
Engine coupling
sleeve& shaft Installation
Case 41 Tail rotor teeter pivot bolt broken Tail rotor Tail fork bolt and nut Installation, Procedure
Case 42 Engine power loss - Component failure Engine Gas turbine blade Inspection
Case 43 Main rotor blade separation Main rotor Blade root fitting Diagnosis
Case 44 Main gearbox fracture due to mal lubrication Main rotor Chip detector wiring Unauthorised parts, Oil level
Case 45 Loss of engine power Engine Compressor rotor Procedure, Adjustment
Case 46 Tail rotor pitch change rod assembly failure Tail rotor
Pitch change rod
bearing Defected parts
Case 47 Engine/main gear box clutch shaft inflight fractured Transmission system A166 clutch shaft
Unauthorised
materials,Procedure
Case 48 Engine flame out Engine
Fuel tank quantity
transmiter Installation
Case 49 Right main rotor shaft failure Main rotor Main rotor mast Standards
Case 50 Transmission gearbox failure and main rotor separation during ground run Transmission system
Input quill bearing
housing Installation, Inspection
Case 51 Engine stopped, fuel flow cut off. Engine
Fuel control cable
attachment Installation
Case 52 Fatique fracture of the tailboom saddle fitting Air frame
Tail boom saddle
support fitting Procedure
Case 53 Engine/main gear box clutch shaft inflight fractured Transmission system Kaflex drive shaft Procedure, Detection
Case 54 Right landing gear struts fractured during landing Air frame Landing strut Repair, Unauthorised parts
Case 55 Fixed swach plate assembly left lug loosening Main rotor
Push/pull tube of
swach plate Omission
Case 56 Main rotor blade cracked due to stiff bearings. Main rotor
Main blade teeter
hing Omission
Case 57 Main rotor diverted from normal plane of rotation Main rotor Door pins Omission
Case 58 Loss of engine power due to disconnected pneumatic line Engine pneumatic line tube Fitting
264
Appendix E
Factual analysis database of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
Cases Detailed Organizational / Maintainer Errors
Case 1 1)Undetected fatique crack despite additional maintenance work in this area
Case 2 1)Incorrect installation of gears during overhaul
Case 3 1)Missing cotter pin in a clevis bolt in the flight control system
Case 4 1)Recommended engine maintenance procedure skiped
Case 5 1)Non-compliance with an Advisory Directory (AD) and a Service Buletine(SB)
Case 6 1)Omission of magnetic particle inspection of the transmission spindle during last overhaul
Case 7 1)Inadequate trouble-shooting of the tail cone when the sheet metal skin cracks were stop-drilled, 2)and inadequate inspection after that
Case 8 1)Old securing self-locking nuts of the tail shaft fairing had not been replaced after they had lost their locking property for long time
Case 9 1)Solid rivetsof the vertical fin SAS mount support were replaced by unauthorized blind rivets
Case 10 1)Inadequate maintenance inspection of the second stage stator vanes of the engine compressor
Case 11 1)Inadequate application of an airworthiness directive, 2) and inadequate inspection of the main rotor blades
Case 12 1)Unapproved field modification of the cyclic trim switch, 2)use of non-standard parts, 3)and non-compliance with a service bulletine
Case 13
1)Unapproved repair of the main rotor blade, 2) and failure to locate this repair twice: during later blade modification and during applying a
related AD
Case 14 1)Insufficient FAA airworthness standards and requirements regarding this aircraft main rotor mast
Case 15 1)Winch cable cutting mechanism was assembled in a wrong way,
Case 16
1)Incomplete securing of the heli-raft pod covers, only three screws were hand tightened insteade of complete eight fully tightened screws
as required
Case 17 1)Inadequate inspection for the tail rotor yoke's straightness
Case 18 1)Improper shimmying of the tail rotor drive shaft
Case 19
1)Failure to inspect the tail rotor pitch control rod ends for cracks after a SB had been complied with, 2)corrosion prevention material not
applied
Case 20 1)Improper repair to the main rotor blade
Case 21 1)Six bolts securing the splined sleeve to the power turbine output shaft of the engine had not been fitted
Case 22 1)Inadequate maintenance inspection of the tail rotor blades, 2)Improper other maintenance procedure of the maintenance personnel
Case 23 1)Below standard (loose) fit of the white swashplate outer ring pin
Case 24 1)Incorrect installation of tail roter cables over a guard pin (misrouted)
Case 25 1)Failure to detect a tail rotor blade fatique crack during dye penetrant inspection
Case 26
1)Auxiliary-main battery paralleling cable was not attached to the positive post of the main battery, 2) and failure to detect the loose cable
during BFS
Case 27 1)Inadequate maintenance inspection for cracks in the horizontal stabilizer left attach point, 2) and use of unapproved parts
Case 28
1)Failure to remove an access panel to fully and completely examine the thruster control cable to diagnose the yaw anomaly reported
previously
Case 29 1)Failure to detect the signs of fretting and loosiness in the red main rotor blade pitch change horn to main rotor blade grip attachment
Case 30
1)Critical unauthorised welding repair of the tail boom clevis lugs, 2) and ommiting of refering to the manual standards regarding this
repair
Case 31 1)Both anti -corrosion and anti-fretting compounds were not applied during the last modification applied to tail rotor spider assembly
Case 32 1)Swash plate scissors link had been incorrectly installed
Case 33 1)Swash plate scissors link had been incorrectly installed
Case 34
1)Non-compliance with manufacturer's instructions regarding illuminated MGB oil pressure warning light, 2) setting aircraft to fly with
major defect
Case 35 1)Overtightening of main hydraulic system flareless fitting to stop a leak
Case 36 1)Spiral bevel pinion and the main bevel gears were misaligned during overhaul
Case 37
1)Bumper plug missed during installation of aft end of drive shaft, 2) Maintainer didn't refere to manual, 3)Defect was not detected during
inspections
Case 38 1)Operator didn't perform the 800 hrs inspection of the input free wheel unit required by maintenance manual
Case 39
1)Use of an unauthorised opaque protective patch on the erosion cover's scraf joint hid external symptoms of a developing blade spar
crack
Case 40 1)improper axial placement of the stub shaft into the coupling sleeve of the ngine drivetrain
Case 41
1)Incorrect seating of the bolt within the threaded insert of tail rotor fork assembly, 2)25hrs required torque inspection of the assembly not
performed
Case 42 1)No periodic power checks or inspections for corrosive sulfidation were performed on engine components
Case 43 1)Icorrect diagnosis of the reported main rotor vibration
Case 44 1)Maingear box chip detector wired with unauthorised cables, 2) Main gear box oil level not properly checked
Case 45 1)Inaacurate engine overhaul procedures as reqired by the overhaul manual, 2)Inacurate N1 field adjustment of fuel control unit
Case 46 1)The tail rotor pitch change rod bearing left to continue in service after it has been discovered to be defected
Case 47 1)Non-approved joining compound was used to join a166 shaft to its yoke, 2) paint was not removed before joining as required
Case 48 1) Lower fuel tank quantity indicator unit has been incorrectly installed in the tank
Case 49 1) No action was taken to treat the reported corrosion of the right main rotor shaft (no action is highlighted by the manufacturer)
Case 50 1) Input quill bearing housing was not positioned correctly, 2)Independent inspection didn't detect this incorrect installation
Case 51 1)Incorrect attachment of the fuel control injection servo to the engine- too short control cable was used
Case 52 1)Non complience with an airworthness directive requiring inspection of the tailboom saddle fitting
Case 53 1)STC inspection was overlooked by maintenance personnel, 2)Shaft flex frame joints were loosen for long time without being detected.
Case 54 1) Rough machining of the inner surface of the rear strut drag brace lower connection hole, 2)Use of non standard bushing component.
Case 55 1)Push/pull tube of the left lug of the non-rotatingportion of the swashplate assembly was not secured in place following maintenance
Case 56 1) Main rotor blade teeter hinge was assembled without the necessary shims
Case 57 1)Helicopter door pins were not installed (doors separated in flight and affected the main rotor normal rotation)
Case 58 1)Insufficient torque was applied to the ''B-NUT'' joining a pneumatic line to the fuel control unit, 2)Tube was deformed & improperly fitted
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Appendix F
Specific Failures analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTOES MANAGEMENT CONDITIONS
SECOND ORDER ORGANIZATIONAL CONDITIONS
Inadequate Processes Inadequate Documents Inadqt. Design Indqt. Resources
SPECIFIC FAILURES (1 TO 31) Orgniz.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Sum 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Sum 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Sum 28 29 30 31Sum Sum
Case 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 6 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 13
Case 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 3
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0
Case 4 1 1 2 0 0 0 2
Case 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 2
Case 6 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 0 0 6
Case 7 0 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 2 2 1 2 1 4 0 6
Case 9 0 1 1 2 4 0 0 4
Case 10 0 1 1 0 0 1
Case 11 1 1 0 1 1 0 2
Case 12 1 1 0 0 0 1
Case 13 0 0 0 0 0
Case 14 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 3
Case 15 0 1 1 1 1 2 6 2 1 3 0 9
Case 16 0 0 0 1 1 1
Case 17 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 4 1 1 0 9
Case 18 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Case 19 1 1 2 1 2 3 0 0 5
Case 20 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3
Case 21 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Case 22 0 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 1 1 0 1
Case 24 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 3
Case 25 0 1 1 2 0 0 2
Case 26 1 1 1 1 2 6 2 2 1 1 0 9
Case 27 1 1 0 0 0 1
Case 28 0 0 1 1 0 1
Case 29 0 0 0 0 0
Case 30 1 4 2 2 2 1 12 6 7 1 1 2 17 1 1 2 1 1 32
Case 31 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 0 1 1 6
Case 32 0 0 1 1 0 1
Case 33 0 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 0 5
Case 34 3 1 1 5 0 0 0 5
Case 35 0 2 2 1 1 0 3
Case 36 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 4
Case 37 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 0 0 6
Case 38 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 3
Case 39 2 2 4 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 9
Case 40 0 0 0 0 0
Case 41 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 6
Case 42 2 2 0 1 1 0 3
Case 43 1 1 2 1 1 2 4 0 0 6
Case 44 0 1 1 0 0 1
Case 45 1 1 0 1 1 0 2
Case 46 1 1 0 1 1 0 2
Case 47 1 1 0 0 0 1
Case 48 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 3
Case 49 0 1 1 2 0 0 2
Case 50 0 0 1 1 0 1
Case 51 1 1 1 1 0 0 2
Case 52 1 1 0 0 0 1
Case 53 2 2 1 1 2 8 1 1 1 1 4 0 0 12
Case 54 1 1 1 1 0 0 2
Case 55 2 1 1 4 1 1 2 0 0 6
Case 56 0 0 0 1 1 1
Case 57 0 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0 0
12 16 14 6 9 5 7 19 19 18 1 1 9 1 2 10 25 1 1 1 4 1 2 6 10 0 6 2 0 5 3
All Indqut Prcess events = 88 All Indqut Dcmnts events= 88 All Inadqt.Dsgn events= 30 All.Rsrces events= 10
TOTAL ORGANIZATIONAL EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 216
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Appendix F
Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTORS MANAGEMENT CONDITIONS (Continued)
SECOND ORDER SUPERVISORY CONDITIONS Each Each
Inappropriate Operations Inadequate Supervision Uncorrected Problem Suprvr. Misconduct Case Case
SPECIFIC FALURES (32 TO 59) Spr V. Mngmt
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Sum 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 Sum 48 49 50 51 52 53 Sum 54 55 56 57 58 59Sum Sum Sum
Case 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 18
Case 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 5 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 6 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 8
Case 7 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 8 0 0 0 0 0 6
Case 9 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 6
Case 10 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 11 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 12 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 13 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 14 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 15 0 0 0 0 0 9
Case 16 1 1 0 0 0 1 2
Case 17 0 0 0 0 0 9
Case 18 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 19 0 0 0 0 0 5
Case 20 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 21 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
Case 22 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 23 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 24 0 1 1 0 0 1 4
Case 25 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 26 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 11
Case 27 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
Case 28 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 29 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 30 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 34
Case 31 0 0 0 0 0 6
Case 32 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 33 0 0 0 0 0 5
Case 34 0 0 0 0 0 5
Case 35 0 0 1 1 0 1 4
Case 36 0 0 0 0 0 4
Case 37 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 3 9
Case 38 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 39 0 0 1 1 0 1 10
Case 40 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 41 0 0 0 0 0 6
Case 42 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 43 0 0 0 0 0 6
Case 44 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 45 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 46 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 47 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
Case 48 0 1 1 0 0 1 4
Case 49 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 50 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
Case 51 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 4
Case 52 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 53 0 1 1 0 0 1 13
Case 54 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 55 0 0 0 0 0 6
Case 56 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 3
Case 57 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 13 2 1 0 4 0 1 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 1
All Indqut Operations
events= 3 All Indqute Supervision events= 18
All Uncrctd Prblm
events= 8
All Sup. Mscndct
evnts= 5
TOTAL SUPERVISORY EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 34
TOTAL MANAGEMENT CONDITION EVENTS FOR ALL
CASES = 250
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Appendix F
Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTORS MAINTAINER CONDITIONS
SECOND ORDER MEDICAL CONDITIONS Each
Mental State Physical State Limitations Case
SPECIFIC FAILURES (60 TO 77) Med. Cond.
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 Sum 68 69 70 71 Sum 72 73 74 75 75 77 Sum Sum
Case 1 0 0 0 0
Case 2 0 0 0 0
Case 3 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 0 0
Case 9 0 0 0 0
Case 10 0 0 0 0
Case 11 0 0 0 0
Case 12 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0
Case 16 1 1 0 0 1
Case 17 0 0 0 0
Case 18 0 0 0 0
Case 19 0 0 0 0
Case 20 0 0 0 0
Case 21 0 0 0 0
Case 22 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 0 0
Case 24 0 0 0 0
Case 25 0 0 0 0
Case 26 1 1 2 0 0 2
Case 27 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0
Case 30 0 0 0 0
Case 31 0 0 0 0
Case 32 0 0 0 0
Case 33 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 0 0
Case 35 0 0 0 0
Case 36 0 0 0 0
Case 37 0 0 0 0
Case 38 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 0 0 0
Case 40 0 0 0 0
Case 41 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0
Case 43 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 0 0 0
Case 46 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 0 0 0
Case 48 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0
Case 50 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 0 0
Case 55 1 1 2 0 0 2
Case 56 0 0 0 0
Case 57 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All Mental events = 5 All Physcl events= 0 All Lmtatns events= 0
TOTAL MEDICAL CONDITIONS EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 5
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Appendix F
Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTORS MAINTAINER CONDITIONS (Continued)
SECOND ORDER CREW COORDINATION Each
Communication Assertiveness Adapt/Flexibility Case
SPECIFIC FAILURES (78 TO 98) Crew Cond.
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 Sum 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Sum 93 94 95 96 97 98 Sum Sum
Case 1 0 0 0 0
Case 2 0 0 0 0
Case 3 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 0 0
Case 9 0 0 0 0
Case 10 0 0 0 0
Case 11 0 0 0 0
Case 12 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0
Case 16 1 1 0 0 1
Case 17 0 0 0 0
Case 18 0 0 0 0
Case 19 0 0 0 0
Case 20 0 0 0 0
Case 21 1 2 3 0 1 1 4
Case 22 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 0 0
Case 24 0 0 0 0
Case 25 0 0 0 0
Case 26 0 0 0 0
Case 27 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0
Case 30 1 1 0 0 1
Case 31 0 0 0 0
Case 32 0 0 0 0
Case 33 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 0 0
Case 35 0 0 0 0
Case 36 0 0 0 0
Case 37 0 0 0 0
Case 38 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 0 0 0
Case 40 0 0 0 0
Case 41 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0
Case 43 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 0 0 0
Case 46 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 0 0 0
Case 48 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0
Case 50 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 0 0
Case 55 0 0 0 0
Case 56 0 0 0 0
Case 57 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
All Commnctn events= 5 All Assrtvnss events= 0 All Adpt/Flxblt events= 1
TOTAL CREW COORDINATION EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 6
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Appendix F
Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACE-ME FIRST ORDER MAINTAINER CONDITIONS (Continued)
SECOND ORDER READYNESS Each Each
Train/Preparation Certf. /Qualification Infringement Case Case
SPECIFIC FAILURES (99 TO 113) Readinss Maintainer
99 100 101 102 103 104 Sum 105 106 107 108 Sum 109 110 111 112 113 Sum Sum Cond. Sum
Case 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 2 0 0 0 0 0
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 1 1 1 1
Case 9 0 0 0 0 0
Case 10 0 0 0 0 0
Case 11 0 0 0 0 0
Case 12 0 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0 0
Case 16 0 0 1 1 1 3
Case 17 0 0 0 0 0
Case 18 0 0 0 0 0
Case 19 0 0 0 0 0
Case 20 0 0 0 0 0
Case 21 0 1 1 1 1 2 6
Case 22 0 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 0 0 0
Case 24 0 0 0 0 0
Case 25 0 0 0 0 0
Case 26 0 0 0 0 2
Case 27 0 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0 0
Case 30 1 1 0 0 1 2
Case 31 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 32 0 0 0 0 0
Case 33 0 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 1 1 1 1
Case 35 0 0 0 0 0
Case 36 0 0 0 0 0
Case 37 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 38 0 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 0 0 0 0
Case 40 0 0 0 0 0
Case 41 0 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0 0
Case 43 0 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 0 0 0 0
Case 46 0 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 0 0 0 0
Case 48 0 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0 0
Case 50 0 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 0 0 0
Case 55 0 0 0 0 2
Case 56 1 1 2 1 1 0 3 3
Case 57 1 1 1 1 0 2 2
Case 58 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 2
All Trn/Prprtn events= 6 All Qulfctn events= 3 All Infrgmnt events= 4
TOTAL READYNESS EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 13
TOTAL MAINTAINER CONDITIONS FOR ALL CASES = 24
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Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTORS WORKING CONDITIONS
SECOND ORDER ENVIRONMENT Each
Lighting Weather/Exposure Envrn Hazards Case
SPECIFIC FAILURES (114 TO 127) Environment.
114 115 116 117 Sum 118 119 120 121 122 123 Sum 124 125 126 127 Sum Sum
Case 1 1 1 0 0 1
Case 2 0 0 0 0
Case 3 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 0 0
Case 9 0 0 0 0
Case 10 0 0 0 0
Case 11 0 0 0 0
Case 12 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0
Case 16 1 1 1 1 0 2
Case 17 0 0 0 0
Case 18 0 0 0 0
Case 19 0 0 0 0
Case 20 0 0 0 0
Case 21 0 0 0 0
Case 22 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 0 0
Case 24 1 1 0 0 1
Case 25 0 0 0 0
Case 26 0 0 0 0
Case 27 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0
Case 30 0 0 0 0
Case 31 0 0 0 0
Case 32 0 0 0 0
Case 33 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 0 0
Case 35 0 0 0 0
Case 36 0 0 0 0
Case 37 0 0 0 0
Case 38 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 1 1 0 1
Case 40 0 0 0 0
Case 41 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0
Case 43 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 0 0 0
Case 46 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 0 0 0
Case 48 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0
Case 50 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 0 0
Case 55 0 0 0 0
Case 56 0 0 0 0
Case 57 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
All Lighting events= 3 All Wthr / Expsor events= 2 All Envrnmt evnts= 0
TOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 5
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Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTORS WORKING CONDITIONS (Continued)
SECOND ORDER EQUIPMENT Each
Damaged/ Unserviceable Unavail / Inapproprte Uncertified Case
SPECIFIC FAILURES (128 TO 140) Equipment.
128 129 130 131 132 133 Sum 134 135 136 137 Sum 138 139 140 Sum Sum
Case 1 0 0 0 0
Case 2 1 1 0 0 1
Case 3 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 0 0
Case 9 0 0 0 0
Case 10 0 0 0 0
Case 11 0 0 0 0
Case 12 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0
Case 16 0 0 0 0
Case 17 0 0 0 0
Case 18 0 0 0 0
Case 19 0 0 0 0
Case 20 0 0 0 0
Case 21 1 1 1 1 0 2
Case 22 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 0 0
Case 24 0 0 0 0
Case 25 0 0 0 0
Case 26 0 0 0 0
Case 27 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0
Case 30 0 0 0 0
Case 31 0 0 0 0
Case 32 0 0 0 0
Case 33 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 0 0
Case 35 0 0 0 0
Case 36 0 0 0 0
Case 37 0 0 0 0
Case 38 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 0 0 0
Case 40 0 0 0 0
Case 41 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0
Case 43 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 0 0 0
Case 46 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 0 0 0
Case 48 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0
Case 50 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 0 0
Case 55 0 0 0 0
Case 56 0 0 0 0
Case 57 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
All Dmgd / Unsrvcbl evnts= 2 All Inpprprat evnts= 1 All Uncrtfd = 0
TOTAL EQUIPMENT EVENTS FOR ALL CASES 3
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Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTORS WORKING CONDITIONS (Continued)
SECOND ORDER WORKSPACE Each Each
Confining Obstructed Inaccessible Case Case
SPECIFIC FAILURES (141 TO 154) Workspace Working Cond.
141 142 143 144 Sum 145 146 147 148 149 Sum 150 151 152 153 154 Sum Sum Sum
Case 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4
Case 2 0 0 0 0 1
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 0 0 0
Case 9 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 10 0 0 0 0 0
Case 11 0 1 1 0 1 1
Case 12 0 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0 0
Case 16 0 0 0 0 2
Case 17 0 0 0 0 0
Case 18 0 0 0 0 0
Case 19 0 0 0 0 0
Case 20 0 1 1 0 1 1
Case 21 0 1 1 0 1 3
Case 22 0 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 0 0 0
Case 24 0 0 0 0 1
Case 25 0 0 0 0 0
Case 26 0 0 0 0 0
Case 27 0 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0 0
Case 30 0 0 1 1 1 1
Case 31 0 0 0 0 0
Case 32 0 0 0 0 0
Case 33 0 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 0 0 0
Case 35 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
Case 36 0 0 0 0 0
Case 37 0 0 0 0 0
Case 38 0 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 2 2 4 0 4 5
Case 40 0 1 1 0 1 1
Case 41 0 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0 0
Case 43 0 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 1 1 0 1 1
Case 46 0 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 1 1 0 1 1
Case 48 0 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0 0
Case 50 0 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 0 0 0
Case 55 0 0 0 0 0
Case 56 0 0 0 0 0
Case 57 0 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 6 4 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
All Cnfining evnts= 2 All Obstrctd evnts= 12 All Inaccessbl evnts= 3
TOTAL WORKSPACE EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 17
TOTAL WORKING CONDITIONS EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 25
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Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTORS MAINTAINERS’ ACTS
SECOND ORDER MAINTAINER ERRORS Each
Attention/ Memory Judg./Decision making Knowledge Skill/ Techniques Case
SPECIFIC FAILURES (155 TO 174) M. Error
155 156 157 158 159 160 161 Sum 162 163 164 165 166 Sum 167 168 169 Sum 170 171 172 173 174 Sum Sum
Case 1 2 2 1 1 6 1 1 1 3 0 2 2 11
Case 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0 0
Case 6 1 1 0 0 0 1
Case 7 1 1 1 1 0 0 2
Case 8 0 0 0 0 0
Case 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 4
Case 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Case 11 0 0 0 0 0
Case 12 0 0 0 1 1 1
Case 13 2 2 0 1 1 0 3
Case 14 0 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0 0
Case 16 1 4 2 7 0 0 0 7
Case 17 1 1 0 2 2 0 3
Case 18 0 0 1 1 0 1
Case 19 0 1 1 0 0 1
Case 20 0 0 0 0 0
Case 21 2 3 1 1 7 1 1 2 4 0 0 11
Case 22 1 1 0 0 2 1 3 4
Case 23 1 1 0 0 0 1
Case 24 1 1 2 0 0 0 2
Case 25 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Case 26 1 1 0 1 1 0 2
Case 27 0 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 1 1 0 1 1 2
Case 29 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 4
Case 30 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 6 14
Case 31 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 4
Case 32 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Case 33 2 2 0 0 1 1 3
Case 34 0 1 1 2 0 0 2
Case 35 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 4
Case 36 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Case 37 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
Case 38 0 0 0 0 0
Case 39 1 1 0 0 0 1
Case 40 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 4
Case 41 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 3
Case 42 0 0 0 0 0
Case 43 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 3
Case 44 0 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 1 1 0 2 1 3 4
Case 46 0 1 1 0 0 1
Case 47 0 0 1 1 0 1
Case 48 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Case 49 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Case 50 1 1 0 0 0 1
Case 51 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 5
Case 52 0 0 0 0 0
Case 53 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 3
Case 54 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 3
Case 55 1 1 2 0 0 0 2
Case 56 1 1 0 1 1 0 2
Case 57 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 4
Case 58 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4
2 8 7 21 12 1 4 0 7 5 5 6 11 5 7 0 0 18 13 13
All Attention/ Memory events = 55 All Judg/ Dcision events= 23 All Knldg evnt= 23 All Skll/Technq. evnts= 44
TOTAL MAINTAINER ERRORS EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 145
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Specific Failure analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
HFACS-ME FIRST ORDER FACTORS MAINTAINERS’ ACTS (Continued)
SECOND ORDER MAINTAINER VIOLATIONS Each Each
Routine/ norm Infraction Exceptional Flagrant Case Case
SPECIFIC FAILURES (175 TO 197) Violat. M. Acts
175 176 177 178 179 180 181 Sum 182 183 184 185 186 Sum 187 188 189 190 191 192 Sum 193 194 195 196 197 Sum Sum Sum
Case 1 0 0 2 2 0 2 13
Case 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 3
Case 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 2
Case 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 7 2 2 0 0 0 2 4
Case 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 9 0 0 0 0 0 4
Case 10 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 11 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Case 12 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 3
Case 13 1 1 0 0 0 1 4
Case 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 16 0 0 1 1 0 1 8
Case 17 1 2 3 1 1 0 0 4 7
Case 18 0 0 1 1 0 1 2
Case 19 1 1 0 0 0 1 2
Case 20 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 3 3
Case 21 0 0 1 1 0 1 12
Case 22 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 6
Case 23 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 3
Case 24 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 25 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 26 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 27 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Case 28 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 29 0 0 0 0 0 4
Case 30 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 0 7 21
Case 31 2 2 1 1 0 0 3 7
Case 32 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 33 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 34 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 4
Case 35 1 1 0 0 0 1 5
Case 36 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 37 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 4
Case 38 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 40 0 1 1 0 0 1 5
Case 41 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 42 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 43 1 1 0 0 0 1 4
Case 44 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 45 0 0 0 0 0 4
Case 46 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 47 1 1 0 0 0 1 2
Case 48 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 49 0 0 0 0 0 2
Case 50 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 51 0 0 0 0 0 5
Case 52 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0 0 3
Case 54 0 1 1 0 0 1 4
Case 55 1 1 0 0 0 1 3
Case 56 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
Case 57 0 0 0 0 0 4
Case 58 0 0 0 0 0 4
1 14 0 0 2 5 4 0 1 2 3 4 1 3 0 0 4 2 0 1 0 2 0
All Routine / Norm events = 26 All Infrction evnts= 10 All Exceptional events= 10 All Flagrant events = 3
TOTAL MAINTAINER VIOLATIONS EVENTS FOR ALL CASES = 49
TOTAL MAINTAINER ACTS FOR ALL CASES = 194
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HFACE-ME 3rd Order analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
MANAGEMENT CONDITIONS
Organizational conditions Supervisory conditions
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
Processes Documents Design Resources Operations Supervision Problems Misconduct
Case 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Case 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 6 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 9 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Case 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 11 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 14 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 16 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Case 17 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 18 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 19 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 20 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 22 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 23 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 24 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Case 25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 26 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Case 27 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 28 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 30 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Case 31 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 32 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 33 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 34 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 35 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
Case 36 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 37 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 38 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 39 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Case 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 41 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 42 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 43 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 45 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 46 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 47 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 48 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Case 49 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 50 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Case 51 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 52 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 53 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 54 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 55 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 56 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Case 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 31 21 8 3 15 6 4
Organizational conditions = 96 Supervisory conditions = 28
Total Management Conditions Failure Enteries = 124
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HFACE-ME 3rd Order analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
MAINTAINER CONDITIONS
Medical conditions Crew coordination Readiness
A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17
Mental Physical Limitations Communicat Assertivens Adapt/ Flexi Train/ Prepar Certification Infrigment
Case 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 16 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Case 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 21 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
Case 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 30 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Case 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 55 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Case 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 3 0 1 5 3 4
Medical conditions = 3 Crew coordination = 4 Readiness = 12
Total Maintainer Conditions Failure Enteries = 19
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HFACE-ME 3rd Order analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
WORKING CONDITIONS
Environment Equipment Workspace
A18 A19 A20 A21 A22 A23 A24 A25 A26
Lighting Weather Hazards Damaged/us Unavailable Uncertified Confining Obstructed Inaccessible
Case 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Case 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 16 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 21 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
Case 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 35 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Case 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 39 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 2 0 2 1 0 3 9 3
Environment = 5 Equipment = 3 Workspace = 15
Total Working Conditions Failure Enteries = 23
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HFACE-ME 3rd Order analysis of 58 maintenance- related helicopter safety occurrences
(Continued)
MAINTAINER ACTS
Error Violation
A27 A28 A29 A30 A31 A32 A33 A34
Atntion/Mem Judg/Decisn Knowledge Skill/ Technq Routin/Norm Infraction Exceptional Flagrant
Case 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Case 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 7 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Case 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 9 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 10 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Case 11 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Case 12 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Case 13 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Case 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 16 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 17 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Case 18 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Case 19 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Case 20 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Case 21 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 22 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Case 23 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Case 24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 25 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 26 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 27 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Case 28 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 29 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Case 31 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Case 32 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 33 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 34 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
Case 35 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Case 36 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 37 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Case 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 39 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 40 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Case 41 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Case 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 43 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Case 44 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Case 45 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 46 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 47 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Case 48 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 50 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 51 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Case 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 53 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Case 54 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Case 55 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 56 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Case 57 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Case 58 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
28 13 16 22 17 10 6 2
Maintainer Errors = 79 Maintainer Violations = 35
Total maintainer Acts Failure Enteries = 114
Total Failure Enteries for the whole 58 accidents/ incidents = 280
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Appendix H
Fault Tree Diagram of Puma G-PUMH Helicopter Accident over the North Sea
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Appendix H Fault Tree Diagram of Puma G-PUMH Helicopter Accident over the North Sea (Continued)
281
Appendix H Fault Tree Diagram of Puma G-PUMH Helicopter Accident over the North Sea (Continued)
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Appendix H Fault Tree Diagram of Puma G-PUMH Helicopter Accident over the North Sea (Continued)
Second Engineer re-assembled the tail rotor without
detecting a 59 mm crack at the back of the blue hinge. He
neither detected it during his final inspection on job
59 mm crack still undetected
D E
Second Engineer could not see the crack
of 59 mm as well
Crack again not seen
Second Engineer did not look at the
back area of the hinge where the crack
was there
Back area of hinge again not looked at
The lighting in the workplace is of
lesser intensity than what is
recommended for this type of job
Improper lighting
The maintenance manual
doesn't emphasize
checking the back area of
the hinges
Improper job procedure
Second Engineer couldn’t
position himself between tail
pylon and tail rotor head so as
to see at the back of the blades
hinges
Again improper access
The available stand was not firm enough for the
second maintainer to stand properly
Improper stand
Again the crack area can
only be seen at an angle
Indirect vision to job area
Third Engineer performed the 2nd inspection on the tail
without detecting the 59 mm crack. He signed the a/c as
serviceable.
Last chance to detect the crack missed
Third Engineer could not see the crack
of 59 mm for the third occasion
Crack not seen for the third occasion
Third Engineer did not look at the back
area of the hinge where the crack was
there
Back area of hinge thirdly not looked at
The lighting in the workplace is of
lesser intensity than what is
recommended for this type of job
Improper lighting
The maintenance manual
doesn't emphasize
checking the back area of
the hinges
Improper job procedure
Third Engineer couldn’t position
himself between tail pylon and
tail rotor head so as to see at
the back of the blades hinges
Improper access once more
The available stand was not firm enough for the
the third maintainer to stand properly
Improper stand
For the third occasion,
the crack area can only
be seen at an angle
Indirect vision to job area
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Appendix I Specific Failures for the analysed 58 helicopter safety occurrences
Specific Failures Frequency Specific Failures Frequency
1. Fail to enforce regulations 12 30. Lack of parts/ equipment 5
2. Fail to provide oversight 16 31. Inadequate facilities/ materials 3
3. Fail to track performance 14 32. Insufficient operational resources 0
4. Inadequate guidance 6 33. Inadequate brief times 0
5. Poor planning 9 34. Supervisory improper manning 1
6. Task complex/ confusion 5 35. Inadequate schedule 0
7. Procedures incomplete 7 36. Improper task prioritization 0
8. Non existing procedures 19 37. Non useful information 0
9. No/ poor documentation 19 38. Unrealistic expectations 2
10 .Documents not updated 18 39. Failure to provide guidance 0
11. Alerts/ Service B. not provided 1 40. Failure to provide oversight 0
12. Documents/ CD's unusable 1 41. Failure to provide training 0
13. Conflicting information 9 42. Failure to track performance 2
14. Insufficient information 1 43. Failure to track qualifications 0
15. Documents not understandable 2 44. Failure to inspect 13
16. Practical step(s) omission 10 45. Task planning / organization 2
17. Information not available 25 46. Task delegation / assignment 1
18. Procedure sequence 1 47. Amount of supervision 0
19. Delayed informing response 1 48. No corrective actions 4
20. Purchasing failure 1 49. Documents not updated 0
21. Deficiency not corrected 4 50. Unsafe condition not reported 1
22. Modified equipment 1 51. Parts/ tools incorrectly labelled 0
23. Unserviceable/ deformed component 2 52. Known hazards not controlled 2
24. Design error 6 53. Corrective action delayed 1
25. Poor layout/ Configuration 10 54. Ignoring risks 3
26. Poor/ no accessibility 0 55. Failure to enforce rules/ SOP's 0
27. Easy to be incorrectly installed 6 56. Use of unsafe equipment 0
28. Organizational Improper manning 2 57. Use of untrained personnel 0
29. Lack/ constrains of funding 0 58. Failure to follow rules/ SOP's 1
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Appendix I Specific Failures for the analysed 58 helicopter safety occurrences (Continued)
Specific Failures Frequency Specific Failures Frequency
59. Assigned unqualified worker 1 88. Fail to correct discrepancies 0
60. Complacency 0 89. Fail to confirm messages 0
61. Distracted 2 90. Inattention to feedback 0
61. Mental fatigue 0 91. Waiver when confronted 0
63. Life stress 2 92. Peer pressure 0
64. Misplaced motivation 0 93. Maintainer emergency response 0
65. Task saturation 1 94. Maintainer system failure response 0
66. Canalized attention 0 95. Changes to routine 1
67. Peer pressure vulnerability 0 96. Different from similar tasks 0
68. General health 0 97. Team member changes 0
69. Medical illness 0 98. Disregard of constraint 0
70. Physical fatigue 0 99. Not trained for task 2
71. Circadian rhythm 0 100. Inadequate knowledge 0
72. Hearing limitations 0 101. Unrealistic training 0
73. Visual limitations 0 102. Insufficient On Job Training 1
74. Insufficient reaction time 0 103. Inadequate skills 1
75. Incompatible aptitude 0 104. New for task 2
76. Physical capability/ strength 0 105. Not certified in task 1
77. Physical reach/ size 0 106. Not certified in model 1
78. Terms not standardized 0 107. Qualification expired 0
79. Hand signal not standardized 0 108. Not licensed to operate 1
80. Documentation/ log failure 0 109. Intoxicated at work 0
81. Documentation delays 0 110. Hung over 0
82. Equipment failure (radio) 0 111. Inadequate rest 2
83. Equipment use (light / whistle) 0 112. Drug / medicine use 0
84. Inadequate brief / pass down 3 113. Night shift/ work 2
85. Inadequate shift turn-over 2 114. Night visibility 0
86. Maintainer new in group 0 115. Workspace illumination 2
87. Fail to brief / make suggestions 0 116. Inadequate flashlights 0
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Appendix I Specific Failures for the analysed 58 helicopter safety occurrences (Continued)
Specific Failures Frequency Specific Failures Frequency
117. Inadequate natural light 1 146. Vision blocked (obstacles) 6
118. Extreme temperatures 1 147. Not directly visible 4
119. Ice on equipment/ precipitation 0 148. Maintenance hindered 1
120. Visibility in rain/ snow / fog 0 149. Not easily seen / detected 1
121. Equipment / manning changes 0 150. Inadequate aircraft design 0
122. Inadequate clothing 0 151. Inadequate support equipment 1
123. Wind 1 152. workspace totally inaccessible 0
124. High noise level 0 153. Workspace partially accessible 1
125. House keeping/ cleanliness 0 154. Workspace not directly accessible 1
126. Hazardous/ toxic substances 0 155. Maintainer missed communication 2
127. Trip/ fall hazards 0 156. Loss of situational awareness 8
128. Equipment is of limited usability 0 157. Maintainer distracted / interrupted 7
129. Equipment unusable(damaged/ sub serviced) 0 158. Maintainer fail to recognise condition 21
130. Equipment gauge/ calibration error 0 159. Maintainer procedural mistakes 12
131. Unsafe equipment ( brakes / electrical) 1 160. Maintainer sequence errors 1
132. Unreliable / faulty equipment 1 161. Maintainer omitted procedural step 4
133. inoperative / uncontrollable equipment 0 162. Maintainer exceeded ability 0
134. Equipment used elsewhere 0 163. maintainer poor decision 7
135. Equipment not in inventory 0 164. Maintainer misjudgement /misperceived 5
136. Equipment unusable (inappropriate) 1 165. Maintainer misdiagnosed situation 5
137. Power sources inadequate 0 166. Maintainer improper procedures 6
138. Calibration expired 0 167. Maintainer inadequate task knowledge 11
139. Open purchase / uncertified 0 168. Maintainer inadequate process knowledge 5
140. Extended beyond service life 0 169. Maintainer inadequate aircraft knowledge 7
141. Insufficient workspace 1 170. Maintainer delayed response 0
142. Constrained position 1 171. Maintainer overuse of controls 0
143. Constrained equipment use 0 172. Maintainer inadequate skills 18
144. Insufficient manoeuvrability 0 173. Maintainer poor techniques 13
145. Vision obstructed (fog / smoke) 0 174. Maintainer improper cross check 13
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Appendix I Specific Failures for the analysed 58 helicopter safety occurrences (Continued)
Specific Failures Frequency
175. Maintainer did not follow brief 1
176. Maintainer bending of regulations/SOP's 14
177. Use of incorrect equipment (as norm) 0
178. Maintainer violated training rules 0
179. Maintainer doesn't utilize checklists 2
180. Maintainer skipped procedures 5
181. Use of incorrect parts/ materials 4
182. Maintainer violated single event to safe time 0
183. Maintainer violated to expedite mission 1
184. Use of incorrect equipment(isolated act) 2
185. Maintainer skip publication cross check 3
186. Use of incorrect parts / materials 4
187. Maintainer falsifying qualifications 1
188. Maintainer falsifying inspections 3
189. Maintainer not using required equipment 0
190. Maintainer violated under pressure 0
191. Maintainer signed off without inspection 4
192. Critical procedure skipped 2
193. Maintainer falsifying qualification (blatant) 0
194. Maintainer falsifying inspections (blatant) 1
195. Not using required equipment (blatant) 0
196. Maintainer other blatant violations 2
197. Maintainer thrill seeking 0
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Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
A Preparation for
maintenance
A-2 Aircraft documents/
Task jobcards
1 Relative a/c manuals , CD's availability / usability
2 Relative a/c manuals, CD's text clarity / meanings
3 Illustrations/ Flowcharts/ Circuit diagrams/ Tables
4 Service bulletins / A. Directives application / updating
5 Maintenance procedures, steps sequence
6 A/c logs updates / Maintenance history availability
7 H & S monitoring data / Performance data records
8 Current snags, faults clearly stated
9 Specific job cards assigned
10 Hand writing quality / Correct data entry
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
A Preparation for
maintenance
A-1 Task assignment /
Responsibility
allocation
1 Type of maintenance: scheduled / unscheduled
2 Initial fault reports / critical readings, phenomena notes
3 Task delegation / assignment : written, verbal
4 Single maintainer / team work
5 Single shift / multi-shift task
6 Familiar task / first time task
7 Time constraints / pressure
8 Second opinion needed , expected, provided
9 Task assignment overlaps / Non fixed responsibility
10 Tasks conflicts / parallel multi- system maintenance
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Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
A Preparation for
maintenance
A-3 Aircraft location /
Orientation /
Levelling
1 On station / off station / dig-out location
2 In hangar / off hangar / In workshop / under shelter
3 On runway / on taxi way / on tarmac / ground run area
4 Floor: concrete / asphalt / rocky / dusty soil / mud
5 Cleaning area / paint removing area / painting area
6 Restricted zone / open area
7 In-wind , side-wind, back-wind a/c orientation
8 A/c levelled, inclined as required, not levelled
9 Weather: temperature / wind / rain / ice / humidity
10 Space suitability for functional tests
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
A Preparation for
maintenance
A-4 Required Standard
tools / Special tools
1 Specify, provide required standard tools
2 Specify, provide required special tools
3 Criteria, know how of using special tools
4 Possibility to overlook , replace certain recommended tools
5 Tool control standards application
6 Possibility of snag carry-on due to lack of tools
7 Tools quality / standardization
8 Part(s) damage criticality if inappropriate tools are used
9 Overall number of different tools needed for the given task
10 Average number of cycles of using a single tool for this given task
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Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
A Preparation for
maintenance
A-5 Required
Equipment /
Devices / Testers
1 Specify, provide required serviceable equipment, devices, testers
2 Knowledge, skills required to use equipment, devices, testers
3 Possibility to overlook , replace certain recommended equip, devices, .
4 Number of individuals required to operate equip, devices, testers
5 Possibility of snag carry-on due to lack of equip, devices, testers
6 Equipment , devices, testers quality / standardization / calibration
7 Part(s) damage criticality if inappropriate equip, devices, are used
8 Overall number of different equip, devices needed for the given task
9 Average number of cycles of using a equip, device for this given task
10 Errors expected when using same equip, devices in various a/c types
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
A Preparation for
maintenance
A-6 Workshops /
Shelves / Parts
Stands / Hoists
1 Specify, provide required workshop benches, fixtures
2 Specify, provide appropriate stands, shelves for new / removed parts
3 Provide appropriate hoisting, handling
4 Standardized tag, label control for part(s)
5 Standardized multi-shift interface with part(s) on shelves
6 Criticality of not using required stands for larger part(s)
7 Provide required air, water, multi-voltages lines and terminals
8 Workplace gas/dust / paint stripping sucking, ventilation
9 Workplace sealing
10 Multi-workers handling, hoisting operations expected
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Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
B Maintenance
preliminary
steps
B-1 Identification of a/c
targeted systems /
parts
1 Target systems/ parts are identifiable using documented / verbal info.
2 Target components are to be identified through trial and error checks
3 Target components are to be identified using man senses e.g. visually.
4 Target a/c components are single part(s)/ multi-component systems
5 Target components are frequently / moderately / rarely maintained
6 Interfering with target a/c parts will influence other parts / systems
7 Time / efforts spent to identify the target parts, e.g. leaking points
8 Possibility of snag carry-on if target part(s) are not identified
9 Identification requires more than one maintainer working in parallel
10 Difficult/ critical identification e.g. eng. temperature overshoot period
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
B Maintenance
preliminary
steps
B-2 Aircraft Jacking /
Hoisting / Supports
1 Appropriate area for a/c ( or a/c part) jacking, hoisting, support
2 Possibility to carry maintenance without a/c jacking, hoisting, support
3 A/c must be fully/ partially jacked, hoisted, supported
4 Required a/c levelling, inclination during jacking, hoisting, supporting
5 Use of dummy undercarriage / wheels, supports
6 Number of maintainers to a/c jacking, hoisting
7 Coordination, standard procedures during a/c jacking, hoisting
8 Relevant safety measures in place
9 Possibility of other parallel works to be done on jacked / hoisted a/c
10 Length of time for the a/c to be on jacks/ hoist
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Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
B Maintenance
preliminary
steps
B-3 Required hydraulic/
pneumatic power
facilities
1 Specify , provide required hydraulic / pneumatic power, air line
2 Fluctuating / inappropriate hydraulic, pneumatic power supply
3 Possibility of conducting maintenance without hydraulic / pneumatic power supply
4 Criticality of snag carry on due to lack of hydraulic / pneumatic power supply
5 hydraulic / pneumatic gauges/ indicators are accurate / clearly readable
6 Influence of applying hydraulic / pneumatic power on other parallel maintenance
7 Noise / vibration / heat produced by hydraulic / pneumatic generators
8 Total number of co-workers required for this task utilising hydraulic / pneumatic
9 Period of using hydraulic / pneumatic supply on a/c adjustments/ maintenance
10 Efforts paid on hydraulic / pneumatic control rather than actual a/c maintenance
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
B Maintenance
preliminary
steps
B-4 Required electrical
/ radio / navigation
maintenance
facilities
1 Specify , provide required electrical / radio/ navigation maintenance devices
2 Fluctuating / inappropriate electrical supply / radio, navigation testing signals
3 Potentiality of conducting maintenance without electric, radio, navigation supplies
4 Obligation to perform maintenance without 'snag carry on' due to lack of electric, ..
5 Electric, radio, navigation gauges/ indicators are accurate / clearly readable
6 Influence of applying electric, radio, navigation devices on other parallel maintenance.
7 Noise / vibration / heat produced by electric, radio, navigation generators/ devices
8 Number of co-workers required for this task utilising electric, radio, navigation devices..
9 Period of using electric, radio, navigation devices on a/c adjustments/ maintenance.
10 Efforts paid on electric, radio, navigation control rather than actual a/c maintenance.
292
Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
B Maintenance
preliminary
steps
B-5 Needed liquids,
lubricants, fuels,
gases (llfg)
1 Specify, provide required llfg & their appropriate handling devices/ connectors
2 Fluctuating, inappropriate llfg supplies / hoses, connectors
3 Potentiality of ignoring llfg facilities and carry on maintenance without them
4 Obligation to perform immediate maintenance . restriction to 'carry on snag'
5 Gauges, meters, indicators are clearly readable
6 Containers, cylinders , connectors are clearly identifiable,/can't be confused
7 Llfg contamination, expire possibility during maintenance activity
8 Number of cycles of maintenance using llfg devices
9 Degree of difficulty, complexity of using llfg facilities during maintenance
10 Number of co-workers required
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
B Maintenance
preliminary
steps
B-6 Getting position,
using stands/
walkways
1 Influence of maintainer position on performing maintenance / inspection
2 Potentiality to not using recommended stands, walkways, proper access points
3 Impact of fixing stands, walkways on other parallel maintenance
4 Difficulty of fixing/ moving stands, walkways as a motive to not using them
5 Very confined spaces: difficult for personnel positioning /restricted movement
6 Very confined spaces: need for additional light / additional ventilation
7 Very confined spaces: difficulty to control lose items / 'on-the-way' items
8 Very confined spaces: Influence of reduced ability to work there for long time
9 Non direct positioning : need to use tool extensions, mirrors / single hand job
10 Very high / remote/ hidden parts of a/c: impact on proper maintenance/ inspection
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Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
B Maintenance
preliminary
steps
B-7 Getting access:
cowlings / covers/
access points
(ccap)
1 Specify ccap required to be opened / removed to facilitate access to target areas
2 Impact of ccap design (shape, weight) on the decision to / not to open, remove it
3 Impact of ccap design (no of fasteners / screws ) to be opened on that decision
4 Potentiality of the task to be done / finalized without opening ccap as required
5 Number of co-workers needed to open / support the required ccap
6 Influence of opening ccap on other parallel maintenance
7 Total efforts required to get access if compared with actual maintenance task
8 Potentiality of opening the wrong ccap and its influence on required maintenance
9 Applying required caution / attention / warning indicators to show removed ccap
10 Recording opened ccap / removed covers
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
B Maintenance
preliminary
steps
B-8 Initial inspection/
observations/
measurements/
checks/ hand
feel/ readings
(ior)
1 Sensitivity of initial ior when done according to scheduled / non scheduled maintenance.
2 Potentiality of error during visual inspection due to distance, orientation, light, ..
3 Potentiality of error during gauge / indicators reading due to distance, light, …
4 Potentiality of error during hand feel, noise level perception, cable tension sense .
5 Potentiality of error during flight controls movements / resistance sensing
6 Potentiality of error during initial identification of leak / vibration / smell sources
7 Potentiality of misperception of pilot-reported snags
8 Potentiality of error during initial diagnostic performance / functional tests
9 Difficulty / complexity of performing initial checks
10 Number of maintainers needed to perform initial checks
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Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
C Parts Removal /
Paints,
Sealants
Stripping
C-1 Liquids/ gases
discharge, power /
signals on-off(dpo)
1 Importance/ influence of dpo on the given maintenance job
2 Potentiality of skipping dpo due to location of/ access to relative parts, switches...
3 Complexity of performing the dpo process. / or dpo involves readings, measures..
4 Number of workers needed to perform the dpo
5 Importance of tools or equipment needed
6 Complexity of re-charging / power or signals re-set as cause to skip doing dpo
7 Potentiality of discharging/ setting (off/ on) wrong systems or subsystems
8 Potentiality of error if only partial dpo is required
9 Influence of dpo on other parallel maintenance activities/ other trades tasks
10 Time needed to perform dpo process. Number of units to be discharged…
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
C Parts Removal /
Paints,
Sealants
Stripping
C-2 Removing the ‘on-
the-way’ items
(otw)
1 Potentiality of error during deciding minimum otw items to be removed
2 Difficulty / complexity of removing otw items / number of nuts, screws, glue, …
3 Total effort required to remove the otw items as motive to ignore removing them
4 Obligation to remove otw items to facilitate performing main maintenance
5 Potentiality of errors on other systems due to removing the otw items
6 Potentiality of errors during removing otw items due to tools, space, positioning..
7 Potentiality of removed otw items to be forgotten if not recorded / indicated
8 Number of maintainers needed to remove otw items / multi-trade interference
9 Potentiality of error when not using guiding marks /pre-adjustments records
10
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Appendix J
Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
C Parts Removal /
Paints,
Sealants
Stripping
C-3 Removing targeted
items (parts /
cables / pipes /
lines) (ti)
1 Potentiality of error during deciding minimum ti to be removed
2 Difficulty / complexity of removing ti. / number of fasteners/ nuts / screws / glue
3 Total effort required to remove ti as motive to ignore removing them if possible
4 Obligation to remove ti to facilitate performing main maintenance
5 Potentiality of errors on other systems due to removing the ti.
6 Potentiality of errors during removing ti due to tools, space, positioning, design
7 Potentiality of removed ti items to be forgotten if not recorded / indicated
8 Number of maintainers needed to remove ti / multi-trade interference
9 Potentiality of later errors if guiding marks / pre-adjustments records are not used
10
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
C Parts Removal
/ Paints,
Sealants
Stripping
C-4 Stripping paint /
sealants (ps)
1 Potentiality of error during deciding minimum area of paint / seal to be stripped
2 Difficulty / complexity of stripping ps / use of chemicals, physical means
3 Total effort required to strip ps as motive to ignore stripping them if possible
4 Obligation to strip ps to facilitate performing main maintenance
5 Potentiality of errors on other systems, parts due to stripping the ps.
6 Potentiality of errors during stripping ps due to tools, space, positioning, design
7 Potentiality of stripped areas to be forgotten if not recorded / indicated
8 Number of maintainers needed to do the stripping / multi-trade interference
9 Potentiality of later errors due to stripping errors e.g surface scratched before NDI
10 Potentiality of stripping errors if non-authorised chemicals, solvents are used
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Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
C Parts
Removal /
Paints,
Sealants
Stripping
C-5 Applying covers/
seals/ fixtures/
supports (csfs)
1 Potentiality to ignore applying csfs due to difficulty/ short maintenance time, …
2 Potentiality to forget applying csfs due to remoteness/ hidden / smallness of parts
3 Number of maintainers needed to apply csfs
4 Possibility of error during selecting right type of csfs
5 Total efforts required to apply csfs as motive to skip applying them
6 Potentiality of applied csfs to be forgotten if not indicated or recorded
7 Possibility of not applying csfs if not clearly stated in procedures
8 Potentiality of the seal / cover to be sucked, dropped accidentally into the system
9 Possibility of using non-authorised types of csfs
10 Potentiality of affecting other systems / other parallel maintenance
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
C Parts Removal /
Paints,
Sealants
Stripping
C-6 Applying red
indicators /
removed parts
warnings (iw)
1 Potentiality to ignore applying iw due to difficulty/ short maintenance time, …
2 Potentiality to forget applying iw due to remoteness/ hidden / smallness of parts
3 Error when deciding if separate iw are needed in addition to (red) csfs
4 Possibility of the applied iw to be loosened, dropped , wind-washed away
5 Total efforts required to apply iw as motive to skip applying them
6 Potentiality of applied iw to be forgotten if not recorded
7 Possibility of not applying iw if not clearly stated in procedures
8 Potentiality of the iw to be sucked, dropped accidentally into the system
9 Possibility of using non-authorised types of iw
10 Potentiality of affecting other systems / other parallel maintenance
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Maintenance Error Root Causes Existence Scale (RCES) – 870 Assessment Criteria – Design Practice (Excerpts)
(Continued)
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
C Parts Removal /
Paints,
Sealants
Stripping
C-7 Apply shelf
control / use
bags, tags,
labels (btl)
1 Potentiality to ignore using btl if number of removed items e.g nuts, bolts is small
2 Potentiality to ignore using btl if expected time before re-installation is small
3 Potentiality to issue bad quality btl if the target parts involve oily/greasy context
4 Potentiality of ignoring btl in very confined, remote, high sections of the a/c
5 Potentiality of not using btl when probability of parts inter-confusion is low
6 Potentiality of not using btl if target parts are v. familiar (frequently maintained)
7 Potentiality of leaving loose screws, bolts attached to removed cowlings/ parts
8 Potentiality of not using proper shelf control if maintenance is done out of hanger
9 Potentiality of ignoring btl if the target parts are to go immediately to other step
10 Impact of task complexity/ length (multi-shift) in small parts/ btl confusion
Main Task Sub Task Assessment Criteria
C Parts Removal /
Paints,
Sealants
Stripping
C-8 Recording removed
/ loosened /altered
parts (rrl)
1 Potentiality of not recording v familiar frequently removed parts.
2 Potentiality to forget recording if maintenance is to be performed off- hangar
3 Potentiality to forget recording if a by side-part is only to be partially loosened
4 Potentiality not to record removed item if only slight work is to be done on it
5 Number of small removed parts as motive not to record all of them
6 Potentiality not to record if there is no provision for reporting in the a/c log pages
7 Local oily / greasy / compact context as a motive to delay then forget recording
8 Mutual misunderstanding of who is to record if task is a team work job
9 Potentiality of keeping 'only' voluntary personal notes if task is so complicated
10 Tendency to ignore recording small removed items if not fully stated in procedure
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Appendix K
Theory of Fuzzy Sets
Definitions:
A. Fuzzy set:
 Nahmias (1978) cited the definition of a fuzzy set, first given by Zadeh (1965), as: “A
generalized characteristic function, that is, one which varies uniformly between zero
and one rather than merely assuming the two values of zero and one. Intermediate
values give grades of membership of various points in the set, higher values implying a
higher grade of membership.”
 Cox (1999) graphically defines a fuzzy set as: “A curve that encodes the imprecision
or fuzziness associated with a phenomenon through its surface. The shape of the
curve , in fact, represents the semantics of the actual concept.” Graphically this can
be illustrated in Figure 8.1.
 A more current definition of a
fuzzy set is given by Mares
(2006) as: “ A mathematical
model of vague qualitative or
quantitative data, frequently
generated by means of the
natural language. The model is
based on the generalization of
the classical concepts of set
and its characteristic function.” Figure 1 The structure of a fuzzy set (Cox 1999)
 “A fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership. Such a
set is characterized by a membership (characteristic) function, which assigns to each
object a grade of membership ranging between zero and one” (Kahraman et al.
2003). It can be seen from Figure 1 that a fuzzy set is generally composed of:
i. A horizontal axis representing the domain of monotonically increasing real
numbers which map the fuzzy population.
ii. A vertical axis of values between 0 and 1.0 that give the amplitude (degree) of
the membership in the given fuzzy set.
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iii. The surface of the fuzzy set itself represented by the set curve which connects an
element in the domain with its corresponding degree of membership in the set.
B. Membership function μ(x):
Also known as the characteristic or truth function of a fuzzy set.
 Cox (1999) interpreted the membership function of a fuzzy set as: “ A measure of
the compatibility between a value from the domain and the idea underlying the
fuzzy set” .
C: Interval of confidence:
Kaufmann and Gopta (1985) wrote: “The interval of confidence is one way of reducing
the uncertainty of using lower and upper bounds”. This concept can thus be used to
“treat the uncertainty with whatever information is available”, Objective (e.g. a sought
dimension is surely to be between two measured values) or subjective (e.g. when
information is based on
experience or expert opinion).
The interval of confidence, as a
concept can be further illustrated
by Figure 2. This vital concept
simply implies that the value of
the given uncertain phenomenon,
which is represented by the fuzzy
set in the figure, lies definitely in
an interval of confidence
between the values of ‘a’ and ‘c’, Figure 2 Interval of confidence of a fuzzy set
with the most probable exact value
describing this phenomenon expected at
point ‘b’.
D: Normal fuzzy sets
 Kaufmann and Gopta (1988)
Defined a normal fuzzy set as: ‘A
fuzzy set A  R is normal if it
maximum membership function value is 1, Figure 3 A typical normal fuzzy set
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where R is the set of natural numbers’. This is given mathematically as:
ν μA (x) = 1 , also written as: Max (μA (x)) = 1 . This is shown in Figure 3.
E: Convex fuzzy sets:
Kaufmann and Gopta (1985) Defined a convex fuzzy set as :
“A fuzzy set A  R is convex
if and only if every ordinary
subset (within the fuzzy set) that
is given by S = {x: μS(x) ≥  }
,   [0,1] is convex, that is, if
it is a closed interval of R. This is
given graphically by Figure 4. It
can be observed from the figure
that a convex fuzzy set may or
may not be a normal fuzzy set.
Figure 4 A typical convex fuzzy set
F: Fuzzy Numbers
 “ Fuzzy numbers are sets that represent an approximate numeric quantity. These are
convex fuzzy sets”.(Cox 1999)
 “A fuzzy number is a fuzzy subset in R which is both normal and convex”
(Kaufmann and Gopta 1988 ). Figure 5 represent a typical fuzzy number.
It is thus seen that a fuzzy
number A represents a given
uncertain phenomena in accordance
with the curve described by a
membership function μA(x), the
interval of confidence being a value
in R between ‘a’ and ‘c’, and the
most expected value of A is sought
at ‘b’.
Figure 5 A typical fussy number A
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Appendix L:
First Page of ErroDetect V.1.12 – Workplace Software as Being Applied Within Industry at The Selected MRO Organization
Maintenance Error Main Causal Factor A : Organizational Processes
Enter
Enter Initial Assessment of Criteria As Being OF: Criteria's
1.V. Weak Influence 2.Weak Influence 3.Moderate Influence 4.High Influence 5.Absolute Influence Degree
Give Initial Assessment Only To Those Criteria That Apply To The Maintenance Line Under Investigation Of
Influence
Sub-Causal Factor A-1: Regulations Enforcement Here▼ KI K2 K3
POE due to non-conformity with international regulations governing maintenance activities within workplace 1 0.5 1 1.5
POE due to non-conformity with internal regulations governing maintenance activities within workplace 2 1 1.5 2
POE because maintainers don't quite understand regulations 3 1.5 2 2.5
POE because regulations are not readily available within workplace zone for the maintainers to observe 4 2 2.5 3
POE because regulations are not regularly explained to maintainers (e.g. in separate training sessions) 3 1.5 2 2.5
POE because there are no definite regulation-enforcement activities that are active part of the quality / SMS 3 1.5 2 2.5
POE because there is no definite independent unit responsible for regulation-enforcement within workplace 1 0.5 1 1.5
POE because some regulations may be overlooked by maintainers sometimes as parts of common norms 2 1 1.5 2
No previous cases of definite punishments (various levels) against regulations-breakers so others may learn 1 0.5 1 1.5
No definite innovative initiatives/ updating activities regarding regulation enforcement are there (managmnt) 3 1.5 2 2.5
Total number of criteria checked for this subtask 10 11.5 16.5 21.5
Average representative fuzzy number for this subtask 1.15 1.65 2.15
Primary index of error potentiality for this subtask (1st order) 1.65
1.15 1.65 2.15
Sub-Causal Factor A-2: Oversight Provision
Lack of the overall understanding of the importance of oversight (within management and even maintainers) 2 1 1.5 2
Oversight provision is not assigned as a definite responsibility to a definite unite/ team within the line/MRO 3 1.5 2 2.5
Oversight activities are conducted as part of the regulations only, no further overtopping initiatives are there 3 1.5 2 2.5
Lack of quality assurance activities (e.g. quality audits, technical records, standards, etc) 1 0.5 1 1.5
Lack of quality control (A/c inspections, shop inspections, material inspections, NDT/ NDI calibrations, etc) 1 0.5 1 1.5
Lack of program reliability (data control, preliminary investigations, alerts notices, results monitoring,etc) 1 0.5 1 1.5
Lack of maintenance safety (safety program, health matters, safety equipment,etc) 2 1 1.5 2
Lack or inconsistence of periodic oversight activities from external bodies (regulators, higher management) 2 1 1.5 2
Lack or inconsistence of random oversight activities from external bodies (regulators, higher management) 2 1 1.5 2
Lack of oversight results feedback to middle-management and to maintainers in order to learn and develop 3 1.5 2 2.5
Total number of criteria checked for this subtask 10 10 15 20
Average representative fuzzy number for this subtask 1 1.5 2
Primary index of error potentiality for this subtask (1st order) 1.5
1 1.5 2
